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FOREWORD
On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the
Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke
University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security
co-sponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
The conference examined transnational threats, including
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, cyber
threats to the national infrastructure, and international
organized crime. The goal was to evaluate the seriousness of
such threats and discuss strategies for dealing with them.
In particular, the conference sought to address the question
of how military and law enforcement could blend their
strategies to better counter transnational threats. A
secondary purpose was to clarify the role of the military in
meeting challenges that transcend national borders and
threaten our national interests.
This book highlights some of the main issues and themes
that ran through the conference. After looking at the
various threats and undertaking a risk assessment, the
book considers the unique aspects of transnational threats,
and then identifies the key challenges facing the United
States, paying particular attention to the role of the
military. To conclude, the book discusses some of the steps
that should be taken to secure ourselves against
transnational threats. The Strategic Studies Institute is
pleased to publish this volume as a contribution to the
debate on important national security issues.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Carolyn W. Pumphrey
On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the
Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke
University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security
cosponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
The conference examined transnational threats, including
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
cyber threats to the national infrastructure, and
international organized crime. The goal was to evaluate the
seriousness of such threats and discuss strategies for
dealing with them. In particular, the conference sought to
address the question of how military and law enforcement
could blend their strategies to better counter transnational
threats. A secondary purpose, as noted by Major General
Robert H. Scales, Jr., at the start of the meeting, was to
clarify the role of the military in meeting challenges that
transcend national borders and threaten our national
interests.
Transnational threats are major security threats for the
21st century. They are characterized by their global nature,
which means, by definition, that these threats straddle both
the domestic and foreign spheres. Whereas responsibility
for U.S. national security threats in the past clearly
belonged to the military and responsibility for domestic
security belonged to law enforcement, these clear-cut
divisions no longer exist. This poses some profound
constitutional and security challenges. On the one hand,
institutions that have developed separately must now learn
to work closely together and to blend their strategies in
order to ensure our nation’s security. On the other hand, the
division of military and law enforcement functions is closely
linked to the preservation of our liberties, and the task of
1

merging them is fraught with hazards. In the very act of
preserving our security, we run the risk of forfeiting some of
our liberties. Blending law enforcement and the military is
thus a vital but dangerous balancing act.
This introduction will synthesize some of the main
findings of the conference participants and attendees. After
looking at the various threats and undertaking a risk
assessment, we will consider the unique aspects of
transnational threats. We will then identify the key
challenges facing the United States, paying particular
attention to the role of the military. To conclude, we will
discuss some of the steps that should be taken to secure
ourselves against transnational threats.
A Threat Assessment.
Our starting point must be to evaluate the nature of the
threats we face. Only when we understand what is at stake
can we determine what we can put at risk.
Terrorism entails the use of psychological warfare to
achieve political goals. The perpetrator of an act of
terrorism lacks the legitimacy of a nation-state or other
recognized political entity. Terrorism is thus usually
(though not inevitably) classified as a crime. Contemporary
terrorist networks typically are not state-sponsored. A
number of terrorist acts have been perpetrated by sub-state
groups, and individual terrorism is also a potential problem.
The aims and objectives of contemporary terrorists are often
unclear. In part, this is the result of deliberate policy on
their part; anonymity enables them to capitalize on the fear
and alarm generated by their violence. Their organizations
are also far more amorphous than was typical of traditional
terrorist groups, making them harder to retaliate against
than in the past.
Terrorists today have a frightening capability in that
they can now get access to (or manufacture) nuclear,
biological, and chemical WMD. In the estimation of Bruce
2

Hoffman, they are not likely to resort to the use of such
weapons for a variety of reasons. In part, it is because such
weapons cost a lot to acquire, test, and manage. In part, it is
because terrorists can achieve their goals just as effectively
by using more traditional weapons. They must also consider
the possibility that they will alienate public sympathy if
they inflict massive casualties. Hoffman argues that the
more likely threat may come from an unconventional
chemical, biological, or radiological weapon built on a
deliberately small scale. Such an attack would generate just
the right amount of alarm and fear to serve the purposes of
the terrorists.
Given these realities, the threat of terrorism involving
WMD is, in Hoffman’s view, less than generally assumed.
While rapid technological innovation and opposition to
perceived U.S. hegemony suggest that future terrorist use
of WMD cannot be precluded, his estimate is that the threat
is currently somewhat exaggerated. His assessment is not,
it should be noted, fully shared by commentators Jeffrey
Addicott and Victor Utgoff. In their estimation, remote
though it may be, the mere chance that such a catastrophic
incident might take place, makes terrorism by WMD a
threat of considerable magnitude.
Cyber threats come in two varieties: information
warfare and cyber-crime. Both threats are directed against
the U.S. information infrastructure. The distinction
between the two types derives from the intent of the
perpetrator. If the attacks are carried out with the intent to
disrupt or undermine the government, they constitute war.
If, by contrast, they are carried out for reasons of personal or
organizational gain, they are crimes.
Dan Kuehl and commentators Richard Marshall and
Phillip Lacombe all stressed the seriousness of these
threats. The national information infrastructure is of
critical and growing importance to American economic
strength, political vitality, national will, and military
power. Cyber attacks, especially if they take place in the
3

context of more conventional military hostilities directed
against the United States, have the potential to do
enormous damage. Cyber crimes, too, can be immensely
costly. Even if a hacker is penetrating systems for
amusement rather than out of deliberate malice, the
damage can be considerable. Our increasing dependence on
cyberspace makes the United States vulnerable, especially
as the private sector owns and controls much of the medium.
We are also at risk because we awoke to the threat relatively
late, because technology is changing at a pace unmatched in
earlier times, and because the environment is a new one.
The revolutionary new environment obliges the United
States to revise many of our traditional paradigms before
we can develop effective strategies. As a result, we find
ourselves less well prepared to deal with these threats than
with many others.
Organized crime is defined by Phil Williams as the
continuation of business by criminal means. It is
characterized by association for criminal purposes,
corruption, and violence. The international criminal
organizations of today are larger in size, scope, and power
than those of earlier times. Their composition is
increasingly multi-ethnic, and the criminals are showing a
growing ability to cooperate among themselves. Many
organizations have tremendous resources. They have
tapped into the new opportunities presented by the
internationalization of trade, finance, and communication.
They are adaptable and flexible. They show an ability to
exploit states in direct relationship to their vulnerabilities
and have a flair for minimizing the risks to themselves.
From the standpoint of the United States, we are not, in
Phil Williams’ estimate, in direct danger. Organized crime
thrives best where the state is weak and corrupt; the United
States serves rather as a host-state, i.e., a state which offers
good markets. Inasmuch as the intention of organized
criminals is to exploit and manipulate the United States
rather than destroy it, the threat is limited. As Tom Fuentes
puts it, it is not in the interest of a leech to kill the blood
4

donor. But the threat is certainly not one that can be
ignored. Organized crime threatens the stability of
strategically important states by instigating corruption and
eroding, if not supplanting, legitimate governments. This is
no mean threat when we are dealing with states like those of
the former Soviet Union that have a nuclear capability. And
the profits from organized crime can also be used to bankroll
other dangerous groups, including terrorists. Finally, as
both James McDonough and William Olson emphasize,
drug trafficking in this country exacts an immense human
and financial toll.
Two features shared by all of these threats significantly
add to the risk they pose. On the one hand, they are
transnational and, on the other hand, they are products of
the information age. These characteristics enhance their
capabilities, obscure their intentions, and increase our
vulnerabilities.
Information age technologies provide organized
criminals, hackers, and other enemies with all the
advantages that the rest of us also enjoy, including greater
organizational flexibility and the ability to hide. The
transnational nature of the threat creates jurisdictional
complications which play into the hands of our enemies,
permitting them to escape from justice, put their money in
safekeeping, and minimize the risk to themselves in a
variety of ways. The intentions of the perpetrators of
transnational threats are also harder to determine than has
typically been true. While the reasons for this are complex,
one explanation lies in the anonymity offered by the
Internet. This complicates our task because until we know
what harm is intended us, it is hard for us to accurately
measure the threat or choose the appropriate response.
Open access to information provided by the new electronic
environment has eroded some of the relative advantages the
United States once enjoyed as a result of our effective
intelligence-gathering capabilities. We also find ourselves
handicapped because we are currently organized to deal
with threats that clearly emanate from foreign or domestic
5

enemies. We are also conceptually oriented towards a
different kind of operational environment.
If the peculiar nature of transnational threats emerged
clearly from conference discussions, so, too, did the absence
of real consensus as to which pose the most serious risks.
This in and of itself is something of a problem since we do not
have infinite resources to apply to the problem. As Bruce
Hoffman noted, we are in danger of miscalculating danger.
We risk either needlessly eroding our liberties or wasting
valuable resources.
Challenges.
Balancing Security and Liberty. The heart of the
challenge that faces us is how to deal with transnational
threats and still preserve our liberties. Transnational
threats are characterized by their global nature. They pose
both unique security problems and profound constitutional
challenges. A variety of protections exist in the United
States that have historically prevented the growth of
“tyranny.” Protection of privacy and clear limits to military
authority are among the most cherished of our liberties.
However, in the face of transnational threats, these liberties
sometimes seem to tie our hands. Were we less protective of
our privacy, we might be better able to track our enemies;
we might, for example, be able to conduct surveillance using
electronic means. This, however, would bring us closer to a
world dominated by an Orwellian Big Brother. Again, we
fear to use the military to counter the terrorist threat
because we fear that this might lead to the loss of civilian
control of the military. And yet the military is perhaps best
equipped financially, organizationally, and strategically to
minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. We face,
that is, a twofold threat. If we underestimate the threats, we
run the risk of serious, even catastrophic danger. If we
overestimate them, we run the risk of sacrificing our
liberties. If we are anything less than rational and objective
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in our cost/benefit analysis, we may end up doing more
harm than good.
This is not to say that preservation of liberties and
maintenance of our security are incompatible. As Elizabeth
Rindskopf-Parker stresses, the historical record makes it
clear that it is possible to find a balance between the need for
security and the need for protection. Not all of the limits
that constrain us, moreover, are writ in stone. Some are
products of recent times and specific circumstances, and can
be circumvented. Provided that we understand the
purposes behind our laws and remain true to them, we can
adapt ourselves to the new circumstances.
Coming to Terms with a New Environment. The second
major challenge of our time is how to cope with a new
operational environment. We must move swiftly to adapt
our institutions to the needs of the day. We are not really
organized to deal with transnational threats. Nor do we
have a doctrine that reflects the realities of today’s threats.
U.S. national defense bears the imprint of the industrial
era, when technologies were far less complex and when
nation-states and clearly defined national boundaries were
the hallmark of political life. The speed with which we move,
develop technologies, formulate plans, or anything else, is
geared to slower times. Mechanisms that once served to
resolve conflict, gather information, or use force are now
outdated. One might think here of diplomatic frameworks,
procedures, and protocols developed in an era of sovereign
states, of intelligence-gathering organizations structured to
meet the needs of the Cold War, or of education and training
designed to equip leaders for warfare in the industrial age.
The very way we conceptualize is out of date. We are
culturally unprepared to see attacks on information
systems as problems in the same league as attacks involving
the pulsation of violence. Much of our vocabulary is obsolete.
Traditional definitions do not fit the realities of conflict in
the information age. War, for example, traditionally has
been understood as armed and violent conflict between
7

political entities. An essential ingredient is believed to be
force or the pulsation of violence. Under international law,
war is legitimate only if it is fought defensively, that is, in
response to an attack. In the information age, however, we
may suffer catastrophic damage from “attacks” that do not
involve the use of force. If we do not know and have not
clearly articulated what does or not constitute an attack,
how can we respond in an appropriate fashion? At the very
least, an absence of clear doctrine and definitions prevents
us from acting with assurance and consistency.
Uncomfortable Partnerships. This point closely
correlates to the previous one. The changing nature of
transnational threats has made it imperative that we
achieve greater cooperation at many levels—national and
local, national and international, military and law
enforcement, private and public. Central to the theme of
this conference is the need to blend law enforcement and
military strategies. The control of our communication
networks by the private sector means that it must be a
partner in our national defense. Similarly, cooperation
between nations is vital if we are to cope with threats that,
by definition, cross borders.
The challenge stems from the fact that, for a variety of
reasons, such cooperation is fraught with difficulties. For
one thing, it goes against the grain. Business is wary of an
alliance with government, fearing that it will lead to
regulation or to loss of profits. The American public is
traditionally mistrustful of government; as Richard
Marshall points out, the average citizen would rather let an
American company intrude into its computer systems than
any of the Federal agencies, even though the latter are far
more carefully monitored. Intelligence and law enforcement
agencies have a history of rivalry and very distinct cultures.
Their processes do not work the same way, making the
development of joint strategies quite difficult. In particular,
they answer to different authorities and use their
information in different ways. Law enforcement is
primarily interested in prosecution, whereas the goal of
8

intelligence is to collect information in order to preempt
threats. Additionally, many of the barriers that exist
between agencies are the result of carefully thought out
legal considerations and should be dismantled only with
caution. As for international cooperation, this is made
tricky by the fact that our bedfellows are not always
long-standing friends. Moreover, international law is still in
its infancy, and working with an infinite number of laws and
jurisdictions at the least complicates the task of joint
operations.
While these are certainly challenging problems, they are
not insurmountable. The uneasy nature of the partnerships
stems in part from the fact that different communities do
not understand one another very well; as Elizabeth
Rindskopf-Parker points out, they are sometimes more
suspicious of one another than is warranted. Familiarity
may breed respect. On a slightly different note, we should
not forget that culture is formed and what has been formed
can be reformed or unformed. If we examine our institutions
and work out why things are the way they are, we can safely
modify those aspects that are not logical. When dealing with
the business world the government has leverage; the safety
of our networks is clearly of critical importance to their
well-being. And we should never forget that for many
companies, government is their biggest consumer. As to
working with the international community, it should be
noted that if there are obstacles in our way, there are also a
number of factors which should facilitate our task. First and
foremost is the fact that almost all stand to benefit by the
elimination of transnational threats.
Resources. Resource limits pose yet another challenge.
Our armed services, as Jeffrey Addicott emphasizes, are
already stretched thin by their existing missions. The
United States must deal with transnational threats, which
are widely dispersed. We also face a rather different kind of
shortage. Our national security very much depends on
getting access to the finest technological minds of the day,
but competition with the business sector has led to a brain
9

drain from the public to the private sector. Our financial
resources are similarly strained. Some organized criminal
groups in particular are extraordinarily wealthy. William
Olson notes that drug traffickers earn more every year than
the United States spends on all of its counter drug efforts.
The annual income of these and other criminal
organizations is frequently greater than that of many
governments around the world.
Our challenge is to find ways to use our existing
resources wisely, minimizing waste and duplication of
effort, and balancing all our disparate needs. The American
public, ironically, may complicate this task. William Natter
and Bruce Hoffman both address this issue. Our
government is responsive to public demands. The public is,
however, often reactive and emotional. It seems to have
overreacted to the terrorist threat and quite possibly
under-reacted to the cyber threat. When sufficiently
aroused, public opinion can put pressure on the government
to allocate resources in ways that are not necessarily
balanced. We must find ways both to evaluate threats in a
sober and logical manner and to accommodate, but not
manipulate, the public fears.
The Role of the Military.
One of the goals of the conference was to consider what
role the military should play in the struggle against
transnational threats. As already noted, the ambiguities of
the situation stem from the fact that transnational threats
are neither uniquely foreign nor domestic. Terrorism
always treads a fine line between crime and war.
International organized crime is still largely a law and order
problem as far as the United States is concerned, but
indirectly touches on issues of national security.
Information warfare and cyber terrorism are even more
nebulous since they do not involve the use of force as this
term is classically understood. But because of what a cyber
attack can do to our national security, it often seems more
10

like an act of war than a crime. In all cases, moreover,
jurisdictional and geographic boundaries are crossed by
perpetrators of the threats, and networks operate both
within and outside the United States.
How extensive the role of the military should be is clearly
a matter of debate. For a number of reasons, many feel that
the responsibilities for transnational threats should not
rest primarily with our armed forces. Phil Williams makes
the point that force is often “a blunt instrument”—too blunt
to use against criminal organizations which are businesses
and which should be hit where businesses can be hurt most
(in their purses). Military organizations, moreover, are
organized hierarchically and, as such, are not well suited to
dealing with networks. Spike Bowman makes the point that
the use of force (as for example the launching of missiles
against Afghanistan) is a narrow way to respond to a
problem and not particularly useful against such dispersed
threats. He also points out that the use of force is not likely
to be universally acceptable in the international community
and thus is not going to carry the weight of other solutions.
Jeffrey Addicott raises a quite different concern: the
military forces of the United States are currently overtaxed
and, even if they are well equipped to deal with these
threats in principle, in practice they will not be of much use.
These rather pragmatic arguments are reinforced by legal
considerations. Since Reconstruction and the enactment of
the Posse Comitatus Act, the active duty military has been
prohibited from performing police duties in the United
States.
This does not mean, however, that the military has no
role to play. Dan Roper distinguishes between a leading role
and a supporting role for the Department of Defense (DoD).
The leading role must be taken only where national security
is at stake. Most transnational threats do not fall into this
category. An exception may prove to be information
warfare. At the moment cyber threats fall into a shady area
between crime and war, and our definitional ambiguities
cloud our ability to assign clear responsibility to the DoD.
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But, as Dan Kuehl stresses, cyberspace is critical to
America’s security and well-being. In his view, at least, the
DoD has both a role and a responsibility, albeit in
conjunction and cooperation with law enforcement and the
private sector, to protect this environment from all enemies,
foreign and domestic. If we do conclude that this type of
transnational threat is a mission for the DoD, one of its
tasks will be to develop suitable new strategies. General
Kenneth Minihan, for example, notes that the military
might think about defending U.S. strategic sanctuaries by
asynchronous means, developing an equivalent of our Cold
War deterrent strategies.
For the most part, the military is likely to play a
supporting role only, where the primary initiative and
responsibility lies elsewhere. How this might work in detail
is well illustrated by Addicott, who notes current plans to
use the military in counter-terrorism. In these plans, state
and local authorities still have primary responsibility to
respond to emergencies within their jurisdiction, but can get
extensive assistance from DoD in the event of a WMD
attack. Addicott also discusses plans for the use of the
National Guard and Army Reserves as primary response
forces to a WMD episode. As he points out, the reserve
components are not subject to the same legal constraints as
the regular military.
In general, conference participants agreed that the
military has much to contribute. It can provide
transportation, emergency medical care, and translators. It
can assist in large-scale disaster relief and humanitarian
operations. It can play a constructive part in the interdiction
of drugs and criminal products and make useful
contributions in the area of intelligence. It can provide
training to other agencies; the 1996 Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (also known as the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici [NLD] Act), which envisions the use
of DoD personnel to help local metropolitan authorities
respond to a WMD event, is an example of this kind of
thinking. Finally, the DoD has developed useful concepts
12

and functional strategic approaches. It has developed
models for jointness which could provide very useful
insights to other groups as they seek to learn how to work
together. It already has provided a model which has
modified the way law enforcement understands
intelligence.
Overall, however, there was considerable agreement
among conference participants that the role of the military
in dealing with transnational threats should be a limited
one. In their view, the experience of the military is its most
valuable asset. And, except when dealing with information
warfare, it should play a supporting rather than a leading
role.
Agenda.
The purpose of the conference was to define the nature of
transnational threats and to consider how best to meet
these threats. The conference participants offered a number
of general principles as guidelines for action as well as a
number of concrete proposals. These, interestingly, fit
rather well with some of the programs and strategies that
are already being implemented by the government. The
chapters by Jeffrey Hunker, David Crane, and Jeffrey
Addicott, in particular, reflect this.
As far as principles are concerned, six stand out.
1. Widespread agreement exists that speed is vital. The
hallmark of the information age is an extraordinarily rapid
rate of change. To maintain our current edge, we must move
faster than we have in the past in addressing a range of
tasks, from fiscal planning to technological retooling.
2. Adaptability is another key requirement. This
relates to the previous point; situations evolve so quickly
that we do not have time to undertake massive
restructuring of existing bureaucracies. Rather, we should
develop flexible plans and make use of assets already in
existence.
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3. Jointness. Existing barriers between agencies and
between the public and private sectors must be reduced.
4. Clear thinking is another essential ingredient for
success. Until we gain a clear conceptual grasp of the nature
of conflict in the information age, we will not be able to
develop clear strategies, and our responses are doomed to be
fragmented, indecisive, and even contradictory.
5. Creativity. Given the new operational environment
in which we move, it is imperative that we do what
Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker calls out-of-the-box thinking.
6. Finally, it is essential that we keep within the
bounds of the law, whatever the temptations might be to
cut corners for security’s sake.
Proposals for Action.
Suggestions as to how to improve our abilities to deal
with transnational threats are too numerous to list in their
entirety, but a few deserve mention because they were
frequently reiterated in the course of the meeting.
Interestingly enough, one of the points to emerge quite
strongly and from a variety of sources was the need to be
respectful of the law. This is significant, because as danger
looms large, it is easy to betray this principle. The fact
remains, however, that remaining true to our constitutional
principles at home and fostering democratic principles and
the rule of law abroad are likely to serve us well; they garner
respect for agencies like the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and will ultimately help address the root
causes of international violence and crime. Corruption, it
was noted, is the soil in which crime grows, and terrorism is
rarely, if ever, the tool used by democratic states.
Along similar lines, it was noted that international law
and diplomacy promise to offer some real advantages over
the use of force as a means of countering transnational
threats. At the moment, however, many existing
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mechanisms for conflict resolution are geared to the
existence of sovereign states. As a result, in the borderless
environment that characterizes transnational threats, it is
often extremely difficult to know with whom, or in what
manner, to carry on negotiations. It is clearly imperative
that we develop avenues of conflict resolution that better
reflect current realities.
A number of recommendations were made as to how to
make better use of our limited financial resources. At the
top of the list was the call for improved financial planning.
The government lacks a clear plan outlining how to deal
with transnational threats and establishing logical
priorities. As a result, spending by Congress tends to be
reactive, directed against whatever threat is in the
headlines rather than to the best programs. Research and
Development tends to be market-driven. Steps should be
taken to ensure that resources are applied in such a way as
to address specific weaknesses. Special attention should be
paid to meeting our technology needs. On a slightly different
note, international financial controls should be established
to make it harder for criminals to transfer money. This
would make their activities less lucrative and not only hit
them where it hurts—in their purses—but would undercut
some of the resource advantages they currently enjoy.
Another theme to emerge with clarity was the need for
rather substantial organizational reform. Conference
participants here targeted the U.S. intelligence community.
There was considerable agreement that its current
structure prevents it from dealing with transnational
threats in anything other than a fragmented and patchwork
way. There was less agreement as to what to do about this.
Some participants suggested a massive restructuring along
the lines of the National Security Act of 1947. Others felt
that this would not be feasible, given the entrenched nature
of the existing bureaucracy. They recommended a more
remedial approach such as opening up lines of
communication between the different government agencies.
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The need for planning and vision was another theme to
emerge with frequency. Congress needs to be given a plan
for how to deal with transnational threats. This should be
clear, comprehensive, and well crafted. This will make it
less susceptible to pressure groups and be proactive rather
than reactive in how it handles threats. The government
also needs to be able to present to industry a vision of our
national security needs. And the military must continue in
its efforts to develop flexible plans capable of meeting
rapidly evolving threats. These plans must be based on new
and more fitting paradigms of war. On a rather different
note, James McDonough raised an important point when he
spoke of the need to develop an operational approach that
would integrate regional and local efforts into a larger
strategic effort.
The importance of education and training was also
recognized. Several initiatives were identified as being of
value and in need of further development. Jeffrey Hunker
noted the existence of several pilot programs designed to
bring into the federal government a cadre of highly skilled
information technology security professionals, including
the creative scholarship for service program whose purpose
is to attract young people to careers in this area. Spike
Bowman noted some interesting programs that are being
undertaken to train other nations in investigative
techniques so that they may be better able to assist us in our
common efforts to combat international organized crime.
The conference participants also stressed the value of
education. Federal authorities, it was agreed, need to be
educated so that they more fully understand the nature of
the threats with which they are dealing. And for many
participants public education was also a priority; suggested
initiatives included introducing courses on Transnational
Threats to university curriculums.
Last, but not least, was the call for cooperation. This
indeed may be viewed as the keynote of the conference. If we
are to deal effectively with the problem of countering
transnational threats, we must find ways to bring about
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more effective cooperation among a whole host of different
entities: cooperation between state and local government,
between business and government, between federal
agencies, and among nations.
Strongly emphasized was the need to forge an effective
partnership between the public and private sectors. This is
crucial because the private sector now controls a very high
percentage of our communications networks and because
business often has cutting-edge skills which we need if we
are to maintain our technological superiority. Such
cooperation should be based on an understanding of the
mutual benefits that will accrue from a secure Internet and
might come about as a result of the development of new
types of institutions combining public and private groups in
innovative ways.
Cooperation among defense, intelligence, and law
enforcement must be improved. Threat analysis, warning,
incident response, and investigation would all benefit from
serious efforts in this area. Preliminary steps have been
taken; the National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC), intrusion detection monitoring systems, and
information sharing and analysis centers referred to by
Jeffrey Hunker, are examples of programs that are being
discussed or have been initiated. All could be improved. To
ensure a better understanding between different agencies,
other steps were recommended. These included mandatory
rotational jobs for persons in intelligence and law
enforcement communities.
There is also much legal work to be done that will
enhance the ability of law enforcement to work together
with other agencies. Among the recurrent themes of the
conference was the need for new laws. These could help
bridge the gaps between the traditional use of intelligence to
prosecute criminal cases and strategic intelligence, which
is used to predict, preempt, and defend against attacks on
the United States and its citizens. With such new laws in
place, one of the major frustrations of today would be
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alleviated: information would flow more freely and
criminals would find it more difficult to escape detection.
Also addressed was the need to develop international
investigative and evidentiary standards as well as
electronic access protocols. These steps would go some way
to assist law enforcement in tracking down criminals and
bringing them to justice.
Conclusion.
In sum, international organized crime, terrorism, and
information warfare all pose serious threats to our national
security. Because they constitute a threat that is
simultaneously both foreign and domestic and because they
are able to take advantage of the new high-tech operational
environment, they pose rather unique challenges to our
security and to our civil liberties. Dealing with these
transnational threats calls for a joint effort on the part of our
law enforcement and the military. It is of paramount
importance that we learn how to do this and how to do it
while remaining within the limits of the law.
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CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT’S
PERSPECTIVE
Spike Bowman
This is an introduction to the problem of modern
transnational threats and the role of law enforcement in
meeting them. Some clarification, first, is in order.
Transnational threats of many kinds have been with us for
years. Some of these threats are truly significant, but are
ones with which this introduction will not be concerned.
Espionage, for example, is a traditional transnational
threat, but not one on which these introductory comments
will focus. Nor will this overview be directly concerned with
traditional intelligence threats, like efforts made by other
countries to ferret out the secrets of our defense programs,
or even such nontraditional threats as economic espionage.1
Indirectly, however, all of these threats intersect the
subjects of primary concern, making the fundamental
problems encountered that much more difficult.
The focus for this introduction to transnational threats
is fourfold: terrorism, international organized crime,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and cyber crime. The
purpose is to define the nature of these threats and briefly
discuss the remedies available to deal with those threats.
Finally, with a singular and, some might argue, parochial
focus I will address the increasingly appropriate and
necessary role of one traditional remedy—law
enforcement—to meet and deter these threats.
Terrorism.
Terrorism, though not a new phenomenon, fortunately is
still foreign to the experience of most Americans. Despite
our relative insularity from terrorism, however, we have
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had a few wake-up calls in the last few decades. The first
time we faced a threat that significantly affected U.S.
interests was in 1983 with the Beirut bombings of our
Embassy and the Marine barracks.2
While Beirut spawned our first real challenge regarding
terrorism, one that persisted throughout the 1980s, that
challenge was really quite different from today’s threat.
Then, terrorism was still at a distance from our shores, and
the state-sponsors were more easily identified. At the time,
much of the collective attention of the U.S. Government was
focused on merely trying to figure out who the actors were,
how states were supporting them, and, occasionally, which
states. We devoted a lot of energy to the issue of
state-sponsored terrorism, and our anti-terrorism efforts
were focused more on states than on individuals.
In the ensuing years, however, the nature of the terrorist
threat changed dramatically. Nations quickly recognized
that state-sponsored terrorism was an unhealthy activity
and one that would make them international pariahs.3 With
an evolution born of necessity, the responsibility for
terrorism devolved to large, hierarchical, and generally
well-organized groups of terrorists—which received covert
rather than overt funding from sponsor states. Those
concerned with threat analysis concentrated their attention
on the activities of large terrorist groups such as the
Hezbollah, the Hamas, and others. They focused, in
particular, on locating the whereabouts of the leadership
and the members. To a large extent, concern remained with
states who funded these organizations.
Today, with evolutionary logic, those engaged in
terrorism represent a further devolution of responsibility
and organization. Hamas, Hezbollah, and other large
groups associated with terrorism have taken on roles more
commonly associated with states. They are energetic
fundraisers; they organize people, build hospitals and
schools, provide social welfare, etc. For the same reasons
that states could no longer afford to be associated with
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terrorism, the large, organized groups usually seek to
distance themselves from overt acts of terrorism, although
they do claim responsibility for terrorist acts from time to
time.4
The result is that terrorist actors today are more loosely
organized than they have tended to be in the past. Some, it is
true, do retain a degree of homogeneity. Osama Bin Laden’s
organization is a case in point. Though loosely structured, it
nevertheless is held together by a rudimentary hierarchy
and a lot of money.5 Many groups around the world, in
contrast, organize on an ad hoc basis. They may be
homogenous, or they may be drawn from a variety of
different terrorist groups; the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), the Hezbollah, the Hamas, and others may contribute
the occasional “pick-up” terrorist. When they do organize
like this, it is often so they may work together for a specific
purpose and to engage in a specific operation.6 This
devolution of authority makes them particularly difficult to
deal with because the terrorists become harder to identify.
More than ever, it is hard to determine who the terrorists
are, where they are, where the hierarchy is located, and who
is in charge.
International Organized Crime.
Organized crime is nothing new to Americans. Those of
us who grew up on the East coast were raised on stories of
the Mafia. We all saw the Godfather movies, which were
largely based on fact. But organized crime is no longer quite
the same as it was 50 years ago. Protection rackets are no
longer the bread and butter of organized crime, whiskey
smuggling is an arcane memory, and computers are
replacing guns. Perhaps more significantly, however,
whereas terrorist organizations have tended to become
smaller over time, criminal organizations, aping the growth
of large international corporations, have tended to become
larger.
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Organized crime has become so ubiquitous it is
impossible to define the scope of it for any but limited
purposes. For this primer on transnational threats, the
focus will remain on a small number of very large organized
crime groups. Six of them stand out—the Italian Mafia,the
Russian mobs, the Mexican and Colombian cartels,the
Japanese Yakuza, and the Chinese Triads.7 Though there
are others, these six are especially noteworthy in that the
groups are large enough and have a sufficiently
well-structured hierarchy to be able to organize large
logistical networks and even to work together for profit.
They can trade knowledge and expertise, offer each other
protection, and even trade drug routes with one another.8 To
give just one example, during the early 1990s, at the end of
the Cold War, we observed numerous Italian organized
crime figures at work in Eastern Europe. They were
teaching the Eastern Europeans how to become organized
and make crime a business.9
International organized crime is frightening. It poses a
serious potential threat to both political and economic
institutions throughout the entire community of nations.
The Russian mobs offer an illustration of the extent of the
problem. Organized crime in Russia and Eastern Europe
has expanded to an alarming degree. According to police
from Eastern Europe and Russia (with whom the Federal
Bureau of Investigation [FBI] works on a daily basis), 50
percent of their banks are controlled by organized crime.10
Where the rot has set in, countries must deal with
entrenched corruption—the corruption of elected officials,
of leaders, of the military, corruption, in fact, of all social
institutions.11 In the case of Russia and Eastern Europe,
this could eventually lead to the creation of a series of
oligarchic criminal states. Russia alone could develop into a
criminal-syndicalism state that spans no less than 12 time
zones. The consequence for economic relations worldwide is
obvious. Moreover, the already fragile control mechanisms
for an increasingly unstable nuclear arsenal represent a
frightening concern for the entire free world.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction.
WMDs are increasingly a concern for Americans. It is
hard to pick up a newspaper today without finding at least
one story involving a WMD threat. One of the best known
incidents took place in Japan where members of the Aum
Shinri Kyo cult unleashed a nerve gas attack in the subway
on March 20, 1995. 12 This event demonstrated the
frightening ease with which WMDs can be employed by
terrorist groups or even disgruntled citizens. The ongoing
drama in Iraq has highlighted another aspect of the
problem, which is the difficulty of locating and identifying
the exact nature and scope of highly portable WMD threats.
The weapons inspections teams assigned the task of
locating and destroying Saddam Hussein’s WMDs have
been seriously frustrated in their efforts.13
Nor is America itself immune from WMD threats. On the
home front, the explosion in Oklahoma City made it clear
that putting together a weapon of mass destruction is a
relatively simple matter.14Just recently, the FBI caught two
men in Miami with ricin, a very deadly poison.15 This
material has no legitimate uses, which should, in theory,
make it very hard to obtain. Yet the FBI has had several
cases concerning it in the past few years. An Ohio man
recently ordered three vials of bubonic plague bacteria from
a pharmaceutical company and was able to get them.16 The
FBI responds weekly to anthrax threats. Although these, so
far, have turned out to be hoaxes, the number of these is, in
and of itself, indicative of the extent to which the resort to
WMD threats is being contemplated.
Cyber Crime.
The cyber age is demolishing paradigms. Traditionally,
counterterrorism operations have been directed towards
physical threats. Similarly, criminal enterprise has
normally occupied a physical dimension. Today, however, a
new reality is dawning. Many of the harms that once were
wholly physical in nature can now be visited on us
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electronically and anonymously. Financial transactions can
now be instantaneous and anonymous. Information, the
basis for commerce, can be transferred instantaneously and
without leaving a trail, even innocently, as by academic
exchange. Computer technology has made our service
sectors vulnerable.17 Cyber threats pose a danger to our
power grids, our air traffic control systems, pipelines,
emergency services, and a host of other communications
systems.18 Moreover, the incidence of identity theft has been
on a spectacular rise.19
The cyber threat has been driven by our own desires.
Commercial industry needed to find effective ways to
transfer money and information, thereby taking better
advantage of world markets.20This led to the dramatic and
rapid mastery of cyber space. As the cyber highways became
busier, however, economic and industrial espionage also
increased to the point that they virtually became industries
of their own. The threat from espionage of this sort has
become so acute, indeed, that in 1996 a new federal statute
was enacted to address the problem.21The statute has two
different applications as regards those engaged in
espionage. It applies, on the one hand, to the individual
working on his own for a commercial purpose or for a
company, and, on the other hand, to a person working on
behalf of a foreign power. The statute calls for different
penalties depending upon whether the person involved in
espionage falls into the first or the second category. The
person working for a foreign power is punished much more
substantially than the person working solely for the private
sector.
Dealing with Transnational Threats.
Terrorism, organized crime, WMD, and cyber threats
have much in common. None of the threats are confined by
borders—hence the fact that we speak of them as
transnational threats. In fact, organizations engaged in
such activities have every incentive to spread out as far as
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they can, extending across borders to diffuse national
responsibility and capability to keep them in check.
The transnational threat poses a unique set of problems.
In the first place, it is hard to enforce any kind of legal
mechanism across borders. Nations tend to guard their
sovereignty fiercely and dislike it when foreign nations
intervene in their affairs, even if it is to deal with a problem
that afflicts both parties alike. In the second place, it
permits the members of such organizations to escape
responsibility for their actions. Since the nerve center of a
group like the Russian mobs or the Hezbollah cannot be
found, one cannot target it with sufficient certainty to make
the criminal members believe there is a probability that
they will have to pay for their actions.
Taking this as a given, what are our options when it
comes to dealing with transnational threats? Our first, and
always preferred, option is to use diplomacy. Since the late
Middle Ages, this has been the traditional starting point for
solving problems between nations. In 1648 the Peace of
Westphalia set the pattern for future conflict resolution by
establishing the idea of national sovereignty defined in
large measure by physical borders.22 The treaties arising
from that event determined that nations would be sovereign
within borders; that nations would deal with each other as
physical entities; that they would exchange diplomats and
negotiate with each other as equals, regardless of size or
stature.
Unfortunately, when nations deal with transnational
threats of the sort we have been discussing here, diplomacy
proves to be largely inoperative. There is no
sovereign-to-sovereign contact. There are no opportunities
to do business with or negotiate with members of the other
party. There is no framework, no procedure, and no protocol
with which to work.
Other state-to-state persuasive tools are equally
ineffective when it comes to dealing with transnational
threats. For example, a second option normally available to
25

resolve international issues is to encourage the
international community to bring political pressures to bear
in order to bring about change. Like diplomacy, however,
political persuasion holds no utility whatsoever when
dealing with amorphous, dislocated, and dispersed
transnational threats.
Economic sanctions are a third frequently used option.
Economic sanctions, even in the best of circumstances, have
rarely proved to be a highly effective tool. Nations have a
way of belt-tightening that withstands this recourse more
often than not.23 For the transnational threats we face
today, however, it is virtually useless as a means of coercing
organizations, which lack a vital nerve center.
A fourth method of responding to transnational threats
is, of course, the use of force. Launching missiles into
Afghanistan in response to an act of terrorism is, in the view
of this author, a legitimate way of responding to the
problem.24 Legitimate or not, however, it is also a very
narrow way of responding to any problem. It offers only a
limited solution and one which has proved to be effective
more often when followed by political reconciliation, which,
of course, presumes a polity with which to reconcile.
Because the threats we view in this forum are so
decentralized and physically dispersed, military force will
have minimal deterrent effect and likely will be useful only
when it can be used to physically stop the terrorist or WMD
event. It is far less likely to be effective in combating
organized crime or cyber intrusion.
This brings me to the fifth traditional option to remedy
the international threat—law enforcement. The existence
of defined borders has serious implications for law
enforcement. They make it difficult for law enforcement
agencies to deal with transnational threats. Just like the
military or the private person, the police officer has to stop
at the border. He has no jurisdiction beyond his own
territory. As a result, law enforcement has always been the
least favored means of dealing with transnational threats.
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It is what we might call the poor stepchild of the traditional
responses to international problems.
The Role of Law Enforcement.
The Limitations of Law Enforcement. The constraints
faced by law enforcement in dealing with transnational
threats should be fleshed out here in a little more detail.
First, to some degree, domestic law, foreign law, and
international law will inevitably be somewhat mismatched.
Our domestic laws in the United States do not always take
into account international law and, in fact, some of our
domestic laws, or their implementation, deliberately ignore
traditional international law.25 All domestic laws account
for the unique needs of each nation. The result is that every
country in the world will find it difficult to apply domestic
laws when the causes and/or actors are transnational.
Naturally enough, this characteristic of Westphalian
politics means that a continuing problem will be
jurisdiction. When U.S. law enforcement agents travel
abroad, their guns and their badges stay at home because
they are not, by international or foreign laws, authorized to
exercise the trappings of sovereignty within the boundaries
of another sovereign nation. Jurisdiction, by definition, is
consigned by a sovereign, and even if it is extended beyond
the sovereign’s borders by domestic law, foreign nations
need not, and virtually never will, recognize that presumed
authority within their own sovereign territory.26
Another problem is venue. How does one determine
where to hold the trial of a member of an international
organization? If, for example, we look at the organized crime
entities that blanket all of Eastern Europe, we find it
remarkably difficult to answer very basic questions. Where
is the crime taking place? (Usually it is occurring in a series
of places.) Who is responsible? Choosing the venue,
moreover, proves to be a major problem because, once again,
venue is tied to the sovereign border.
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Another obstacle in the way of law enforcement agencies
is their limited access to information. It is vital that they
know what is happening. Yet, to get a clear picture of
transnational threats, they must rely on external resources,
both foreign and domestic. A federal agency seeking to curb
the criminal activities of drug traffickers, for example, must
know where the players are. Law enforcement officers have
to know what methods are being used to control people.
They have to know how and when the money of drug
organizations is being transferred. They have to know what
the drug routes are. Vexingly, such information is often very
hard to obtain when it must be obtained from sources
located beyond one’s own sovereign borders.27
The collection and use of evidence pose another problem.
It is extremely difficult to bring international criminals to
justice in the United States, in part because our
requirements for criminal evidence are so strict. If the FBI
wants to use information it has obtained from another
country, first the Bureau and then the courts must
ascertain that it is reliable. If the FBI does not know the
source of its information, it often cannot use it in court.
Calling on foreign witnesses also poses difficulties. Even if
willing and available, they must come to the United States
in order to testify and present evidence.
Finally, extradition is always a challenge. Extradition
from one country to another is a technique that, once again,
is tied to the Peace of Westphalia. It is a very cumbersome
process.To some extent, the United States has been able to
deal with this and several of the other problems by
executing mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATS).
MLATS harmonize U.S. laws with those of other countries
to the extent possible. Such bilateral arrangements do help
facilitate the transfer of witnesses, extradition of suspects,
and collection of evidence.28
The Utility of Law Enforcement. The reality is that there
are many reasons why law enforcement is not always an
effective tool to use against transnational threats.
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Nonetheless, for all of the limitations, and there are many, it
is a tool that we ought to take very seriously. Why?
First of all, the threats we are examining here are
universal threats. All of the civilized countries in the world
are faced by the same problems we are. Most nations, in fact,
are threatened to a far greater extent than we are. 29
Organized crime, for example, is a much bigger problem in
Eastern Europe than it is in the United States. Regardless
of the size of the problem, nations share transnational
threats in common, giving them a common purpose in
working together to eradicate or at least diminish the
threats.
In addition, despite the fact that all nations have
different laws, most of the countries of the world do
criminalize the same type of activity. Murder, burglary, and
crimes of that nature are widely condemned and formally
criminalized. Hence we at least have some basis in law for
cooperation. Similarly, police, for the most part, have a
common purpose worldwide. For most of our lifetimes, the
great enemy of the United States was the Soviet Union. Yet
today, the FBI works on a daily basis with the Ministry of
the Interior (MVD) in Russia, assisting them in their
struggle with organized crime.30 This type of cooperation is
increasingly common throughout the world. There are
honest law enforcement officers all over the world, and they
are fighting for the same thing—preserving the institutions
of government, law, and civilization of their country.
Additionally, other remedies are simply not proving
effective. Some remedies, such as military force, are
effective for a brief moment. They provide a temporary
solution for a particular problem. If, however, we wish to
find a way systematically to control transnational threats,
we must do so on a legal basis. Law provides the foundation
for human society, and criminal law is internationally
acceptable. A solution rooted in international law will be
much more acceptable to the international community than
any other type of remedy we may attempt. Launching
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missiles into Afghanistan was certainly permissible,
certainly lawful, and certainly, whatever the critics may
say, a morally responsible thing to do. It was not, however,
universally accepted. On the other hand, when we arrest
terrorists or international criminals and try them, that is
accepted.31
Finally, law enforcement promotes the rule of law. The
significance of this cannot be overestimated. In the final
analysis, the rule of law offers the best chance for all of us.
This is what the developing countries of the world are
looking for. They are trying to find a stable basis on which to
build their society. Promoting the rule of law plays a key role
in assuring them that they will eventually achieve stability.
Proposals for Action?
It is useful to consider some brief suggestions as to how
law enforcement may be used to deal with transnational
threats.
Develop international financial controls and legal
standards. One of the serious problems confronting us at
the moment is that criminals have the ability to transfer
money all around the world with total anonymity
International financial controls need to be established to
deal with this problem.32 Our national laws must be
harmonized with standards acceptable to the international
community.33
We need to develop investigative and evidentiary
standards that will transfer from one country to another.
One way to accomplish these goals is through education and
training. We have, in fact, already founded a law
enforcement academy in Budapest and are building another
one in Thailand. We also bring foreign nationals engaged in
law enforcement activities to study at the FBI facility in
Quantico, Virginia. These initiatives serve a dual purpose.
On the one hand, they help build relationships. On the other
hand, they help law enforcement agents develop the
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necessary expertise in carrying out criminal investigations,
teaching them how to preserve evidence on a day-to-day
basis.
We also need to deal with cyber crime. Here law
enforcement can play an important role by developing
electronic access protocols. We simply must find a way to
determine more effectively, more efficiently, and more
quickly the origin of cyber threats. This is quite difficult.
Once again, it the transnational nature of the threats in a
world defined by national borders that compounds the
problem. While law enforcement agents can relatively
easily determine the immediate source of an attack, it is
rare that they can determine its ultimate source. They may
be hot on the scent of a trail only to find themselves stopped
at the border. By the time they have negotiated the right to
proceed, the trail is cold. We need, therefore, to find some
way of getting countries to work together so that law
enforcement agents can follow the thread of a crime all the
way to a resolution.
Education and training. Worldwide training is also
needed in the fight against cyber crime. We are making
some progress in that direction. The FBI, as noted, has
developed some educational programs. So has the
Department of Defense (DoD). Worthy of mention here are
the efforts made by the Marshall Center in Europe to
develop social programs that will foster democracy.34 More,
however, can and should be done.
Here in the United States further education and
training are likewise needed in a variety of areas. More time
and energy should be devoted to helping Federal agents and
state and local authorities understand the nature of the
threats facing them and how to handle them.
Interagency cooperation. Law enforcement agencies and
other agencies need to learn how to work together to find
solutions to the transnational threats. We need, for
example, to have a coordinated surge capability. The police
cannot handle all existing problems. In the United States,
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the FBI has the authority and (at least within this country)
the venue to deal with threats. However, we do not have the
logistical ability to move everything where we need it. We
need, therefore, the assistance of all the different branches
of the U.S. Government. Many of them have a lot to offer.
The DoD may be something of a 600-pound gorilla, but it can
provide the logistical support needed in a time of crisis.35 We
need the expertise of the Environmental Protection Agency
and Department of Health and Human Services. We need
the help of FEMA whenever there is a disaster.
Of course, this is not a new concept. Federal agencies
already work together to deal with transnational
threats—the task is to improve the synergy. Members of
different agencies practice and run exercises together, for
example. However, such coordination efforts are still in
their infancy. We need a lot more practice; we need many
more joint exercises; we need to have far more
determination.
Fiscal Planning.
Of course, we must find a way to fund such coordinated
efforts. When we respond to an Oklahoma City bombing or
indeed any terrorist attack, it is vital that we have fiscal
backing. We need to give some thought ahead of time to
what our needs will be. We need to develop legislation that
will determine how the Economy Act will handle the
multiplicity of agencies responding to a single threat.36 To
date this area has been badly neglected; the police are not
very good at exploiting the entire U.S. Government in a
crisis solution, even if they were funded for it, and the
National Security Council has focused its primary attention
on how to deal with overseas threats.
Conclusion.
In sum, terrorism, international organized crime, WMD,
and cyber crime, all pose real threats to the United States.
They are tricky to deal with, in part because they are
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transnational in nature and because we must overcome a
worldwide preoccupation with national sovereignty before
we can effectively begin to counter the threats. Traditional
remedies ranging from the use of diplomacy to the use of
force prove to be of limited utility in dealing with this kind of
threat. So, too, is law enforcement. Yet, though it
traditionally has been the least favored of all remedies, law
enforcement does offer some unique advantages. Above all
else, it promotes a resort to the rule of law. The spread of the
rule of the law is in the best interest of all nations. We
should, therefore, give considered thought to how we, the
government as a whole, can enhance and increase the role of
law enforcement in dealing with transnational threats.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. Because economic espionage relates only tangentially to the
issues with which this work is concerned, no direct discussion is devoted
to this subject. Nonetheless, it is clearly an area of concern, particularly
as it relates to cyber crime. The threat from economic espionage is on the
increase, and the technologies that we share with other countries can
now be used against us. Also, the number of joint ventures we see
occurring today in commercial industry is significant. The idea of
national ownership is virtually anachronistic today, and the
transnational dispersal of proprietary information and technology
simply increases their vulnerability.
2. In October 1983 some six tons of explosives were detonated in a
suicide bombing that killed 241 Marines. The Marines had been sent on
a mission intended to help stabilize the region; but as political events
unfolded they came to be viewed by warring factions as partisan. The
result was a series of sniping attacks on Marines, with the finale being
this suicide mission. Often forgotten is the fact that a simultaneous
bombing of the French military encampment killed 58 French
paratroopers.
3. There has been a proliferation of international agreements
providing that every signatory nation shall have jurisdiction over
specified terrorist offenses, e.g., the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, 18
USC 32 (1984) (applies to anyone who destroys a civil aircraft registered
in a country other than the United States); and the Hostage Taking Act,
18 USC 1203 (1984) (resting on a universal crime principle, it allows
trial whenever the offender is found in the United States). Additionally,
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unlike the unaffiliated terrorist actors, a state is subject to political
pressure. The G-7 nations (before Russia’s entry into the Group)
effectively threatened South Africa with the cancellation of air traffic
because of a failure to punish terrorists.
4. The larger the group, however, the harder it is for the group’s
activities to escape detection. In consequence, the larger
terrorist-oriented groups have not escaped designation by the Secretary
of State as terrorist organizations. See Department of State Public
Notice No. 3031, October 8, 1999, 64 FR 55112. Most of the claims of
responsibility that come from the larger, well-organized groups are for
actions directed at Israeli interests, for which they claim a military
right.
5. See Bruce Austen, “An inside look at Terror Inc.,” U.S. News and
World Report, October 19, 1998, pp. 34-37.
6. A case in point may be the millennial conspiracy that was
frustrated when a would-be terrorist attempted to cross into the United
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issues reside. Great care has gone into constructing a framework within
which all these organizations can work together, but no congressional
attention has been paid to funding. Without legislative intervention, the
Economy Act poses a significant problem. Neither lead agency, FEMA or
the FBI, is funded in a way to pay for all the logistics necessary to
respond to significant crisis events. For example, without Congressional
intervention, it is difficult for DoD, which expends the equivalent of the
FBI budget every 2 1/2 days, to forgive the expense incurred from airlift
support, etc., supplied at the request of either FBI or FEMA.
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CHAPTER 3
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS:
U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY
Daniel S. Roper
Introduction.
Transnational threats pose an increasingly serious
threat to the United States, one that calls for a serious
collaborative effort on the part of those concerned with our
national security. This chapter will discuss U.S. military
strategy as regards transnational threats. It will provide
the readers with the perspective of, though not necessarily
the official position of, the Joint Staff. The Global Division,
Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, of which
this author is a member, was established in 1997 in
response to the challenges presented by emerging
transnational issues.
This chapter will focus on how the Department of
Defense (DoD) responds to transnational threats. It will
include three topics of special relevance to our goals. First,
the chapter will provide an overview of the National
Security and National Military Strategies. It will discuss
what these strategies tell us about the transnational
environment in which we operate. Second, this chapter will
review the derived imperatives of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the conceptual framework used
by the U.S. military to address these imperatives. And
third, this chapter will consider what role DoD should play.
What support can DoD provide to civil authorities? What
inherent challenges does it face and under what constraints
does it operate? What are the specific support criteria and
imperatives that all departments and agencies should
consider as they tackle these problems? This chapter, in
short, will not seek to offer any specific solutions. Rather, its
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purpose is to help illuminate the issues and challenges
before us.
The National Security Strategy and the National
Military Strategy.
The National Security Strategy (NSS), most recently
updated in December 1999, identifies six strategic priorities
of the United States. For our purposes here, note
particularly the last two:
1. To promote peace and security in key regions of the
world;
2. To create an open and competitive trading system that
benefits Americans and the world;
3. To strengthen international arms control and
nonproliferation regimes;
4. To protect the environment and health of U.S.
citizens;
5. To increase cooperation in confronting security
threats to critical infrastructures and U.S. citizens that defy
borders and unilateral solutions; and,
6. To strengthen intelligence and military, diplomatic,
and law enforcement tools.
The NSS establishes how the elements of national
power—diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic—may best be used to protect American interests
in the new century. The reader should note that the last two
strategic priorities clearly relate to the issue at hand, that
is, how to deal with transnational threats and how to
maximize the effectiveness of military and law enforcement
strategies.
The objectives and priorities outlined in the NSS form
the basis for the National Military Strategy (NMS). The
NMS is an unclassified public document that communicates
to other government officials, U.S. citizens, and other
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nations how the U.S. military supports the NSS. It provides
military advice to the president, National Security Council,
and Secretary of Defense, and offers broad strategic
direction for the services and combatant commanders. It
looks ahead about 5 years, basing its calculations on current
or programmed forces. The NMS of Flexible and Selective
Engagement was derived from the NSS. It is updated and
published on an as-needed basis.
Revisions are in part driven by a continuous assessment
process called the Joint Strategy Review. The Joint
Strategy Review 1999 upheld the major components of the
NMS through the year 2010 and beyond. The three major
components of the NMS are to (1) shape the international
environment through engagement, (2) respond to the full
spectrum of crises in a dangerous and uncertain world, and
(3) prepare now for an uncertain future through focused
modernization and improved business practices. Our
national military objectives are to promote peace and
stability by encouraging the just, political resolution of
international disputes, and to defeat adversaries who
threaten the United States, our vital interests, or our allies.
The NMS characterizes our current strategic
environment as one that includes transnational dangers,
asymmetric challenges, regional dangers, and wild cards.
Transnational dangers are defined as challenges that
transcend national borders and threaten our national
interests. Asymmetric challenges are defined as
unconventional approaches or inexpensive means that
circumvent our strengths, exploit our vulnerabilities, or
confront us in ways we cannot match in kind. As with the
NSS, our NMS clearly reflects our growing concern with
transnational threats.
Transnational Environment.
So what does this environment of transnational threats
and asymmetric challenges look like? To borrow a phrase
from the distinguished politico-military analyst Yogi Berra,
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the future ain’t what it used to be. Analysis reveals a cluster
of diverse and complex missions, showing what kind of
military operations may be needed to meet national security
needs in the coming decades. A list of potential operations
makes clear the diverse and often noncomplementary
functions that the armed forces may be called upon to
perform. In some cases, the military will naturally play a
leading role. National missile defense and joint force
operations are obvious examples. In most cases, however,
the military will play a supporting role only. The military
may be called upon to engage in such activities as
counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, and disaster
relief. These functions combine domestic and
extra-territorial requirements. American constitutional
law makes a military lead inappropriate in these
circumstances.
A variety of government agencies, including the
military, will be involved in all of these missions. This does
not mean that these agencies will have to undergo radical
institutional change or even adapt themselves dramatically
in order to face these challenges. But what is needed is
flexibility. The government agencies must develop a clear
sense of how their existing expertise and resources can be
used to help carry out these missions. This includes the
military.
Transnational Perspective.
Legality becomes a significant issue when our armed
forces engage in operations that do not fall unambiguously
within the military sphere of authority. These include
operations undertaken to deal with transnational threats
such as critical infrastructure protection, counterdrug,
international organized crime, counterterrorism, and
information operations. For the military, these are, in one or
more respects, unconventional issues.1 The Joint Staff is
well aware of the complications that can arise when the
military participates in such missions. Rather than waiting
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to deal with such challenges as they arise, the military takes
the initiative. By taking a dynamic approach, it ensures
that the legal ramifications of such joint missions are
considered in advance, that potential issues are quickly
identified, and that the security implications of legal issues
are clearly articulated. It sees to it that these concerns are
addressed with minimum delay in the National Security
Council (NSC) and interagency councils. It also makes a
vigorous effort to see that persons both within and without
the military are educated on these questions. The
Department of Defense (DoD) is, perforce, limited in what it
can do to counter transnational threats by constitutional
parameters. The kinds of proactive measures outlined here,
however, minimize the impact of these restraints. They
permit DoD to make the most of its capabilities and seize the
opportunities for action available to it, while still working
within these legal constraints.
A Proactive, Forward-Looking Process.
These, then, are the challenges imposed by the
transnational threat environment. What has DoD done and
what does it plan to do to meet these challenges? The U.S.
military is not taking an ad hoc approach. Military planners
in DoD and JCS are systematically studying and analyzing
the future. Assessment and evaluation are accomplished
through annual and biannual updates of the NSS and NMS.
A thorough analysis of these challenges has produced some
results. DoD (with the assistance of the JCS) has drawn up a
list of what it calls derived imperatives. These are the
crucial steps which must be taken in order to deal with the
threats we face in this new environment. It has also
identified three corresponding areas on which the CJCS
should focus: information operations, homeland defense
and support to civil authority, and joint force training and
exercises. A number of external studies, including the
Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense Panel,
the Rumsfeld Commission, and several Presidential
Decision Directives, have validated the conclusions of the
45

DoD/JCS analysis. Recent Joint Strategy Reviews have
focused their attention on addressing asymmetric
challenges. They have noted that this emerging strategic
dimension impacts national security and has many legal
ramifications. Military planners have, in short, determined
important priorities.
How does the military codify the actions and processes
which must be taken in support of these priorities? Two of
the most significant mechanisms are the Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS) and the Unified Command Plan
(UCP). They are proactive, forward-looking processes. They
enable U.S. armed forces to shape, respond, and prepare as
required by the NMS. The JSPS links the many
strategy-related documents together, thereby consolidating
military advice and giving it a clear and disciplined format.
This advice can then be given to our civilian superiors who
are ultimately responsible for making strategic decisions.
The NMS, which we have mentioned earlier, plays a central
role in this process. It provides, in summary form, guidance
to the president and Secretary of Defense, considers results
of ongoing strategic assessments, and provides broad
military advice. This advice permeates all of our other key
documents.
Unified Command Plan—A Conceptual Framework
for Future Strategy and Policy.
The UCP offers an adaptable conceptual framework
designed to meet rapidly changing challenges on the world
scene. The plan is evolutionary in nature, thereby making it
possible for the U.S. military to fulfil its global engagement
responsibilities in the face of constant change. It lays out a
flexible plan for moving forward in the direction where
strategic imperatives are headed. It plans for a joint forces
organization, a space and information command
organization, and a joint task force concerned with the
provision of military support to civilian authority for the
purpose of homeland protection. As CJSC General Henry
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Shelton testified to the House Armed Service Committee on
March 3, 1999,
Joint Vision 2010 (the conceptual template for how America’s
Armed Forces will achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint
warfighting) . . . must also have an accompanying vision for
how to best organize. . . . That conceptual framework . . .
Unified Command Plan (UCP) 21 . . . will be included as an
annex to the 1999 Unified Command Plan recommendation.
UCP 21 will lay out a flexible plan to establish a Joint Forces
Command, a Space and Information Command, and a joint
task force to deal with the complex issues of homeland defense.

Military Support to Civil Authority.
The U.S. military is often viewed as the agency best
equipped to deal with certain transnational threats. It does
not, however, have the constitutional authority to play more
than a supporting role domestically. It can offer its support
to civil authority in the areas of logistics, training,
information and intelligence, communications, and
planning. The National Guard also provides leadership and
has developed Regional Response Centers. In accordance
with DoD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities, all requests by civil authorities for DoD
military assistance are evaluated for legality, lethality,
risk, cost, appropriateness, and impact on readiness.
Challenges.
Over the past decade increased demands have been
placed upon DoD to bring resources to bear in support of
civil authorities. At the same time, increasing diplomatic,
environmental, legal, commercial, and moral constraints
have been placed on the actions of the military. Legal
constraints are especially confining. Before military
resources can be employed in support of civil authorities,
various laws must be taken into account. These include
Posse Comitatus, the Stafford Act, the Economy Act, and
Intelligence Oversight legislation. These constraints have
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the potential to limit or degrade the ability of the U.S.
military to execute the NMS. The U.S. military also faces a
challenge in that it needs access to critical skill sets,
especially when it has to deal with threats that emerge on
the scene without warning. For the most part, these are to
be found in the reserve components. This simultaneous
increase in both demands and constraints poses a
complicated challenge to U.S. armed forces and the nation
they support and protect.
Military Obligation.
The most recent UCP (October 1, 1999) established a
civil support role for Joint Forces Command. This role is
evolving. According to this plan, Joint Forces Command
becomes involved in civil support when civil (federal)
authorities ask for our assistance. At all times, this
document stresses, the military must remain subordinate to
the civil authorities. At no time is the support offered by the
Joint Forces Command to become a military operation in
the classic sense. This plan, to be sure, does not garner
universal support. Some would prefer that the U.S. military
play no domestic role whatsoever. This is, however, a
minority view. We cannot let it prevent us from fulfilling our
obligation to the nation and its civilian leaders. As Deputy
Secretary of Defense John Hamre said in December 1999,
We may never completely assuage the fears of that 10 percent of
Americans who fundamentally mistrust their government no
matter what the issue. . . . But we owe it to the rest—without
causing undue alarm—to explain why it is better to have basic
military structures and planning processes in place to support
the first-line civil responder to a major domestic destructive
incident.

Imperatives.
It is widely recognized that better interagency and
civil-military cooperation is needed. This will call for a great
deal of effort, as we know from studying the experience of
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the U.S. military itself as it attempted to integrate the
capabilities of the various armed services. Nonetheless, if
the effort is great, the payoff is even greater. To ensure
increased cooperation several requirements must be met.
First, some general criteria are needed for evaluating
proposed interagency responses to transnational threats.
Second, the diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic elements of national power (known as D-I-M-E)
need to be synchronized. The doctrinal principles of the U.S.
military—Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint,
Perseverance, and Legitimacy—would prove valuable here.
These principles are enumerated in Joint Publication 3-07,
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
Summary.
The fact that non-military issues have become so deeply
entangled with the question of military legitimacy presents
a complex challenge to both the U.S. military and the society
it serves. It is clear that factors other than security as it has
been traditionally defined are becoming relatively more
important in the calculus of national policy. This chapter
has outlined the NSS and NMS and what they tell us about
the transnational environment in which we operate. It has
reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s derived
imperatives and the conceptual framework used by the U.S.
military to address these imperatives. Finally, it has
discussed what support DoD can provide to civil authorities.
This discussion made reference to challenges and
constraints, support criteria, and imperatives for all
departments and agencies. Now that the groundwork has
been laid for understanding the problems, we may turn to
the search for solutions.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 3
1. The Global Division of the Joint Staff focuses much of its attention
on these issues, which appear to be non-Title 10 and yet may have
unforeseen collateral or second-order Title 10 effects.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION AND TERRORISTIC USE
OF MASS WEAPONS:
THE LARGER CONTEXT
Kenneth A. Minihan
Introduction.
For the foreseeable future into the 21st century, the
United States will be the preeminent military power of the
world. This means that if we do face a radical physical
threat to national security, it will likely arrive not in the
form of a traditional military attack by a peer competitor
state, but rather in the form of a terrorist attack by a
sub-state entity, based upon the covert deployment of such
weapons of mass slaughter and destruction as chemical,
biological, or nuclear agents. In such a case, certainly we
would want to identify and punish the attacker, but, far
more important, we would want to deter or prevent the
attack in the first place.
To have any hope for successful preemption of such an
attack, we shall require prior knowledge of its mobilization,
meaning we must possess a highly efficient system for
gathering and interpreting the necessary information, that
is, operational intelligence. Fortunately, the United States
is also the preeminent information power of the world, a fact
that should give us some optimism in our quest to acquire
the necessary intelligence capability. Unfortunately,
however, as we learn at length in reading the other chapters
in the present book, the total national security environment
in the United States today is not coherently and efficiently
adapted to the task of ferreting out and responding to
transnational threats. And almost certainly, of course, a
serious weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack upon
this country would be transnational in character.
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In this chapter, rather than discussing intelligence per
se, I shall discuss certain aspects of the total national
security environment that tend to militate against an
adequate intelligence capability for preempting a WMD
attack on U.S. territory. In passing, I shall also comment
upon impediments to national security in general, as well as
steps for their resolution.
Our generation is faced by some urgent tasks and
presented with some vital opportunities. We are living at a
moment of fundamental and revolutionary change. The
industrial era has given way to the era of information. Given
that the United States is, at the moment, one of the leaders
in the technological revolution, it ought to be able to forge an
operating environment that will help assure its national
security. However, it has not performed some vital and
necessary tasks. It has not, in particular, come to terms with
what conflict is today. It lacks a clear sense of the law of
conflict in the information age. Until it develops an
understanding of the principles of war, defines key terms,
and lays down clear areas of responsibility, the military will
not be able to act with decisiveness in response to threats. If
the United States fails to grasp the opportunities available,
it runs the danger of relinquishing what could be a
dominant role within the new operating environment of the
information age. The technological playing field will be
leveled, to the detriment of our national interest.
A Revolutionary Change in Conflict.
Any discussion of current threats must factor in the
changing nature of conflict at the start of the new
millennium. The strategic coin of the 21st century is no
longer just the industrial base, but now includes our
knowledge assets. This fundamental shift in what counts in
war has profound implications for how we conduct our
national defense. What are some of the key changes of which
we should be aware?
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Key Changes in the Nature of Conflict.
We have and will continue to have enormous power and
technological capabilities. Even the technological
difficulties that still beset us will likely be solved
eventually. It does not appear as if the shortage of
bandwidth, for example, will long remain a problem. But we
now have to contend with a profoundly different operating
environment.
The new environment is far more complex than anything
we have experienced to date. It is a global environment built
by the commercial sector rather than by the national
security apparatus. It is also characterized by a pace of
change quite unmatched in earlier eras. All of these changes
are, in turn, radically transforming the nature of conflict
and affecting how we must respond to future threats.
The ramifications of the new environment are many.
Future conflicts will be played out not on a conventional
battlefield but on a turf comprised of technologies and
infrastructures. In the new operating environment,
government, citizens, adversaries, and resourcess all exist
within the same operating space. We no longer live in a
world in which the soldier fights on the battlefield, while the
innocent citizens remain elsewhere. Threats, too, are
changing; whether we are looking at hackers or at
terrorists, we find that power tends to be more diffused and
attacks more random. Traditional means of identifying our
opponents are disappearing. The new global environment
leaves no smoking gun, making anyone who can operate
within our space a potential threat. At the same time we
find that existing paradigms for war and conflict are no
longer appropriate. Take for example a concept pivotal to
the laws of conflict, that of the nation-state. Such a concept
becomes obsolete in the new global environment, which
recognizes no boundaries. The new environment also poses
challenges to existing legal norms, forcing us to reevaluate
many of our rules and priorities.
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As the nature of conflict changes, so too do the demands
placed upon us. Who defends us and how are subject to
change. Among other things, some defense initiatives that
once belonged to DoD must now fall to others. Even the
responsibilities of command shift; leadership needs will
change. We must now find people who are knowledgeable
when it comes to operating within the technology
environment. And DoD must prove able to change at a far
more rapid rate than ever before. Whereas in the past DoD
made annual plans, it now must emulate the many modern
businesses which plan continually and expect to reengineer
their companies every 2 or 3 years.
Responding to the Changes.
In short, we are now dealing with a whole battlespace of
physical and virtual, lethal and nonlethal, and dispersed
operations. In order to deal with future WMD threats, we
must seize the opportunities presented us and also meet the
new challenges. In many ways, we are in a fortunate
position. After all, in the past the United States invested
heavily in information technologies. It contributed more
than any other nation to their research and development
and also was heavily involved in the planned technology
expansion. As a result, we have largely shaped the current
operating environment. As long as we continue to invest in
information technology and infrastructure, we should be
able to hold our lead. The Cold War, we should remember,
was won with steady investments, not as a result of a
wrenching somersault in force structure. We must approach
the new challenges in a similarly patient and persistent
manner.
Need for a New Analytical Model.
Among those things we need to do in order to ensure a
relevant defense is to develop a new analytical model. The
industrial age model, built around organizational boxes and
analogues, is not appropriate. A more useful model might
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take the shape of a rich technology grid. Such a grid would
enable us to do the following:
1. Understand the physical network and transportation
layer.
2. Decide on the investments that should be made in
global technologies. (These should be those that help us
shape the operating environment in such a way as to enable
us to achieve our national security goals.)
3. Determine the legal ramifications.
We must also revise our understanding of conflict and
the laws that govern it. As mentioned earlier, conflict in the
information age transcends geographic boundaries, but we
have not changed doctrine to meet the changed
circumstances. We have not reallocated authorities;
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), for example, continue to be
geographically defined.
We must develop clear guidelines permitting us to react
to threats. One of the most vital issues is to determine the
difference between a crime and an attack. Only when we
have decided what an attack is can we discuss what might
be the appropriate responses to an attack. The United
States misguidedly spends more time on identifying those
who have damaged us than on deterring them in the first
place. We might rather borrow concepts drawn from Cold
War deterrent theories to develop a strategy of active
defense. We might, for example, defend certain parts of our
strategic sanctuary within the global infrastructure
asynchronously. That is, we would give warning that
certain types of virtual and physical attacks might not be
met in kind. But obviously, so long as the distinctions
between crime and attack remain hazy, this kind of
discussion cannot even begin.
The United States must also make a more concerted
effort to retain its technological advantage. At the moment
it is hindered in two ways. First, DoD has failed to take
adequate steps to ensure that its leadership has the
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necessary technological knowledge. Second, it still follows
an annual planning cycle. It must learn to think in terms of
“web years,” i.e., exponentially accelerated timelines, and
reorganize with the same alacrity as in the business world.
Only then can it avoid the danger of falling behind. If it does
not seize the day and keep up with the changing
environment, it may find its advantages whittled away. It is
possible that in the future our enemies will achieve a level
playing field. This will deprive our children of the kind of
trust in their future enjoyed by the children of the World
War II generation during the growth of the industrial age.
Conclusion.
For an instructive perspective, let us think back to the
early years of World War II, long before the disaster at Pearl
Harbor in 1941 drew the United States into war. Previous
generations had prepared, at least conceptually, for the
national defense. The keels of most of the battleships that
fought in the war had already been laid. Elaborate plans
had been written. Responsibilities were clearly delineated.
The generation that went to war understood its
responsibilities and the law of armed conflict. Are we now in
a similar position? Were we to experience an electronic
Pearl Harbor today, could we meet it with the same degee of
justified confidence as displayed by our fathers and
grandfathers on the eve of our entry into World War II? I
fear that we could not. We must begin to repair that
deficiency. We must begin now to lay down the security
keels for the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 5
INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AS THEY
RELATE TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIME ORGANIZATIONS
AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
William J. Olson
This chapter will address the issue of international
organized crime. Attention will be paid to the nature of the
threat in general, and to the challenges faced by intelligence
in particular. Mark Twain once described himself as an
optimist who never arrived. In evaluating the problems we
face and our ability to handle them, this author must
confess that he finds himself in a similarly pessimistic
frame of mind.
The Threat.
Why this pessimism? To understand why international
organized crime poses a serious national security threat, it
is important to recognize how such institutions operate and
how they are changing. Until recently, major criminal
organizations were largely confined to individual countries
or regions. They were not viewed as transnational threats,
nor did they pose any perceptible national security threats
to us or anyone else. But what we are seeing, increasingly, is
an internationalization of the activities of criminal
organizations. This goes hand-in-hand with the
internationalization of legitimate commerce because
organized criminals are nestled inside of it, performing
illegal acts under cover of legal operations. This is true of
both business and banking. Unfortunately, as
communication and commercial barriers break down, the
environment becomes more favorable for international
criminal organizations. It is both easier for them to operate
and harder for authorities to pursue them and curb their
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activities. Thus, ironically, one of the most positive
developments of modern times brings with it a seriously
increased threat to our national security.
International organized crime exacts an immense
human toll. It undermines our financial institutions and
compromises our trade processes. It is immensely costly. In
the past 5 years, in the United States alone, the costs of
paying out of pocket for illicit drugs and for their health care
and other social consequences are somewhere in the area of
one and two trillion dollars. That is not counting the cost in
human misery and life. In the last 10 years, international
terrorists have killed a small number of Americans and,
overall, about 11,000 people. But we lose at least this
number every year to the drug trafficking carried on by
criminal organizations. In the United States today we find
drugs on virtually every street corner, in many of our
schools, and in thousands of our homes. Most of these drugs
originated as a product (usually an agricultural product)
somewhere overseas, and were smuggled into the United
States by a variety of different means.
Those in the drug trade do not merely wreak havoc by
destroying lives and wasting resources. In the process of
introducing the drugs to the United States and other
nations, these criminals also undermine local governments,
either through threat and intimidation or through
corruption. There are many governments around the world
today that are wholly owned subsidiaries of criminal
organizations. Other governments find their ability to deal
with criminal organizations seriously compromised because
their police institutions are either inadequate or are too
corrupt to act. This, in turn, leads to a growing lack of faith
in government. Eventually resorting to crime comes to be
seen as the only way an individual can get ahead. And so the
problem continues to escalate. This is not a distant concern
or a remote problem.1
At this time, Colombia is very much on the mind of
Congress, which is trying to introduce some major
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legislation that will help deal with the problem. Colombia
shows signs of approaching social and political collapse. Its
problems are largely caused by drug trafficking fed by an
American appetite for drugs. What makes the situation so
dangerous is that drug trafficking is no longer exclusively in
the hands of drug trafficking organizations. A number of
other groups have become involved. These include
insurgents, paramilitary organizations, and others. They
use the proceeds of the drug traffic to fund their own
activities. A variety of threats have thus become linked.
Even though international organized criminals are
themselves mainly just interested in money, their activities
have profoundly serious repercussions and do indeed pose a
major threat to our security.2
International organized crime poses further problems
for us inasmuch as the criminals are both organized and
cunning. It is important to bear in mind that one of the
principal characteristics of international organized crime,
as opposed to opportunistic crime or criminal conspiracies,
is precisely that it is organized. Such organizations have
some kind of hierarchical structure, even if loosely defined.
It still offers significant advantages such as durability and
staying power. A comparison with the business community
will help explain this. If, for example, the head of General
Motors were to be removed, a replacement would almost
certainly be found somewhere in the corporate structure. In
the case of criminal organizations, the same thing happens,
which means that it is impossible to get rid of the body by
chopping off the head, so to speak.
Organizations have another advantage. They have
institutional memory, which makes possible growth and
learning. The former leader of a Colombian drug cartel
operating in Mexico was recently interviewed. We learned
from him that every time there was a drug bust, the cartel
sent a team to Mexico to find out what had gone wrong. Once
the cartel had found out how an operation was
compromised, it made sure never to make that mistake
again. Other cartels have learned how to manipulate the
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judicial discovery process used in American courts. When
one of their members is brought up on trial, these cartels
legitimately use discovery to find out everything the
prosecution knows. This includes the techniques used by
the law enforcement authorities to penetrate the
organization and arrest the perpetrators. Cartel
representatives then take that information back and apply
it. The next time around, authorities will not be able to use
the same techniques again successfully.
International criminal organizations also show
considerable business acumen, which makes them
formidable opponents. They are fundamentally business
enterprises. They are organized to make money. And they
do it extremely well. As a business organization, they share
many characteristics with other business organizations.
They are product-oriented. The Colombian cartels provide
an excellent example here. They have proved themselves to
be quite versatile in the way they market different kinds of
products. The cocaine cartels learned from those engaged in
the marijuana trade. These, in turn, had learned (and in
some instances also got their seed money) from emerald
smugglers.
The Colombian cartels also show a sophisticated
understanding of how markets evolve. For example, they
quickly recognized that there would be a market for heroin
because (1) it was a depressant whereas cocaine was a
stimulant; and (2) most drug consumers are drawn to
multiple addictive substances. They therefore got the
Colombians into the business of heroin production (making
and selling it). The criminal organizations of Mexico show a
similar aptitude. They are now the major suppliers of
methamphetamine in the United States. They have
achieved this prominence as a result of careful study of
market trends. They keep the supplies of
methamphetamine as plentiful and as cheap as possible. If
necessary, they even hand drugs out for free in order to
develop a market. They also try to diversify; they seek to
dominate a market and seek alliances.
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International criminal organizations have found ways to
minimize their risks. This they do in part by cooperating
among themselves. For example, the Italian Mafia today
works with the Colombians. The Colombian cartels wanted
to penetrate European markets, but it was hard to establish
networks since Colombians are so few in Europe, making
them conspicuous. They decided it would be better to let the
Italians or Albanians market their goods for them. They
provided the Mafia with cocaine; in return, they accepted
either heroin or money. The international criminal
organizations also look for the most suitable venue for their
activities. In other words, they select the environment,
particularly a law enforcement environment, that is least
likely to cause problems for them, one where local laws are
lax, corruption rampant, or enforcement incompetent.
The threat posed by these organizations is magnified
because of their enormous wealth. Their business is
growing. Drug traffickers earn more every year than the
United States spends on all of its counterdrug efforts. The
annual income of these and other criminal organizations is
frequently greater than that of many governments around
the world, and it is more dependable. So far, there is very
little we have been able to do internationally that has made
a dent in their ability to generate large sums of money.
Moreover, they are expanding their capabilities. They are
rich, powerful, and ruthless; and they threaten the
sovereignty of many of the countries we call allies or with
which we have to deal.
Response to the Threat.
In short, international organized crime and drug
trafficking clearly pose a serious threat to our interests. The
threat is one that we cannot afford to ignore, but it is also
one that we are not in particularly good shape to deal with.
Why not? First, we are only now beginning to take the
problem seriously. It was not until the mid 1960s that we
awoke to the existence of a criminal threat to the United
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States. The Lyndon B. Johnson administration then
admitted that there were crime families and operations in
the United States and promised to pursue them,
particularly the Mafia. Thirty-five years later we are in a
position to say that we more or less have the Mafia under
control. But we have not succeeded in eliminating it. It still
exists; it still operates.
But today we are faced by a threat of a more serious
nature. International organized crime poses far more
significant threats than the Mafia and similar
organizations of the past. If we, as a superpower with all the
enormous resources at our disposal, have not been able to
eliminate the operations of a criminal organization within
our own borders, how much harder will it be for us to deal
with criminals operating both within and beyond our
borders? We are, in fact, only just beginning to develop the
kinds of institutions we need to take effective action. And we
cannot look for relief in this regard to other nations across
the world. In most instances, they are more out-manned,
out-gunned, and out-dollared by international criminal
organizations than we are.
There are many factors that make it difficult for the
United States to meet the challenge of international
organized crime. In the balance of this chapter, however, we
will focus for the most part on the problems related to
intelligence-gathering, analysis, and dissemination.
First, there are major structural, organizational, and
institutional obstacles that handicap us as we attempt to
deal with the threat of international organized crime. This
is particularly true in the area of intelligence. “Intelligence”
in this context means both law enforcement information
and information collected by the intelligence community.
Because international organized crime is international, we
have to work with the international community when we
attempt to deal with the threat. We cannot enforce our own
laws internationally, thus we have to work through other
countries. Yet they have different legal and administrative
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structures and different ways of doing business. To
compound the problem, many of the institutions with which
we have to deal are corrupt or compromised—when they are
not incompetent, incapable, or both. Another organizational
weakness is a lack of clarity when it comes to the allocation
of responsibility. Who collects the information? Who
analyses it? Who acts on it? Law enforcement operates by a
very different set of motives and authorities than does the
intelligence community. This leads, on one hand, to the
wasting of what are already limited resources. On the other
hand, it means that, at times, important issues fall through
the cracks in the system.
Second, international criminal organizations are very
adept at camouflaging their activities. As noted earlier,
criminal organizations have taken advantage of the growth
in banks without borders. They are taking advantage of
these markets in order to to disguise their activity. It is
extremely difficult to uncover criminal activity once the
associated money has fled to in the international financial
system.
Third, our ability to deal effectively with the current
threat is handicapped by the fact that international
organized criminals belong to what are, in effect, business
communities. Those tasked with pursuing them and
thwarting their activities are not trained and organized to
operate against this kind of institution. They are used to
dealing with other countries and with organizations like
themselves. They are not businessmen and do not think like
businessmen. Yet, unless they can think like businessmen,
they will find it very difficult to anticipate the moves of these
criminals and get the better of them.
Fourth, the best way to penetrate such organizations is
by human intelligence (HUMINT). The United States has
tended to rely too much on technical means instead. As a
result, it has neglected to find better ways to collect
intelligence by HUMINT. And it is clear that this will be no
easy task. Criminal organizations are largely ethnically
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based and use family networks to protect their empires.
This means that they are very adept at avoiding penetration
by outsiders.
Conclusion.
Clearly, then, international organized crime poses a
threat both in terms of the damage it can inflict and in terms
of our relative incapacity to defend against it. The picture
looks rather bleak. However, at least there is a dawning
awareness that there is a problem. A philosopher once
observed that, in dreaming, we all inhabit our separate
worlds, but on waking we all share the same world. And it is
in waking from our separate dreams that we learn that we
have a common problem or set of problems. We have awoken
to an appreciation of the threat and are perhaps at the point
where we will be able to work together with other nations
across the world to reduce it. It is to be hoped that we will. To
quote an observation by Winston Churchill, “Americans will
always do the right thing—after they have tried everything
else.”
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. See U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terorism,
Publication 10687, annually. In 1999, international terrorist acts
accounted for 233 deaths and 706 wounded worldwide. Only five U.S.
Citizens lost their lives in such incidents in 1999. Between 1994 and
1999, 68 Americans died in terrorist attacks internationally, and 613
were injured.
2. The most comprehensive source on international
narcotics-related issues is the U.S. Department of State’s International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report. This is an annual report on drug
production, trends, government activities, and the threat from criminal
organizations.
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CHAPTER 6
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS VIS-À-VIS LAW
ENFORCEMENT
AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:
LESSONS ON THE EMERGING
RELATIONSHIP
Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker
Introduction.1
If we are ever to successfully contain transnational
threats, whether chemical, biological, nuclear, cyber, or
criminal, it is vital that we find some way to improve
coordination between law enforcement and intelligence
services. This, in turn, will require us to understand the
differences in mission, legal authority, and institutional
cultures that separate those responsible for national
security and those who tend to domestic security. For it is
these as much as anything which give rise to the tensions
between the services. The role of law enforcement has
traditionally been confined to domestic matters, and its
mission has been to engage in criminal prosecution. By
contrast, the role of military intelligence has traditionally
been confined to dealing with strategic threats to the
nation’s security. Because their activities do not normally
involve citizens nor entail prosecutions, the normal
protections of the Bill of Rights do not apply. Both are
committed in their own way to protecting U.S. security, yet
the differences are often profound. Our challenge is to use
the tension created by their differences in a creative and
constructive, rather than limiting, manner.
The need for coordination between law enforcement and
defense intelligence capabilities has reached a crisis point
in the last decade. Geographic boundaries and jurisdictions
are becoming less relevant, especially where transnational
65

threats are concerned. As a result, law enforcement and
military intelligence find their roles overlapping in
untraditional ways. Yet a crisis can be an opportunity. If
both law enforcement and intelligence are needed to
confront transnational threats, new ways to surmount the
problem of coordination are needed; we must “think out of
the box” to discover new paradigms for cooperation and new
responses to the national security threats of the new
millennium. Yet while bold solutions are called for, all
changes in the relationship of law enforcement and defense
intelligence must observe constitutional limits with care.
Entrenched ideas can and do change. In my own case,
over the course of my long career in service to U.S. national
security organizations, my understanding of the
relationship between intelligence and law enforcement
gradually evolved, and my views often took surprising
turns. It took time, to be sure, but many of my basic
assumptions did change. The facts I observed gradually
forced me to challenge many of the fundamental legal
precepts that I had first learned in law school in the 1960s
and which were, as a result, deeply ingrained. It takes time
for an individual to change his or her basic assumptions. It
takes still longer when large agencies and whole nations are
involved. But it does happen.
Moreover, I have observed others considering whether
we should change the way we handle law enforcement and
military intelligence. Progress in understanding the
complicated issues involved has clearly been made. In 1992,
for example, the understanding of intelligence within the
Department of Justice was minimal.2 Today, however, there
is considerable understanding of both law enforcement and
intelligence capabilities among the affected agencies.3
So we certainly are capable of change. But should we?
My belief as to the importance of coordination does not, I
must say, go unchallenged. Some analysts, in fact, doubt the
seriousness of transnational security threats. Many others
worry about what might happen to citizen rights and
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protections if military intelligence and law enforcement
work together too closely. Thus we should not seek to change
the way things are before we have evaluated the threats and
determined our priorities.
How can we do this? History can provide us with some
guidance here. R. James Woolsey, former Director of
Central Intelligence, for example, has commented that our
deceptively peaceful and prosperous time is correctly
understood only when compared to the 1920s—an era
which, in hindsight, appears to be “the calm before the
storm.” Such historical reference is useful in determining
where we are now, where we should go, and how to arrive
safely. This is just as true for grand strategic questions as it
is for tactical legal considerations. So in this chapter, I will
resort to history of a very personal kind to try to shed light
on these important questions. I will share with you the
lessons that I learned through my own personal
experiences. I will take you on a journey through my past,
dwelling on those key moments when my consciousness was
shaped by events. Along the way, I will broach some of the
solutions that have suggested themselves to me.
Lessons.
Experience has helped me identify several problems that
need to be dealt with if we are to create better coordination
between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. To
begin with, each of these two communities occupies a
different part of the constitutional landscape, and neither
knows the other’s territory well. At the beginning of my
tenure as General Counsel of the National Security Agency
(NSA), I thought I understood the best way to protect the
constitutional rights of citizens. My confidence was based on
16 years in civil rights, civil liberties, and anti-trust
litigation. I thought I understood the Bill of Rights and the
protection of the civil rights of citizens. With the arrogance
that sometimes characterizes lawyers, I was sure there was
little I could learn about protecting the rights of U.S.
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persons from my new NSA colleagues. I was equally
convinced, having represented draft resisters during the
Vietnam War, that the military—one in five of my new NSA
colleagues—could not help me. I erred on both counts.
I learned that while my NSA colleagues might learn
something from my experience, the reverse was more often
true. And the most important thing I learned from my NSA
colleagues was that there had been effective responses to
problems uncovered in the Watergate period—responses
not only unknown to me but to most other informed
Americans. Two new rules, in particular, had been
developed in response to the Watergate scandal. These
rules, I found out, were simple and comprehensive. First,
U.S. intelligence may “not collect on U.S. persons.” Second,
U.S. intelligence “does not do law enforcement work.” The
entire NSA work force was indoctrinated with these two
rules. As a result, the legal decisions being made by the NSA
Office of General Counsel were far more careful than mine
would have been. Both predecessors and successors as NSA
General Counsel have told me that they experienced a
similar change of heart.
In later years, this early impression—that few lawyers
understood the rudiments of intelligence operations
law—was repeatedly reinforced as I talked to different
groups about the law of intelligence. It was inescapably
confirmed as a result of the financial crisis involving the
Atlantic branch of the Banca Nazionale de Lavoro
(BNL)—the so-called “Pizza Connection Case.”4
Early on, I was asked by a senior federal official why U.S.
intelligence had failed to note a fraudulent wire transfer
scheme involving movement of millions of dollars among
accounts in American branches of an Italian bank. His
question revealed ignorance of a significant Watergate
reform: it is unlawful for U.S. intelligence to collect law
enforcement information about U.S. persons or to
investigate law enforcement concerns in the United States.
Here was a major gap in understanding about U.S.
68

intelligence. I was stunned. If senior federal officials did not
understand NSA’s governing principles, how could wise
decisions about the relationship between law enforcement
and intelligence be made?
My surprise was colored by the fact that I had been
greatly influenced by the opinions of Justice Lewis Powell in
cases considering the legal role of intelligence under the
U.S. Constitution. I had assumed that Justice Powell’s
understanding of the constitutional role of intelligence was
widely shared throughout all branches of
government—Congress, the executive branch, and the
judiciary. In fact, I now saw that Justice Powell’s sensibility
was something of an anomaly. It was produced by his own
unique experiences during World War II as an Army officer
responsible for handling sensitive intelligence information
garnered from coded German communications.
It was this experience that had enabled Justice Powell so
readily to balance the demands of national security with the
Constitutional requirements of the Bill of Rights and to
design approaches to protect at one and the same time
classified information, individual rights, and national
security.
Of course there are others who, with Justice Powell, have
recognized that our Constitution has two distinct halves. A
domestic internal half, focused on the relationship of the
government to its citizens, is embodied in the Bill of Rights.
An external half, focused on the relationship of the
government to its citizens protects the nation from its
external enemies. Judge William H. Webster was once
questioned about how he, a former federal circuit court
judge, could comfortably lead first the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and later the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). He showed a clear recognition of this division
when he said in response, “Domestically, I follow all of the
law; abroad, I support the Constitution.”
In its external role, our government is responsible only
for the protection of its citizens, not for the preservation of
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their rights. I had not considered this role and so had given
little thought to constitutional authorities outside of the Bill
of Rights. I had had cause to reflect on the authorities
enjoyed by the president in his capacity as commander in
chief. When he fulfills this function and is entrusted with
the duty of protecting American citizens, he enjoys his
greatest power. And for the intelligence services, it is
precisely these considerable authorities that are of the
greatest significance. For they derive their own
responsibilities and functions from the needs and demands
placed on them by the president in his national security
capacity.
Like the majority of lawyers, I did not appreciate the
entire set of rights and obligations that our constitution
imposes upon the president and upon those who “stand in
the shoes” of his national security authority—like the
intelligence community. Not understanding these
authorities or being unaware of them, I assumed they did
not exist. “Intelligence law” was an oxymoron because I only
understood one half of the constitutional picture.
This gap in understanding continues to grow. Today, too
many of those under 30 know about intelligence only from
movies or TV—questionable sources for accurate
information. For many years, a shared World War II
experience gave our national leadership a common
understanding about the importance of intelligence and its
proper, but limited role in a democratic governmental
structure. Now that consensus has been lost.
We must bridge this gap. We must relearn how—and
why—our two national responsibilities (national and
domestic security) are organized as they are. From such a
shared understanding, we can rebuild an understanding of
the requirements of our national security. We can
determine what are the legal requirements of national
security, whether domestic or foreign. We can decide what
the balance should be between individual liberty and
national security under our constitution in this new
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century. If we do not do so, we will be, I am afraid, a house
divided between national security and personal liberty,
between intelligence and law enforcement. Transnational
threats will surely endanger this balance and may require
us to consider new ways of doing business. But we will not be
well-prepared to make these changes unless we first
understand the current structure and the reasons for it.
At a slightly later stage in my career, my sense of the
gaping divide between the various communities deepened.
In particular I was alerted to the fact that, if few lawyers
understood the rudiments of intelligence operations law,
there was equally much that intelligence did not
understand about law enforcement. The painful debate on
encryption export policy that has raged for over 10 years did
much to crystallize this consciousness.5
The encryption debate revolves around the question of
whether the government should intervene in order to limit
the strength of encryption products. Some of these are now
so powerful that law enforcement officials cannot decipher
them, and this deprives them of the traditional ability to
eavesdrop electronically. U.S. firms have been prohibited
from exporting their best products. These measures are
strongly supported by law enforcement officers, who are
worried about the protection encryption offers to criminals.
But privacy advocates and U.S. software makers want to
keep government out of the way. I myself participated in
several rounds of the struggle to formulate policy on this
issue while I was at NSA.
During the second round of policy discussions, I
suggested to a new NSA director that the encryption debate
was less about foreign intelligence-gathering than law
enforcement. The problem of unreadable encryption would
be most serious for law enforcement. In contrast, NSA
would find the free export of encryption more manageable.
Therefore, the law enforcement community, particularly
the FBI, should take the lead in designing a balanced
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encryption export policy. The director encouraged me to
bring this idea to the attention of the FBI.
The FBI representatives were surprised on learning that
NSA could not immediately decode and read all encrypted
communications—that some encryption might be too
powerful even for NSA to handle in real time. This news did
not inspire grave concern, however, because those
attending the meeting were locally focused and did not
consider wiretaps to be the critical law enforcement
technique for the post-Cold War world.
This view changed dramatically with the arrival of a new
FBI Director, Judge Louis Freeh, whose own personal
experience with wire tap information in the so-called “Pizza
Connection Case” seemed to have convinced him that the
future of law enforcement would be both global and
technology-driven. This new FBI Director intuitively
grasped the significance of the need to control U.S.
encryption exports.6 He needed no explanation of why
national security and even more so, domestic security,
needed protection against the proliferation of unreadable
encryption then beginning to flood the commercial
marketplace. Here again, personal experience was the key
to his understanding.
Yet despite Judge Freeh’s deeply held personal concern,
influencing a major national security policy involving the
need to coordinate several large bureaucracies proved
exceedingly difficult. Neither he nor the FBI were
sufficiently knowledgeable about encryption technology to
fashion an effective policy for many years. Instead,
motivated by fear of the unknown, they prevented any
change in policy. In so doing, they quite possibly damaged
for years to come any productive relationships with the
technology community. In contrast, while NSA understood
encryption technology and was prepared to accommodate a
changing world, it did not understand the needs of law
enforcement or the process of policy formulation. In
consequence, its actions further confused and enraged the
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“high-tech” community and made it still harder to bring
about constructive change.
Later, when the Department of Commerce was assigned
the role of implementing a succession of new encryption
policies, matters became even more confused. The
Department of Commerce did not understand the
underlying technology of encryption. It had to design and
implement regulations which would be flexible and fair and
at the same time distinguish among highly technical
products whose national security characteristics could not
always be predicted prior to government review. This
proved to be a very difficult policy dilemma.
As the evolution of a new encryption policy progressed
from 1984 to 1999, various approaches were considered. The
early Clipper Chip initiative offered the public high-quality
cryptographic protection embedded in hardware in
exchange for the government’s ability to read the
underlying text, but presumably only under appropriate,
legally authorized circumstances.7 The idea was so severely
criticized that it was eventually discarded. As a policy the
Clipper Chip failed.8 Although the Clipper Chip was
technically innovative, those supporting it had not
considered the public’s mistrust of intelligence. How could
so fundamental a mistake have been made? Those whose
professional life is spent working on intelligence gain little
understanding of policy formulation. They may not always
see themselves as others do. Experience again was the
deciding factor. It explains why the Clipper Chip seemed a
good idea to some within the intelligence community,
particularly those from a military background, accustomed
as they were to positive public relations, but a very bad one
to the rest of the world.
Interestingly, not everyone in the intelligence
community reacted positively when the Clipper Chip
program was first proposed. Some career NSA
cryptographers recalled the price that NSA had earlier paid
for its involvement with the communications of U.S.
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citizens. One senior official reacted with great concern to the
proposal. It was his view that NSA should not create a
readable encryption system for public use because it would
enable NSA technically to read the mail of U.S. citizens. It
was, in some ways, encouraging to find this intense concern
from so senior a member of NSA. At the same time, it was
less comforting in that it revealed a lack of understanding
about how the law controls government capabilities when
citizens’ rights are involved. We bar government from
misusing its technical capabilities, not by preventing or
eliminating these capabilities but by regulating their use
under a rule of law. It is this distinction that separates a
domestic wire tap from foreign signals intelligence. Lacking
experience in the world of domestic law enforcement where
the only protection a citizen has against intrusive
governmental conduct is the law, this NSA official found the
idea underlying the Clipper Chip very disturbing. Many
private citizens agreed with him.
As the encryption policy debate progressed, confusion
among the affected agencies and their personnel grew.
Coordination became problematic because agencies seemed
not to understand their own role in encryption policy
development and implementation, much less that of others.
An interdependent policy addressing simultaneously the
needs of national security, law enforcement, and
commercial regulation proved exceedingly difficult when no
one player understood all parts of this policy puzzle.
Such confusion can be expected to reoccur in the future
as effective yet constitutional responses to transnational
threats are explored, unless all agencies involved in dealing
with transnational threats understand one another.
Studies and commissions on this topic have been increasing
in number since the early 1990s, when several failures of
coordination produced mini-scandals sensationalized by the
press to prod Congress. Eventually the earlier-noted BNL
matter became public, convincing many that the CIA “lied”
in denying that it had information about the banks’ alleged
criminal wrongdoing. In fact, closer examination shows
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something quite different. The CIA Office of the General
Counsel was asked by the Department of Justice whether
there were any reports showing “criminal conduct” by the
Bank. The General Counsel’s Office responded that there
was no such information. It failed to mention, however, that
other reports existed which were relevant to the Bank, but
which in the view of the General Counsel’s Office did not
suggest criminal wrongdoing. When these other reports
came to light, the reaction, as is almost always true when
the CIA allegedly missteps, was that the Agency had been
engaged in an effort to mislead the Department of Justice.
This exchange had the misfortune of occurring in the midst
of a presidential election; it quickly became impossible to
engage in any sensible analysis as charges and
countercharges of increasing intensity reverberated
between the three branches of government.
In the aftermath of both the presidential election and the
BNL scandal, an effort was launched to learn what had gone
wrong in this matter and what could be done to avoid such
failures in coordination between law enforcement and
intelligence in the future when once again they needed to
work together. As co-chair of this effort, I spent great
amounts of time considering the issues that were
preventing law enforcement and intelligence from working
together. My understanding of the issues deepened. It again
became clear that even the most sophisticated members of
the Department of Justice, who had for years worked with
legal issues relevant to intelligence, still did not really
understand the process of gathering and disseminating
intelligence. Nor were there formally established
procedures or other points of contact to guide the
relationship of these two large bureaucracies where
intelligence reporting was concerned.9 This was because the
Department of Justice was not seen as an important
“consumer” by the intelligence community.
Thus, when the Department of Justice posed a question
to the CIA General Counsel’s Office about available
intelligence, the question did not fit well with the office’s
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legal mission. Indeed, as it turns out, the question could not
properly have been answered either by that office or by the
CIA as a whole.
Intelligence reporting has highly structured “channels”
for its analysis, reporting, and dissemination, understood
by personnel on both the consumer and collection side who
have been trained in the proper handling of intelligence
reporting. Intelligence is often fragmentary and
inconclusive, very different from the investigative reports
created by law enforcement investigators. The CIA General
Counsel’s Office manages the Agency’s legal issues but does
not perform an intelligence collection or dissemination
function. It was thus not an appropriate entity to ask to
provide intelligence.
For its part, no part of the intelligence collection
community is trained to make judgments on what is
“criminal” and what is not. Its job, instead, is to collect
information relevant to topics required, not to characterize
what has been collected. Thus Department of Justice had
asked the wrong part of the agency for intelligence
information and placed a characterization on that
intelligence which collectors were not competent to provide.
It did so because it was comfortable dealing with the
General Counsel’s Office and did not have an established
relationship with the intelligence collection and analysis
portions in the CIA.
Under normal circumstances the Agency’s lawyers
should have recognized this problem, recast the request for
information to exclude legal conclusions, and referred it to
the proper part of the Agency for direct handling with the
Department of Justice. However, this exchange happened
in a highly charged situation, amidst intense public
pressure, on the eve of a holiday week-end, making
thoughtful analysis of a novel situation difficult. No one
took the time to analyze the situation.
In retrospect, we also learned that the Department of
Justice was poorly equipped to work with even that
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intelligence information which it had been receiving.
Reports on apparent topics of general interest to law
enforcement went unread for want of staff trained to
understand its potential value.
As a result of this debacle, at the beginning of the Clinton
administration, a new CIA Director and Attorney General
pledged to coordinate more effectively. To do so, they
initiated studies on the working relationship of law
enforcement to intelligence. I was assigned to this effort,
along with a Department of Justice colleague, and had the
opportunity to analyze the relationship, identify problems,
and recommend changes. We were mutually astounded at
what we did not understand about one another’s
responsibilities, although we had worked together closely
over many years. Importantly, our relationship had been
focused on law enforcement prosecutions and other
litigation, where the intelligence agencies were the
governmental client of the Department of Justice. In BNL
the roles were reversed. The Department of Justice became
the client of the intelligence community, seeking
information relevant to its mission. This had not arisen
before, and structures and trained personnel were not in
place to work effectively with one another.
At the conclusion of this study in 1994, a report was
issued touching on many of the issues in the present book.
Still we did not anticipate that the world of law enforcement
would so alter that today, not only senior officials at the
Department of Justice but even local law enforcement
would need to understand how to work with intelligence.
The study required 2 years to complete. The issues were
conceptually difficult. Often we lacked a common language
to explore our concerns. The same words had different
meanings depending on which community was involved.
For example, the two communities had very different
reactions to the concept and rules for handling a “source” of
information. For intelligence, a source’s identity (whether a
person or technical means) is something to be permanently
protected. Not to do so would subject the source, whether a
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person in a foreign environment or a valuable technology, to
permanent compromise. In contrast, a law enforcement
source typically is designed for a specific, short-term use
and is expected to become public when used in prosecution
and trial. These differences produced legendary
misunderstandings.
Complicating this was misunderstanding about the
authorities of each and the lack of a shared understanding
of the constitutional conceptual framework into which each
fitted. So, too, the authorities governing collection on
various topics differed. Finally, for want of understanding,
the two communities were intensely suspicious of one
another. In sum, what members of the two communities did
not know about one another vastly outdistanced what they
did know.
If the intelligence and law enforcement agencies are to
coordinate with maximum effectiveness while observing
constitutional limits, and if the relevant agencies within
these communities are to work together, common
experience and a better exchange of ideas are needed. (This
coordination problem also characterizes many of the
historical relationships within each of these two
communities. Until recently, the CIA’s problems with the
FBI were mild compared to those with NSA.) In our effort to
protect citizens against governmental abuse of power, we
have segregated power into pieces, hoping to contain that
power by compartmentalizing it. The negative aspect to this
approach is that it creates different systems and different
cultures which are unfamiliar and often suspicious of one
another. There is more than a separation of rules and
authorities. In the end an “anthropological divide” and an
inability to communicate separate these two communities,
preventing their cooperation.
This legal, functional, and cultural separation requires
forceful corrective action, not wishful thinking. From my
perspective, Congress would be wise to explore legislating a
personnel system where rotational assignments for anyone
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seeking a mid-level management position in these agencies
are mandatory. Specific—and positive—career incentives
are needed to overcome the natural disinclination to leave
one’s “mother agency” for a rotational tour at a sister agency
when such a move may prove harmful to career
advancement. Without such incentives, it will be difficult to
overcome the disinclination that all people have for change.
Another point is relevant here. Law enforcement and
intelligence organizations are consciously structured on the
model of a “fighting force.” The creation of esprit de corps by
building cohesion, discipline, and the ability to work
effectively together is widely regarded as important. Yet
this very esprit de corps can lead to an “us against the world”
psychology which can be both a strength and a weakness.
Where coordination is concerned, it can be particularly
problematic. The isolation it promotes and the associated
provincial lack of world experience also make difficult such
efforts as understanding others, setting a strategic agenda,
and problem-solving that is “out of the box.”
Thus, besides improving coordination, mandated
rotational assignments promise to offer a second benefit.
The shared experiences and enhanced mutual goodwill
would perhaps foster more creative thinking. Current
personnel systems do not make this easy. To be sure, such a
change in personnel structure would generate concerns.
The fact that the various agencies have different legal
structures would cause some complications. Problems
would likely arise also over the sharing of classified
information with those not cleared for access to all levels of
classified information through different agency processes.
For many years, insistence by the intelligence community
that no one be provided full access to the community
without meeting the community’s comprehensive
background checks, including a polygraph examination,
was a major barrier to the type of personnel exchange I am
recommending here. Gradually that has begun to change,
particularly in certain “joint” activities such as the CIA
centers designed to confront terrorism and
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nonproliferation. Consistent pressure is needed to
guarantee that this progress continues. These issues are
numerous and difficult. They require a concerted and
continuous effort to ensure that both the intelligence and
the law enforcement communities actively engage in
practices that will loosen their respective bureaucratic
structures and make possible greater exchange. We can
coordinate activities as appropriate, even with people of
different clearance levels.
Nonetheless, personal experience teaches me that
increased personnel exchanges can foster more creative
thinking about the problems of transnational threats
among even the most knowledgeable leaders in our military
intelligence and law enforcement communities. In 1992 I
chanced to meet two of the most senior and respected
leaders of the national security community at a seminar on
the future of post-Cold War intelligence. A paper circulated
for review had said nothing about the emerging relationship
between law enforcement and intelligence. Surprised, I
questioned this omission and for my trouble received blank
looks. In 1996, the experience was repeated with yet a third
highly regarded senior expert in the field of military
intelligence. These same views, when offered to law
professors at several highly ranked national law schools in
1994 and 1995, were no more warmly received.
These experiences are offered not to highlight my own
insight, but rather to suggest that I had enjoyed the
advantage of coming from one culture into another and,
with that, had been stimulated to ask fundamental
questions. My point here is that even very experienced and
knowledgeable people cannot understand what they have
not experienced. It is their very expertise in one discipline or
area, gained from a lifetime of intense and circumscribed
focus, that makes coming up with new paradigms and
out-of-the-box solutions difficult. The cross fertilization of
two cultures as similar, yet different, as law enforcement
and intelligence can be profoundly enriching. It can inspire
new ways of attacking common problems, even as these two
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communities continue to perform their tasks according to
different constitutional and legal requirements. Nothing
short of this type of mind-expanding experience is required
if we want to identify the most creative responses to our
problems. I think of this as stepping outside ourselves so
that we can see ourselves and our problems “in the round.”
This is the only perspective that will be good enough as we
confront transnational threats in the post-Cold War world.
The private sector is another area we might explore in
our search for creative new ideas. One of the most important
changes in the recent past is the realization that the private
sector is now a crucial part of our national security.
Government will be able to realize national security
objectives such as protecting the nation’s infrastructure
only if it talks with private industry. Yet industry no longer
is comfortable talking to the government. Why? Among
other reasons, they fear that threat information shared with
the government will become embarrassingly public or
competitively valuable information, or that trademarks will
be lost. Combined with this is a mistrust of government
motives in the national security arena. Once again, this
mistrust is born of a lack of understanding.
Correspondingly, the government cannot now share its
classified information with the private sector. Sensitive
information, whether produced in the public or private
sector, cannot go back and forth readily without carefully
devised regulations and procedures to protect important
interests on both sides. But solutions are being explored.
One of the results of President Clinton’s critical
infrastructure protection initiative is the notion of mixed
public and private centers where both sides can exchange
information with the other in a protected environment.
Perhaps this approach—creating mixed-use entities—could
work in other areas as well. At a minimum, as the Clipper
Chip story shows, the private sector increasingly must be a
part of the discussion.
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Such exchanges promise do more than just facilitate
coordination. The opportunity to change places and see the
world from different perspectives provides us with the
means to challenge our existing assumptions and think in
new ways. This is vital. If we ever hope to find effective
approaches to transnational threats, it is necessary that we
become more creative in our thinking.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. The substance of these comments was originally presented during
a banquet speech at the Conference on Transnational Threats: Blending
Law Enforcement and Military Strategies, February 2-3, 2000. The
editor chose to retain the informal style because of the personal nature
of the approach.
2. At the time, even establishing points of contact for our
intelligence agencies at selected U.S. attorneys’ offices was problematic,
if only because of the different standards imposed on access to
intelligence information by both communities. The understanding of
intelligence within the Department of Justice was minimal. In contrast,
questions asked today even by local law enforcement representatives
are quite sophisticated.
3. One law enforcement representative noted that he had found it
difficult to use military intelligence to assist him in drug trafficking
investigations. He asked how he could use this information in a public
trial if it had to remain classified. The answer, of course, is that it is
possible for law enforcement to use military intelligence while still
observing the important legal and practical requirements unique to
each. With careful coordination, military intelligence can point out
areas of concern. Law enforcement can then follow these leads, using its
own investigative techniques. This solves the problem, as only the latter
becomes evidence for courtroom use.
4. This episode, in fact, eventually led to a public examination of the
problem. The Pizza Connection case was an international drug
trafficking case that was broken through the effective use of
wiretapping.
5. For background on the encryption debate, see Dan Froomkin,
www.washingtonpost.com (Staff); and Amy Branson, LEGI-SLATE
News Service, “Deciphering Encryption,” updated May 8, 1998, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/encryption
/encryption.htm. Encryption is data-scrambling technology. The debate

82

centered on whether or not the government should step in and limit the
strength of encryption products to maintain law enforcement’s
historical ability to eavesdrop electronically on anyone it wants.
Current policy has totally relaxed controls.
6. FBI Director Louis Freeh is an outspoken advocate of encryption
restrictions. He argues that the ability to conduct court-authorized
electronic surveillance should be built into any technology, including
powerful encryption software. He fears, for example, that were the FBI
and local police to lose the ability to tap telephones because of the
widespread use of strong cryptography, the “country [would] be unable
to protect itself against terrorism, violent crime, foreign threats, drug
trafficking, espionage, kidnapping, and other crimes.”
7. For a thorough discussion of the Clipper Chip, see Michael
Froomkin, “The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip,
and the Constitution,” 1995. The article, which is posted on the internet
at http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/clipper.htm,
addresses three issues. First, it outlines some of the promises and
dangers of encryption. Second, it analyzes the constitutional
implications of a major government proposal premised on the theory
that it is reasonable for the government to request (and perhaps
someday to require) private persons to communicate in a manner that
makes governmental interception practical and preferably easy. Third,
it speculates on how the legal vacuum regarding encryption in
cyberspace shortly will be, or should be, filled.
8. Regarding the Clipper Chip and related products, the
government proposes that, in exchange for providing the private sector
with an encryption technology certified as unbreakable for years to
come by NSA, the government would keep a copy of the keys—the codes
belonging to each chip. The government hopes that this would allow it to
retain the ability to intercept messages sent by the chip’s user. Ibid.
9. In contrast, clear procedures had existed for some time to guide
the relationship where the Department of Justice was acting as the
CIA’s lawyer.
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CHAPTER 7
TERRORISM BY WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION:
A REASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT
Bruce Hoffman
Terrorism today reflects both enormous change and
remarkable continuity. New adversaries with new
motivations and new rationales have indeed appeared in
recent years to challenge some of our most basic
assumptions about terrorists and terrorism. Their
emergence, however, has not produced the anticipated
changes in either terrorist weaponry or tactics that were
predicted to follow in the wake of the Aum Shinri Kyo’s 1995
nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Instead, as has been
the case for more than a century, the gun and the bomb
remain the terrorist’s main weapons of choice. Thus, as
fanatical or irrational as even this new breed of terrorists
may seem, like their more traditional counterparts they
have also remained operationally conservative: adhering to
the same familiar and narrow tactical repertoire they have
mastered and believe maximizes their likelihood of success.
For this reason, future terrorist use of chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons may be far less
certain than is now commonly assumed.
The New Terrorism and Its Putative Implications.
In the past, terrorism was practiced by a group of
individuals belonging to an identifiable organization with a
clear command and control apparatus who had a defined set
of political, social, or economic objectives. Radical leftist
organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, Germany’s
Red Army Faction, Italy’s Red Brigades, as well as
ethno-nationalist terrorist movements like the Abu Nidal
organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the
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Basque separatist group, Basque Fatherland and Liberty
(ETA), reflected this stereotype of the traditional terrorist
group. They issued communiqués taking credit for—and
explaining—their actions. However disagreeable or
distasteful their aims and motivations were, their ideology
and intentions were at least comprehensible.
Most significantly, however, these familiar terrorist
groups engaged in highly selective acts of violence. They
bombed various “symbolic” targets representing the source
of their animus—embassies, banks, or national airline
carriers—or they kidnapped and assassinated specific
persons whom they blamed for economic exploitation or
political repression. Their purpose was generally to attract
attention to themselves and their causes.
Finally, these groups were often numerically
constrained. They mostly comprised relatively small
numbers of persons. Neither the Japanese Red Army nor
the Red Army Faction, for example, ever numbered more
than 20 to 30 hard-core members. The Red Brigades were
hardly larger, with a total of fewer when 50 to 75 dedicated
terrorists. Even the IRA and ETA could call on the violent
services of only some 200-400 activists, while the feared Abu
Nidal organization was limited to some 500 men-at-arms at
any given time.
In contrast to the stereotypical terrorist group of the
past, the new generation of terrorists shows signs of having
undergone several important organizational changes.
These, in turn, have affected their operations,
decisionmaking, and targeting. Rather than belonging to
the pyramidal, hierarchical organizational structures that
were dominant among terrorist organizations during the
1970s and 1980s, terrorists are now increasingly part of far
more amorphous, indistinct, and broader movements.
These movements also tend to operate on a linear rather
than hierarchical basis. Hence, instead of the classic
cellular structure that was common to previous generations
of terrorist organizations, some contemporary groups are
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more loosely connected or indirectly linked through
networks. These networks are comprised of both
professional members (for example, full-time terrorists) and
amateurs (hangers-on, supporters, sympathizers, and
would-be terrorists who may lack the expertise or
experience of their more established counterparts).
The absence of any existing, publicly identified central
command authority is significant. First, it means that a
state that has fallen victim to a terrorist attack may not be
able to find a useful target to hit in retaliation. This could
serve to remove any inhibitions on the terrorists’ part
against inflicting widespread, indiscriminate casualties.
Individual networks thus could have greater freedom and
independence in tactical decisions than traditional terrorist
cells. Accordingly, this particular type of loosely structured
terrorist group may pose a very different and potentially far
more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar,
traditional, terrorist adversaries. Second, the anonymity
intrinsic to this type of operation, coupled with the lack of a
discernible organizational structure with a distinguishable
command chain behind the attackers, is deliberately
designed to prevent easy identification and also facilitate
the perpetrators’ escape and evasion.
Finally, many terrorist movements today have less
easily defined aims or identified objectives. Some appear to
be motivated by unswerving hostility towards the West in
general, and the United States in particular, or a desire for
revenge and retaliation that is frequently fuelled by
compelling religious imperatives and justifications rather
than abstract political ideologies. In the past, the familiar,
predominantly secular terrorist groups mostly claimed
credit for and explained their violent acts. In contrast, the
most heinous and lethal attacks perpetrated by terrorists
over the past decade—which have usually been directed
against civilians—have gone unclaimed.1 By maintaining
their anonymity, terrorists may believe that they are able to
capitalize further on the fear and alarm intrinsically
generated by their violence.
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This array of changes has, in turn, raised serious
concerns about the continued relevance of much of the
conventional wisdom on terrorism—particularly as it
pertains to potential future terrorist use of CBRN weapons.
In the past, most analyses of the possibility of mass
indiscriminate killing involving CBRN terrorism tended to
discount it. Few terrorists, it was argued, know anything
about the technical intricacies of either developing or
deploying such weapons. Political, moral, and practical
considerations were also perceived as important restraints
on terrorist use of such weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Finally, and most significantly, we assured
ourselves that terrorists wanted mass spectators rather
than mass casualties. We believed, therefore, that terrorists
had little interest in and little to gain from killing wantonly
and indiscriminately.
A number of terrorist incidents in the 1990s forced a
reevaluation of the terrorist threat. We may point in
particular to the 1993 bombing of New York City’s World
Trade Center by Islamic extremists, the 1995 nerve gas
attack on the Tokyo subway by an apocalyptic Japanese
religious sect mentioned earier, and the bombing of a
government office building in Oklahoma City by an
American white supremacist just a month after the Tokyo
incident. These events, coupled with other attacks
perpetrated by religious-inspired terrorists throughout the
world during the 1990s, appeared to have rendered
traditional analysis dangerously anachronistic.2 Upon
closer examination, however, this has not proven to be
so—despite fears, arguments and spending to the contrary.
First, this new era of terrorism has yet to materialize.
Terrorism, as reported by such authoritative sources as the
U.S. State Department’s annual Global Patterns of
Terrorism publications, has indeed become increasingly
lethal.3 Yet only a total of 84 Americans were killed in 40
attacks perpetrated against U.S. targets overseas during
the 1990s. Approximately six times as many Americans
(571), however, were killed by terrorists in the 69 attacks
88

that occurred the previous decade.4 These figures do not
seem to reflect an upward trend. It is, of course,
incontestably tragic that any Americans should lose their
lives to violence or be wantonly harmed and injured simply
because of the nationality of the passport they carry, the
uniform they wear, or the job they perform. And terrorism
remains a threat to Americans travelling or working
abroad. Nonetheless, the fact remains that despite the
appearance of the “new face terrorism,” the streets of the
world hardly run red with American blood.
Nor is the situation terribly different in the United
States itself. Admittedly, a total of 176 persons were killed
by terrorists in this country during the 1990s—more than
twice the international figure. We must be careful, however,
how we interpret these figures. According to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), only 25 terrorist incidents
occurred in the United States between 1990 and 1997 (the
last year for which figures have been published). The tragic
death toll is the result of only three incidents. And of the
three incidents, it was one especially heinous act—the 1995
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal office building in
Oklahoma City—that accounts for the overwhelming
majority of fatalities (168 deaths).5 Again, there is no doubt
that terrorism remains a threat to the lives and well-being
of Americans in our own country. The actual number of
terrorist incidents (as opposed to the hundreds of CBRN
hoaxes that the FBI and other law enforcement and public
safety agencies now routinely respond to), remains,
however, remarkably low, and those that cause fatalities
still lower.6
None of the above considerations, it should be
emphasized, is meant to suggest that the United States
should become complacent about the threat of terrorism
(domestic or international) or in any way relax our vigilance
either at home or abroad. Terrorism poses, and will likely
continue to pose, a serious threat to Americans and
American interests both in this country and overseas.
Nonetheless, it is equally clear that there has been a
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tendency to exaggerate the dimensions of the threat and the
strategic impact that terrorist violence has actually
wrought. And by overreacting and falling prey to a sense of
acute fear and intimidation, we inflate the terrorists’ power
in ways that are both counterproductive and often divorced
from reality.7
Terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological
warfare, and fomenting widespread fear and intimidation is
essential to terrorists’ purposes. Accordingly, by
succumbing to their threats and braggadocio, and by failing
to distinguish their inflated rhetoric from genuine
intentions and actual capabilities, we play into their hands.
We risk making hard policy choices and budgetary
allocations based mostly on misperception and
misunderstanding rather than on hard analysis built on
empirical evidence. Indeed, the incorrect lessons derived
from the Aum Shinri Kyo experience in general and the
1995 nerve gas attack in particular illustrate the dangers of
responding emotionally and viscerally rather than soberly
and calmly to such terrorist threats.8
The Misunderstood Lessons of Aum Shinri Kyo.
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, the possibility
that the motives of terrorists are changing, and that they
may come to contemplate ever more bloody and heinous acts
including the use of CBRN weapons. Even if we suppose this
is an accurate reading of events (although the empirical
evidence cited above seems to belie this), these trends do not
necessarily imply that terrorists currently possess (as it is
frequently portrayed) either the requisite scientific
knowledge or technical capabilities to implement their
violent ambitions. In this respect, even if it is as easy, as
some say, for terrorists to culture anthrax spores or brew up
a concoction of deadly nerve gas, there are other difficulties
that stand in their way. The effective dissemination of these
viruses and poisons still presents serious technical hurdles
that greatly inhibit their effective use. Indeed, the same
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Japanese religious sect that is most directly responsible for
precipitating our current obsession with terrorism and
CBRN weapons is precisely a case in point.
The Aum Shinri Kyo, it must be said, was by no means a
typical terrorist group. The archetypal terrorist
organization is composed of a handful of men and women,
with limited training, technical capabilities, and resources.
Aum defies this pattern. It was a religious movement with
upwards of 50,000 members and offices in New York,
Germany, Australia, Russia, and Sri Lanka, in addition to
Japan. Aum had assets estimated to be in the neighborhood
of $1 billion—and at least certainly in the hundreds of
millions. It specifically recruited graduates with scientific
and engineering degrees from Japan’s leading universities
and provided them with state-of-the-art laboratories and
lavish budgets with which to fund the group’s variegated
weapons research and development (R&D) programs. While
its biological weapons research was comparatively
modest—its research never employed more than perhaps 20
persons at most9—as many as 80 scientific personnel were
specifically detailed to work on the group’s chemical
weapons programs.
When police raided the sect’s laboratories following the
nerve gas attack, for example, they found enough sarin to
kill an estimated 4.2 million persons.10 In addition, Aum
had either already produced or planned to develop other
powerful nerve agents such as VX, tabun, and soman;
chemical weapons such as mustard gas and sodium cyanide;
and deadly biological warfare pathogens that included
anthrax, the highly contagious disease known as Q-fever,11
and possibly the deadly Ebola virus as well.12 Aum’s most
ambitious project, however, was doubtless its efforts to
develop a nuclear capability. To this end, the group had
purchased a 500,000-acre sheep station in a remote part of
Western Australia. There, they hoped to mine uranium that
was to be shipped back to Aum’s laboratories in Japan
where scientists using laser enrichment technology would
convert it into weapons-grade nuclear material.13
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The group had also assembled an impressive panoply of
conventional weaponry. Aum is believed to have purchased
large quantities of small arms from Russian sources and to
have been in the market for advanced weaponry such as
tanks, jet fighters, surface-to-surface rocket launchers, and
even a tactical nuclear weapon. Aum succeeded in obtaining
a surplus twin-turbine Mi-117 helicopter—complete with
chemical spray dispersal devices. The group also
planned—and had gone as far as to acquire sophisticated
robotic manufacturing devices—to produce at least a
thousand knock-off versions of Russia’s world-famous
AK-47 assault rifle along with one million cartridges.
Finally, the sect had determined how to manufacture TNT
and the central component of plastic explosives, RDX.14
However, despite Aum’s considerable financial wealth,
the technical expertise that it could call upon from its
well-educated members and the vast resources and
state-of-the-art equipment at their disposal, the group could
not effect even a single truly successful chemical or
biological attack. On at least nine occasions, the group
attempted to disseminate botulinum toxin (Clostridium
botulinum) or anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) using aerosol
means. Each time they failed, either because the botulinum
agents they grew and enriched were not toxic or the
mechanical sprayers used to disseminate the anthrax
spores became clogged and hence inoperative.15
Even the comparatively more successful sarin attack on
the Tokyo subway would be laughable if not for the tragic
deaths of 12 persons and the physical and psychological
harm caused to many more victims. For all its sophisticated
research and development, the best means the group could
find to disseminate the nerve gas was in plastic trash bags
that had to be poked open with sharpened umbrella tips in
order to release the noxious mixture.16 And for all the fear
generated by this attack, it was far from achieving mass
destruction or inflicting mass casualties. New research has
revealed that the number of persons physically injured or
affected by the attack is much lower than previously
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reported.17 Of the 5,000 persons who received medical
treatment in the aftermath of the subway attack, the vast
majority (73.9 percent) were suffering from shock,
emotional upset, or some psychosomatic symptom.18 That
the Aum, with all its unique advantages, could do no more
harm than this speaks volumes about the challenges facing
any less well endowed terrorist organization.
In sum, upon further examination and analysis, Aum’s
experience suggests—however counterintuitively or
contrary to popular belief—the immense technological
difficulties faced by any nonstate entity in attempting to
weaponize and effectively disseminate chemical and
biological weapons.19 It also provides striking refutation of
the argument voiced with increasing frequency in recent
years of the ease with which such weapons can be fabricated
and made operational. Public officials, journalists, and
analysts, for example, have repeatedly alleged that
biological attacks in particular are relatively easy for
terrorists to undertake. According to one state emergency
management official, biological weapons
are available—and easy to make . . . . One does not need a
degree in microbiology to make this work, being able to read is
enough . . . . It’s not like enriching uranium.20

Similarly, both the White House and senior FBI officials
have argued that the information needed to develop
chemical and biological weapons can be readily obtained
from the Internet and other open sources.21 Such claims do
not square with the facts. Both the Aum experience and a
considerable body of subsequent research and analysis
make it clear that fabrication and dissemination of such
weapons is not easy. 22 John Lauder, the national
intelligence officer responsible for non-proliferation,
elaborates:
While popular culture can explore the potential BW threat,
actually developing and using an effective biological weapon
poses certain technological challenges.23
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Policy Implications Regarding Future Possible
CBRN Terrorism.
The analysis above is not to suggest, however, either
that there is no threat of terrorist use of CBRN or that such
a threat should be dismissed or discounted. Indeed, the
difficulties now facing a terrorist who seeks to use a CBRN
weapon to achieve mass effects could diminish dramatically
because of new discoveries, further advances in technology,
or other material factors.
What this chapter has argued is that by exaggerating
the ability of terrorists to wreak genuine mass destruction
or inflict widespread casualties, we are in danger of missing
sight of where the real threats lie. A limited terrorist attack
might, for example, involve not a WMD per se, but an
unconventional chemical, biological, or radiological weapon
built on a deliberately small scale. It might be used either
alone or as part of a series of smaller incidents, which might
occur either simultaneously or sequentially, in a given
location. Such an attack could have disproportionately
serious consequences, generating unprecedented fear and
alarm, and thus serving the terrorists’ purpose just as well
as a larger weapon or more ambitious attack with massive
casualties. The most salient terrorist threat involving an
unconventional weapon will likely not involve (or even
attempt) the destruction of an entire city (as often
proclaimed by fictional thriller writers and some
government officials). Rather it will involve the far more
deliberate and delicately planned use of a chemical,
biological, or radiological agent for more discrete purposes.
Yet despite the empirical evidence regarding terrorism
trends and patterns of activity (both domestic and
international), including the correct lessons that should be
drawn from the case of Aum, the United States remains
singularly preoccupied with the threat of mass-casualty
terrorism. It continues to plan for worst case scenarios. This
is largely a result of a mindset that took root in the
immediate aftermath of the near simultaneous Tokyo nerve
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gas attack and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Our
thinking and perceptions of the terrorist threat have
remained fundamentally unchanged since this episode.
New evidence regarding Aum and the overall pattern of
terrorist activity in the 5 years since the 1995 subway attack
suggest that many of our current assumptions may be
wrong.
Nonetheless, no significant reassessment,
reconsideration, or revision of the CBRN terrorism threat
profile established during the 1995-96 time frame has yet
been undertaken.24 Thus, a critical first step in assessing
the threat as it exists today and is likely to evolve in the
future should be to undertake a broad new net assessment
of the terrorist threat not only internationally but
domestically as well. Such an assessment—addressing
conditions, circumstances, and vulnerabilities of today
rather than those of 5 years ago—will permit us to
determine whether the worst-case scenario assessment
approach that has dominated current domestic planning
and preparedness for potential acts of CBRN terrorism is
still appropriate, much less relevant.25
The
current
narrow
policy
focus
on
lower-probability/higher-consequence threats, which in
turn posits virtually limitless vulnerabilities, does not
reflect the realities of contemporary terrorist behavior and
operations. “This kind of analysis,” Brian Jenkins recently
warned in testimony before Congress, “can degenerate into
a fact-free scaffold of anxieties and arguments—dramatic,
emotionally powerful, but analytically feeble.”26 At the
same congressional hearing, another expert, John
Parachini, had similar advice to give. The “apparent
over-reliance," he noted,
on worst-case scenarios shaped primarily by vulnerability
assessment rather than an assessment that factors in the
technical complexities, motivations of terrorists, and their
patterns of behavior seems to be precisely the sort of approach
we should avoid.27
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The main weakness in such an approach is in the
axiomatic assumption that any less serious incident can be
addressed equally well by planning for the most
catastrophic threat. This ignores the fact that the
higher-probability/lower-consequence attacks might
present unique challenges of their own.28
Finally, this approach may lead to less efficacious means
of setting budgetary priorities and allocating resources,
thus leading to less rather than more security for our
country. This was precisely the point made by Henry L.
Hinton, Jr., the Assistant Comptroller General, National
Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office, when he testified before Congress in
March 1999. “The [most] daunting task before the nation,”
he argued,
is to assess—to the best of its ability—the emerging threat with
the best available knowledge and expertise across the many
disciplines involved. The United States cannot fund all the
possibilities that have dire consequences. By focusing
investments on worst-case possibilities, the government may be
missing the more likely threats the country will face. With the
right threat and risk assessment process, participants, inputs,
and methodology, the nation can have greater confidence that it
is investing in the right items in the right amounts. Even within
the lower end of the threat spectrum—where the biological and
chemical terrorist threat currently lies—the threats can still be
ranked and prioritized in terms of their likelihood and severity
of consequences. A sound threat and risk assessment could
provide a cohesive roadmap to justify and target spending.29

Moreover, at a time when the United States is especially
preoccupied with these “high-end” terrorist threats
involving mass-destruction CBRN weapons, the series of
apartment building bombings that occurred in Russia and
Dagestan during August and September 1999 is a salutary
reminder of how terrorists can still achieve their dual aim of
fear and intimidation through entirely conventional means
and traditional methods: using bombs to blow things up.
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This fact has important implications for America’s—and
indeed also other countries’—counterterrorism
preparedness. Given the limited resources and constrained
capabilities typical of most terrorists, they perhaps
reflexively shun weapons and tactics either that cannot be
relied upon completely or that pose such enormous
complexities in terms of their employment (e.g., achieving
effective dissemination) as to border on the unappealing, if
not useless. For this reason, it can be said that terrorists
remain essentially content with the limited killing potential
of their handguns and machine-guns and the slightly higher
rates that their bombs can achieve. In other words, they
seem to prefer the assurance of the modest success provided
by their more conventional weapons and traditional tactics
to the risk of failure inherent in more complex and
complicated operations involving CBNR weapons.
Indeed, of the more than 9,000 incidents recorded in The
RAND Chronology of International Terrorism since 1968,
fewer than 100 evidence any indication of terrorists plotting
to use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons or to
obtain nuclear devices—much less actually to carry out
such attacks. As one critic has observed in connection with
the current concern over terrorist use of biological agents:
“Nasty people and the ingredients for bioterrorism were all
in place over a decade ago. Why now the drumbeating?” 30
Indeed, since the beginning of the century, little more than a
dozen terrorist incidents in fact have occurred that resulted
in the deaths of more than a 100 persons at one time. This is
an arguably infinitesimal number given the total volume of
terrorism that has occurred worldwide within past quarter
century, much less 100 years.31
There is another relevant paradox affecting terrorist
behavior. Terrorists have long been seen as far more
imitative than they are innovative. However, to date, no
similar or copycat act of terrorism, which at the time was
thought might likely follow in the wake of the sarin nerve
gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, has materialized.
In this respect, the Tokyo incident has been the exception
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rather than the rule in terms of terrorist behavior. “This fact
gains significance,” Brian Jenkins observed,
when we note that past terrorist and criminal
innovations—airline hijackings, political kidnappings,
malicious product tampering—were promptly imitated. And
terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological agents, if
they do occur, are likely to remain rare events—they will not
become the truck bomb of the next decade.32

Finally, as serious and potentially catastrophic as a
terrorist CBRN attack might prove, it is highly unlikely
that it could ever completely undermine the national
security, much less threaten the survival of a nation like the
United States or indeed most other Western countries. This
point should be self-evident, but given the rhetoric and
hyperbole with which the threat of CBRN terrorism is
frequently couched, it requires reiteration. Even Israel, a
comparatively small country in terms of population and
landmass, who throughout its existence has often been
isolated and surrounded by enemy states and subjected to
unrelenting terrorist attack and provocation, has never
regarded terrorism as a paramount threat to its national
security and longevity. Israel has never construed terrorism
as worthy of profligate budgets or the diversion of
disproportionate resources and attention.
Moreover, we should recall that even in the wake of the
intense fear and concern following the 1995 Tokyo nerve gas
attack, the Japanese government did not fall, widespread
disorder did not ensue throughout the country, nor did
society collapse. There is no reason to assume that the
outcome would be any different in the United States or in
any other Western democratic state in the event of a similar
terrorist attack involving a chemical or biological weapon.
To take any other position risks surrendering to the fear and
intimidation that are precisely the terrorists’ timeless
stock-in-trade. There is a thin line between prudence and
panic. The challenge, therefore, in responding to the threat
of potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons is to craft a
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defense that is not only both cost-effective and appropriate,
but also sober and practical.
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CHAPTER 8
TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION:
A REVIEW AND NEW PARADIGM
Jeffrey F. Addicott
Introduction.
A fundamental obligation of any state is to protect its
citizens from external as well as internal threats to person
and property. Nowhere is this obligation more difficult to
perform than in the realm of terrorism, particularly when
one considers the apocalyptic horrors that might be
unleashed through the terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). In the case of the government of the
United States, it is concerned not only with those renegade
states that might commit or sponsor various WMD terrorist
activities against U.S. citizens, but also with international
or domestic terrorist groups, and even individuals. When
one considers that terrorists have targeted the United
States more often than any other country in the world, the
specter of WMD terrorism demands top priority in our
thinking and planning.1
Many solutions have been suggested. Among them are
the institution of new security and intelligence-gathering
methodologies to help prevent a WMD terrorist act; the
development of streamlined plans for a rapid federal, state,
and local response to the aftermath of a WMD event; and an
increase in the role of the Department of Defense in
counterterrorism. These solutions are focused, as it were, on
the pressure points of the problem. However, the threat of
WMD makes it critical for our national strategy to
appreciate as well that since democracies do not engage in
terrorism, we must do more to promote democratic
institutions throughout the community of nations. This
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democracy-building initiative must be the basis for a new
and dynamic paradigm whose application might point a
more effective way to WMD terrorist avoidance, especially
in regard to state-sponsored terrorism.
Terrorism.
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism,
either in the international community or in the United
States. As the root word terror implies, terrorism involves
the use of fear to attain certain goals. Notwithstanding that
terrorism is the antithesis of the rule of law, the
postmodernist adage that “one man’s terrorist is another
man’s freedom fighter” further contributes to the inability
to carve out a clear definition. Certainly, however, civilized
nations have come to associate certain specific acts as
terrorism per se. Hostage-taking, public bombings, and acts
directed against civilians are easily defined as terrorist in
nature, regardless of the ideological, religious, or social
goals of the perpetrators.
For those who follow the trends, the lethality of
terrorism continues to grow, particularly against U.S.
interests. Although the number of terrorist attacks has
fallen from 484 in 1991 to 250 in 1996, both the State
Department and the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of
International Terrorism agree that 1996 (the last year
records have been updated) was one of the bloodiest years on
record. A RAND study found that a “total of 510 persons
were killed, 223 more than in 1995, and 91 more than in
1994.”2 These studies are, of course, rather inconsequential
when one considers the aftermath of a terrorist directed
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack in an
urban area of the United States. To the mass casualties and
devastating economic disruption, one must add the
troubling impact this event might have on future civil
liberties and freedoms that Americans now enjoy.
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Sources of WMD Terrorism.
Apart from the normal modus operandi of terrorism, one
must now add WMD as a special definitional subset. In
Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1997, a WMD is defined as
any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to
cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of
people through the release of toxic or poisonous chemicals or
their precursors, a disease organism, or radiation or
radioactivity.3

Thus WMD includes the full range of biological, chemical,
and radioactive agents.
There are three general sources from which a WMD
terrorist attack can emanate—state, sub-state, or
individual. Tragically, all three categories have flirted with
the use of WMD in the past decade.
State-Sponsored Terrorism.
Perhaps the most easily identifiable category of
terrorism is the state-sponsored terrorist attack. In recent
times, the international community has been shocked to
learn that certain renegade states such as Iraq have shown
an unabashed willingness to use deadly nerve gas to kill
thousands of men, women, and children (the Kurds).
Indeed, it can be argued that all totalitarian states pose an
ever-present threat for the use of WMD at any given
time—both against their own people and against other
nations. The U.S. State Department now designates seven
countries as sponsors of terrorism against other nations:
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.4 In
fact, the number is larger. John A. Lauder, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Center, has
testified before Congress that a dozen countries
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now either possess or are actively pursuing offensive biological
weapons capabilities for use against their perceived enemies,
whether internal or external.5

In the context of a state use of WMD in a terrorist attack,
several commentators seek to distinguish a state-sponsored
terrorist act from a state-supported terrorist act.
State-sponsored terrorism exists when a state directly but
secretly uses its own government apparatus and resources
to perform acts of terrorism against another country. Since
accountability for such acts is always denied, the aggressor
state seeks to avoid responsibility. On the other hand,
state-supported terrorism refers to the practice of a state
providing resources to a terrorist group for training,
logistics, or financing as is currently the case in
Afghanistan, where the Islamic terrorist group headed by
Osama bin Laden (the inner core group is known as
Al-Qaeda) takes refuge. Under the state-supported
scenario, the terrorist group generally operates
independently from the state.6
In the final analysis, it is difficult to make a practical
distinction between state-sponsored and state-supported
terrorism. The terms really speak only to the degree of
culpability. If the rule of law has any force, states who allow
terrorist groups to operate with impunity on their soil
should never be able to escape the attendant lawful
consequences.7
The early days of concern regarding terrorism and the
use of WMD saw most of the emphasis focused on the
actions of the totalitarian state. Because many believed that
ready access to WMD material was limited, sub-state
terrorist groups or individual terrorists were generally
given less attention. For these latter categories of terrorism,
the international community generally concentrated on
making specific overt acts international crimes, e.g., airline
hijacking or hostage-taking. For renegade states, however,
the major issue turned on the proper application of
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appropriate sanctions against the state that sponsored or
supported a terrorist incident.
A considerable debate rages regarding how to deal with a
WMD terrorist event vis-à-vis international legal sanctions.
A particularly interesting concern centers on the use of the
diplomatic pouch to import and export, with impunity,
assorted prohibited and illegal items into receiving and
transit states.8 (The diplomatic pouch issue continues to
cause great consternation.) Modern international practice
has witnessed the use or attempted use of the diplomatic
pouch to transport illegal foreign currency, illegal drugs,
weapons, and even people. While all manifestly evil acts
committed under the cover of this diplomatic shield are
sorely objectionable, the most insidious and disconcerting
activities are those in which the diplomatic pouch might be
used as a vehicle to commit clearly defined acts of terrorism,
especially those related to WMD.
Currently, the diplomatic privileges and immunities
accorded to the diplomatic pouch under treaty and
customary international law are set out in Article 27 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.9 In short, the
diplomatic pouch is deemed by international law to be
inviolable and not subject to detention or search. The
central thrust of those who periodically argue for a change
to the Vienna Convention is that the protected status given
to the diplomatic pouch must be significantly revised to
account for the legitimate security interests of the receiving
state. Again, the major concern is that the diplomatic pouch
could be used to commit a WMD terrorist act. For example,
responding to public fears that diplomatic privileges could
be used as a vehicle to commit state-sponsored terrorism
related to WMD,10 then Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger publicly indicated in 1986 that the entire
doctrine of diplomatic immunity should be greatly limited.11
Arguing that state-sponsored terrorists were abusing the
doctrine, Weinberger called upon “diplomats with the
assistance of the legal profession” to define new limits that
would help solve the problem of diplomatic privileges being
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extended to those states that were connected with
terrorists.12
True, in the context of the large-scale destruction that
would result from even a single WMD event, the demands
for security safeguards would apparently far outweigh the
advantages of maintaining the present international rules
intact. Otherwise, if ordinary weapons can be neatly and
easily sent into the receiving state via the diplomatic pouch,
why not WMD? A hostile country, for instance, could
smuggle in a vial of lethal biological material for
contaminating a city water supply. Fortunately, although
these emotion-driven arguments come to the forefront from
time to time, the privileged status of the diplomatic pouch
has never been successfully curtailed. This is true for three
reasons.
First, most people understand that if the diplomatic
pouch privilege is limited, then the determined terrorist will
find yet another way to smuggle WMD materials into the
United States. In an open society such as the United States,
the state-sponsored terrorist can obtain much, if not most,
of the needed materials on the domestic open market and,
more importantly, do so without leaving a signature.13
Second, since nations have an inherent right of self-defense
to search out and otherwise protect themselves against
viable threats to their national security, the state which
sponsored such blatant aggressive behavior takes an
inordinate risk by using the diplomatic pouch in such a
manner.
Third, the Vienna Convention can never hope to
maintain any form of functional integrity unless it is strictly
adhered to. Nations who demand inspection of even the
most suspicious diplomatic pouches must do so only at the
risk of having their own bags subjected to the same process
by the sending state.14 And that practice would quickly
undermine the entire process of free diplomatic intercourse.
The only real guarantee that other nations, friendly or
otherwise, will generally follow international rules rests in
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this reciprocity analysis—the red thread of international
law.
The way to deal with a state-sponsored terrorist attack,
if linkage is established, is to seek redress under the rule of
law—financially, judicially, or militarily.15 Historically, if a
state sponsors a terrorist act, the United States has
generally demonstrated that it has the capability and
willingness to retaliate under the well-recognized
justification of self-defense. Unlike other international
disputes between nations, terrorist attacks should never be
handled by some third party in the context of a dispute
resolution. The renegade state is punished in a legitimate
manner and forum. Ultimately, the aggrieved state can turn
to the classical forms of self-defense, depending on the
severity of the terrorist incident. Realistically, if the United
States had hard evidence that a state was behind a terrorist
attack, it would likely respond under the traditional notions
of self-defense and forcible self-help. The United States
would certainly do what was necessary to protect itself from
acts of violence.16 In this context, the classical right to
engage in self-defense under Article 51 of the United
Nations’ Charter would be entirely appropriate.17
Finally, reflecting the seriousness of WMD, there are a
number of scholars who believe that the threat of WMD to
national survival is so great that a new international legal
regime should allow for a threatened nation to engage in
“preventive or preemptive use of force to either deter
acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition programs, or
destroy illicit WMD sites at any stage in the proliferator’s
acquisition efforts.”18 The 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi
nuclear reactor at Osiraq, is certainly an example of a
nation exercising preemptive self-help in the face of a rogue
nation engaged in the production of WMD materials.19
Sub-state Terrorism.
In early 2000, U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources
reported that Hamas, the militant Islamic terrorist group,
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was experimenting with chemical weapons in their rocket
attacks against Israeli targets.20 With the increasing
availability of high-tech weapons and nuclear materials
from former Communist countries and the ease with which
some chemical and biological agents can now be
manufactured, there is growing concern that sub-state
groups will now actively cross over into the WMD domain.
Sub-state terrorist groups can be either domestic or
international terrorist organizations and are generally
categorized by either religious or political ideologies. In
1995, for example, “25 of 58, or 42 percent of known, active,
international terrorist groups, had a predominately
religious component or motivation.”21
The first use of a WMD by a sub-state group occurred on
March 20, 1995, when members of the Aum Shinri Kyo cult
in Japan released a lethal nerve agent, sarin, in the Tokyo
underground subway. This WMD attack killed 12 people
and reportedly injured 3,000 others.
While attacks by sub-state groups against U.S. interests
have not yet used WMD (as of this writing), many groups
have shown a viciousness and disregard for human life that
clearly points to a willingness to use such weapons in the
future. For instance, Osama bin Laden’s Islamic
fundamentalist terrorist group conducted bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 that
killed 257 people and injured almost 5,000.22 Another
Islamic radical group headed by Ramzi Ahmad Yousef
conducted the 1993 bombing of New York City’s World
Trade Center in an attempt to topple one of the twin towers
onto the other to kill thousands, an act clearly in the spirit of
a WMD event.23
The United States has taken unilateral steps to ensure
that the individual perpetrators of international terrorism
are brought to justice in a court of law. In the United States,
the Omnibus Terrorism Act of 1986 made terrorist attacks
on U.S. citizens overseas a Federal crime and authorized
the extraterritorial arrest and trial in U.S. courts of the
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suspected perpetrators. The most famous case in this regard
was the arrest and prosecution by U.S. authorities of Fawaz
Yunis, an Arab terrorist involved in the hijacking of an
aircraft aboard which were two U.S. citizens. 24
Individual Terrorism.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of WMD terrorism is
the prospect of an individual setting off a WMD in a major
urban area. Because they operate on their own, without
affiliation to any known group or state, individuals who
engage in terrorism are far harder to track or predict. They
are a new breed of terrorist.
To demonstrate our vulnerability to individual
terrorism, on March 3, 1999, William C. Patrick III, a
leading U.S. expert on biological warfare, walked through
the security check system at the Rayburn House Office
Building in downtown Washington, DC, carrying 7 1/2
grams of powdered anthrax (enough to kill everyone in the
building) in a small plastic bottle.25 This action dramatically
illustrated the ease with which a single determined
terrorist could breach security systems and target, in this
case, a major federal government installation. It also
provided a wake-up call to U.S. government officials and the
public at large.26
Patrick told a Congressional committee that he was
trying to show how a hostile or aggressor state could
smuggle powdered anthrax into the United States in a
secure diplomatic pouch. 27 What Patrick was really
demonstrating, however, was the ease with which any
individual terrorist—domestic or international—could
unleash untold WMD horror, almost at will. In his
testimony, Patrick related that he had also carried other
similar deadly materials through all the major airports, and
the security systems of the State Department, the
Pentagon, and even the CIA, without anyone stopping
him.28
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The most notorious example of an individual terrorist
attack in the United states occurred in April 1995 with the
bombing of the Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City
by Timothy McVeigh (an accomplice, Terry Nichols was also
convicted). Although McVeigh did not employ WMD, his
actions clearly raised the issue of individual domestic
terrorism in the context of WMD.29 While one can ponder
the far-fetched “anti-government” sentiments that
motivated McVeigh, the greater issue really revolves
around individual access to WMD materials.
Finally, not all individual terrorism can be associated
with hard-core political or religious ideologues. Individual
terrorism can be committed by persons seeking personal
rather than political gain, or even by individuals who are
mentally ill. Indeed, considering the number of “Timothy
McVeighs” in any given society, the prospect of individuals
having easy access to WMD is chilling. The threat will only
grow with time.
Current Methodology for Dealing with a WMD
Terrorist Event.
By definition, the traditional approach to combating
terrorism is encompassed in two terms—antiterrorism and
counterterrorism.30 Antiterrorism involves all those steps
and actions taken by authorities to decrease the probability
of a terrorist act occurring. It is the proactive, preventative
stage to stopping terrorism. It includes techniques designed
to harden potential high profile targets, e.g., government
buildings or military installations, as well as actions taken
to detect a planned terrorist attack before it occurs.31 For
example, the Pentagon is currently looking at new
image-recognition technology through the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to assist in
the battle against future terrorist attacks.32 DARPA is
experimenting with video surveillance, modeling
techniques, and commercial technologies such as those used

114

to identify automatic teller machine customers by scanning
their faces.
One of the most innovative antiterrorism technological
projects is found in Britain. In the East London Borough of
Newham, more than 200 outdoor cameras keep watch on
pedestrians and passersby, employing a facial-recognition
system that can automatically pick out known criminals and
alert local authorities to their presence.33

Another innovative antiterrorism program is designed
to ease tensions between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and anti-government militias. This
approach has FBI agents talking directly with militia
leaders. From Montana to Indiana, federal agents have
opened dialogues with leaders of several militia
organizations to provide a forum for discussion in the hope
that these channels of communication will help prevent
violence.34
Counterterrorism measures are those tactical actions
taken by authorities in response to a terrorist incident.
Proper prior planning and training will obviously have a
great impact on the success or failure of real world
counterterrorist actions. In most areas of management,
reorganizations are the product of some form of crisis.
Counterterrorism initiatives are no exception. Since the
1980s there have been numerous legislative initiatives that
address terrorist activities, most enacted on the heels of
some terrorist attack. The central existing legislation
dealing with WMD terrorism is the “Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,”35 commonly referred to
as the NLD Act after its sponsors’ names—Senators Nunn,
Lugar, and Domenici.
The 1996 NLD Act envisions the creation of a domestic
preparedness program which is intended to enhance
federal, state, and local emergency response capabilities to
better deal with a domestic terrorist incident involving
WMD. The central thrust of this umbrella security program
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involves the coordinated efforts of key U.S. departments
and agencies focused on protecting U.S. personnel and
property.36
While the Department of Justice, through the FBI, is
still the lead agency in the event of a WMD terrorist attack,
the expected mass casualties, physical damage, and
potential for civil disorder resulting from a WMD incident
have necessitated a gradual shift to DoD as the de facto lead
Federal agency for many counterterrorism issues. However,
on April 1, 2000, President William J. Clinton directed that
neither the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy nor the
Secretary of the Army, under executive agency powers
regarding military support to civil authorities, has
responsibility for “incidents involving chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosive consequence
management.”37 Instead, should a large-scale WMD event
occur in the United States, the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Civil Support will coordinate all domestic
actions, although the Secretary of the Army would still
provide the actual domestic civil assistance through the
Army’s Director of Military Assistance. Thus, while the
individual state and local authorities still have the primary
responsibility to respond to any emergency within their
jurisdiction, when requested, DoD can provide extensive
assistance should a WMD detonation overwhelm the state
and local authorities.
The use of DoD personnel to help local metropolitan
authorities quickly respond to a WMD event is the central
vision of the NLD legislation. Accordingly, under NLD the
Secretary of Defense works in close cooperation with the
FBI, the Department of Energy, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to provide direct support response to major cities in
order to help local providers better deal with WMD
terrorism.
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A primary initiative of NLD includes the establishment
of a nationwide training support plan with an initial focus
on 27 cities in the United States, to be expanded to the 120
largest cities over the next several years.38 In this program,
DoD stands as the interagency lead for a new “first
responder” training program, i.e., training the local
resources of the affected urban area.
With a stated goal of providing WMD training support to
U.S. major cities, the training is conducted primarily by the
U.S. Army Chemical-Biological Defense Command and
consists of 8-to-12-person training teams dispatched to each
individual city. The team trainers are both active and
reserve military personnel, DoD civilians, and contractors
with extensive experience in emergency procedures
associated with WMD. Actual training focuses on
integrating metropolitan actions—by firefighters, police,
and emergency medical technicians—to be taken after a
WMD terrorist incident occurs. Specifically tailored to the
needs of each city, six separate courses are taught: Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Awareness; Operations During an
Incident; Technician Hazardous Material (HAZMAT);
Technician Emergency Medical Service; Hospital Provider;
and Actions for the On-the-Scene Commanders. In this
fashion, local first responders are provided with the
expertise to deal with decontamination, crowd control, and
search and rescue. With $300,000 set aside for each city, the
program is scheduled for completion and final evaluation by
2002. By the end of 1999, over 84 cities had received NLD
training from the military.
Initial evaluations of the NLD training program have
been mixed. Richard Davis, a senior analyst with the U.S.
General Accounting Office, reported that the program was
fragmented and wasteful, adding little to a real world
solution for responding in a unified way to a terrorist attack
using WMD.39 Others, however, continue to support the
initiative, but recognize that the military role must be
balanced against the reality of available resources. In this
light, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced in
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April 1999 the creation of a 3-year advisory panel, headed by
Virginia’s Governor James Gilmore, to “assess domestic
response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of
mass destruction.”40 The panel will report to Congress and
the President on the challenge of WMD and the federal,
state, and local response mechanisms which could handle
the ensuing crisis.
Furthermore, in a July 1999 speech, Secretary Cohen
listed five cautionary aspects of the NLD legislation
regarding military support in the wake of a WMD event:41
• Any military assistance must be in support of the
appropriate authorities.
• A clear chain of command and responsibility must be
established for any type of support rendered by the military.
• Military assistance should not come at the expense of
the primary mission of the U.S. military—to fight and win
the nation’s wars.
• The military response efforts will be grounded
primarily in the National Guard and Reserve. The Guard
and Reserve forces are the “forward-deployed forces here at
home.”
• The U.S. Government must not “trample on American
lives and liberties in the name of preserving them.” The
military will not exceed legal authorities when performing a
counterterrorism mission.

The U.S. Military—Active, Reserve, and National
Guard.
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, “United
states Policy on Counterterrorism,” signed in June 1995,
directed a number of measures to reduce the country’s
vulnerability to terrorism and to better manage the
consequence of terrorist use of WMD. This PDD was
revalidated in May 1998 by PDD-62, “Protection Against
Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans
118

Overseas.” Both PDDs affirm that the FBI is the lead agency
for crisis management and operations. Public Law 93-288,
“The Federal Response Plan,” provides the authority for the
federal government to respond to disasters and emergencies
as defined in the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergence
Act.42 The plan describes the government’s role in providing
immediate action to save lives and mitigate property
damage. FEMA is the lead agency for consequence
management, i.e., care of casualties, decontamination, and
clean up, and DoD is one of the supporting agencies for the
FBI and FEMA, with the Army serving as the lead agency
within the DoD.
Notwithstanding the chain of command which
designates the Army as supporting other Federal agencies,
the prevailing understanding is that the military will be
called on to lead the “on the ground” emergency response in
the aftermath of a significant WMD terrorist attack.
However, those familiar with the facts know that because
today’s U.S. armed forces face serious problems meeting
even the basic national defense requirements, they will
inevitably encounter serious difficulties responding to
requests for adequate and responsible support following a
WMD event. In short, the stark reality of a scaled-down
military suggests that the U.S. active duty military is
simply not prepared to meet the demands associated with a
major WMD terrorist event.
This state of affairs exists for two basic reasons. First,
the continued downsizing of active duty Army personnel
from 770,000 soldiers 10 years ago (total active duty
personnel from all forces in 1990 was 2,043,705) to about
470,000 today has hollowed the military strength of the
United States.43 This reduction in the Army has forced a
decrease from 18 to 10 divisions. Similarly, the Navy has
had to cut by nearly half its number of ships, and the Air
Force has cut its fighter wings from 36 to 20. Second,
coupled with the downsizing of the active duty Army, the
last decade has witnessed an increase in a wide variety of
nontraditional missions which have siphoned off forces to
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such places as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, Kuwait,
Macedonia, Somalia, and Haiti.
Recognizing the overtaxed condition of the active duty
military, Secretary Cohen has tagged the National Guard
and Army Reserve forces as the primary response force to a
WMD episode.44 Accordingly, the Army Reserve’s Regional
Support Commands have realigned themselves along
FEMA boundaries for ease of command and control during
an actual WMD incident. An Army Reserve emergency
operations center is available in each FEMA region that can
support a WMD response. In addition, the Reserves have
also provided several hundred emergency preparedness
liaison officers to the 1st and 5th Armies (Reserve).
The announced rationale for having the National Guard
and Army Reserve out front hinges on several factors. First,
the National Guard and Army Reserves are supposed to be
fully trained in how to function in a nuclear, biological, and
chemical environment. Second, the Army Reserve has
nearly 60 percent of the total Army’s chemical defense and
medical assets. Third, the National Guard and Army
Reserve units can respond quickly because they are a
community-based force.
Unfortunately, the picture of the National Guard and
Army Reserve forces serving effectively in the context of a
WMD event is not as rosy as painted by Secretary Cohen
and others. First, the overall record of performance of
today’s National Guard and Army Reserve in traditional
support roles has been troubled, particularly in regards to
large-scale deployments. And this mixed performance
makes problematic expectation that they will do much
better in handling a full-blown WMD terrorist event.
Although the active Army has increasingly relied on the
Army Reserve (208,000 personnel) and National Guard
(357,000 personnel) to fulfill its critical missions in overseas
operations, it has not come to grips with the problem of
improving Guard and Reserve readiness. The Pentagon’s
so-called Total Force policy, which envisions a seamless
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bond between the active and nonactive military forces, is
still yet to be developed or fulfilled.45 For example, in
preparing for Operation DESERT STORM against Iraq in
1991, a tank brigade from the Georgia National Guard was
slated for combat duty in the Gulf. However, even after the
Guard spent more than 2 months of intensive training at the
National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, the
Army believed the brigade was still not ready and refused to
send it into combat. This is but one of numerous examples of
problems associated with large-scale, stand-alone
deployments of National Guard and Army Reserve
personnel. While they are effective when used in small
numbers and folded in with active duty soldiers, their job
performance in independent military actions remains
unproven.
The problem of readiness rests in part with the very
nature of the force structure of these dedicated citizen
soldiers. National Guard soldiers spend most of their lives
in their civilian jobs, officially training in military skills
only 39 days a year, usually a weekend a month plus a
2-week annual training exercise. While they are activated
for duty in times of crisis, they rarely, if ever, are afforded
the opportunities to rehearse large-unit operations, let
alone train for a massive response to a WMD terrorist event.
Although Secretary of Defense Cohen’s 1999 Annual
Report to the President and the Congress recognizes the
threat from WMD, there exists little sense of urgency to do
anything other than have the National Guard study what
services it might provide in the future:
The National Guard will also complete its work in examining
the roles, missions, and responsibilities that the National
Guard may appropriately fulfill in responding to terrorist
attacks involving WMD.46

It is not enough that the public be told that the National
Guard and Army Reserve will coordinate with FEMA if
WMD terrorism strikes. If the leadership in the United
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States is serious about the issue of WMD terrorism, drastic
and immediate steps need to be taken. At a minimum, this
means creating a dedicated, trained, and effective WMD
Rapid Response Force (RRF) in each of the 50 states.
Creating a WMD Rapid Response Force (RRF).
Studies have shown that hardening potential high
profile targets such as federal buildings or military
installations reduces the frequency of terrorist attacks on
those types of facilities.47 As an effective antiterrorist
measure these types of preventive activities can and must
be continued at key civilian and military facilities across the
nation. In fact, a special emergency funding source now
exists for the U.S. military to “react to unanticipated
requirements from changes in terrorist threat level or force
protection doctrine/standards.” 48 This flexible funding
source was created in 1997, providing a powerful tool for
each commander-in-chief of a unified command to finance
emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirements.
These funds have been used to construct concrete barriers,
clear vegetation, purchase equipment, hire personnel, set
up security checkpoints, etc.
Tragically, despite such limited preventative moves the
federal government has done almost next to nothing to
better prepare for the catastrophic aftermath of a WMD
event in an urban area. The paltry sum authorized by the
NLD legislation to provide one-shot training courses to local
first responders is a far cry from what needs to be done. In
short, a frightened municipality will require a large and
capable WMD RRF to provide order, treat casualties, and
restore confidence. To be sure, the logical choice for
developing this force should be the U.S. military.
Ever since the end of Reconstruction in the southern
states, there has been a distinct aversion to expanding the
role of the armed forces in the domestic arena. This is clearly
reflected in the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the
active duty military from performing police duties in the
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United States. 49 Accordingly, the idea of creating a
centralized homeland defense force under a single
command to handle the issues associated with a WMD
terrorist attack has met with strong opposition from civil
libertarian groups.50 Paradoxically, the very organization
that is most capable of responding to a WMD event is not
given the task.
Nevertheless, in December 1999, the Secretary of
Defense established a separate command called the Joint
Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS). The command is headed
by Major General Bruce Lawlor (United States National
Guard), with a budget of four million dollars and a staff of 36
personnel. The purpose of JTF-CS is to coordinate civilian
and military responses to a WMD event in the United
States. Once the President issues a federal emergency
declaration and approves the use of the JTF-CS, it will
support the designated lead federal agency with DoD’s
consequence management instruments in response to
civilian and military WMD events.
Pending the real world use of the JTF-CS, Lawlor is
tasked to work on integrated contingency plans for quick
access to appropriate military assets that are otherwise
unavailable to the civilian first-line responders. In the
longer run, his role will expand, with the Task Force to be
given direct oversight of the 15 Reserve/National Guard
Regional Response Centers that will be activated by 2006.
In commenting on the mission of his new command, Lawlor
said,
We don’t do law enforcement or arrests. We will save lives,
prevent human suffering, and restore as fast as possible
critical life support systems in the community.51

The only alternative to the use of a centralized active
duty military force would be the use of the National Guard
and Army Reserve to create a WMD RRF for each state with
the attendant funding to develop and train the necessary
personnel. Following the 1991 war with Iraq, this idea was
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quickly put into full force in Israel, where a Home Defense
Command was set up. Building the command with 97
percent reservists, Israel set up 67 stations throughout the
nation in order to better deal with the aftermath of a WMD
event. In contrast, this same idea has not taken hold with
policymakers in the United states.
The biggest obstacle to a WMD RRF in each state is the
massive amount of funding and training required. Indeed,
as the three most important considerations in buying a
house are location, location, location, the three most
important factors in building a WMD RRF would be
training, training, training. And training requires money.
One way to help reduce costs for developing a WMD RRF
is provided by the state defense forces model. USC, Title 32,
Section 109, provides:
In addition to its National Guard, if any, a state or territory . . .
may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense
forces.52

State legislatures in 24 states and Puerto Rico have created
state Defense Forces to perform a wide variety of functions,
ranging from light infantry duties (the Virginia Defense
Force) to military police functions (Ohio Military Reserve).
Of particular interest in looking at the mechanics of
creating a WMD RRF is the example set by the Texas state
Guard. During 1998, units of the Texas state Guard
“participated in 122 events, which involved 1,865 members
who contributed 24,663 man-hours and saved the state’s
cities $490,860.”53 These events included crowd control,
traffic control, and search and rescue operations, entailing
just the type of capabilities sorely needed in the aftermath
of a WMD terrorist attack.
Unfortunately, until policymakers and the public come
to understand that the number one civil defense issue
confronting the United States is the threat of a WMD event,
it is unlikely that steps will be taken to create separate
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WMD-specific forces from the National Guard, the
Reserves, or state Defense Forces. On the brighter side, if
and when a WMD RRF is created, this force could receive
valuable collateral training by assisting local law
enforcement authorities during “normal” emergencies, as is
the case with the Texas state Guard.
“Democracies Don’t Engage in Terrorism.”
Apart from all that can be said for the state of
preparedness in the United States itself for responding to a
WMD terrorist attack, there is comfort in the fact that a
window of opportunity exists for the United States to create
a new paradigm for reducing the likelihood of terrorism, at
least on the international level. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the addition of new democracies to the
community of nations makes us more secure because, in the
words of Anthony Lake,
democracies tend not to wage war on each other and they tend
not to support terrorism—in fact, they don’t. They are more
trustworthy in diplomacy and they do a better job of respecting
the environment and human rights of their people.54

Recognizing a nexus between the nation that mistreats
its own citizens and the nation that fosters aggression
against its neighbors, both the preamble and Article 1 of the
U.N. Charter make crystal clear that the framers believed
that the unleashing of aggressive war occurred at the hands
of those states in which the denial of the value of the
individual human being was most evident.55 Furthermore,
with the research of former University of Hawaii Professor
R. J. Rummel, it is now possible to demonstrate numerically
the validity of the proposition that totalitarian regimes are
the chief abusers of internationally recognized human
rights and the most likely candidates for state-sponsored
terrorism:
War is not the most deadly form of violence. Indeed, I have
found that while about 37,000,000 people have been killed in
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battle by all foreign and domestic wars in our century,
government democide [genocide and mass murder] have killed
over 148,074,000 million more. Plus, I am still counting. Over 85
percent of these people were killed by totalitarian
governments.56

Thus, the new paradigm is a very simple model. If
democracies make better neighbors, then it is certainly in
the best interests of the United States to do all it can to
foster these emerging nations and to thereby enlarge
respect for the rule of law in international relations. In the
words of Professor B. Russett,
Democracies have almost never fought each other. . . . By this
reasoning, the more democracies there are in the world, the
fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will have
and the wider the zone of peace.57

The simplicity of Russett’s argument should be clear to
all. In fact, as Professor John Norton Moore of the
University of Virginia School of Law explains, this simple
fact represents a “new and more accurate paradigm about
war, peace, and democide.”58 It replaces the old thinking
and highlights the fact that democratic growth alone can
hope to reduce the threat of WMD terrorism in the long run.
A recent RAND study seals the point:
The failure of regimes to provide for peaceful political change
and the phenomenon of economies unable to keep pace with
population growth and demands for more evenly distributed
benefits can provide fertile ground for extremism and political
violence affecting U.S. interests. For this reason, the United
states has a stake in promoting political and economic reform as
a means of reducing the potential for terrorism, some of which,
as in Latin America, the Middle East, and the Gulf, may be
directed at us.59

Conclusion.
Dealing with a WMD terrorist event requires two
avenues of consideration, one short term, the other long
term. In the short term, the United states must formulate
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contingency plans that include the immediate
establishment of a large and trained WMD RRF located in
each of the 50 states. This cannot be a crisis-driven action.
As pointed out earlier, the WMD RRF force would need to be
trained from the ground up and dedicated to dealing with
every aspect of a WMD event. In tandem with the
establishment of this force, antiterrorism efforts must also
be expanded. At a minimum, likely civilian and military
targets need to be hardened as much as practicable.
In the long term, the United states needs to intensify
efforts to assist the full development of fledgling
democracies on the principle that democracies do not wage
war or terror on each other. If the RAND study quoted above
is correct, this strategy will go far in reducing the root
causes of terrorism.
If necessary and appropriate actions are not taken now,
it is certain that the effects of a WMD terrorist event will be
far more devastating than necessary. The question is not
whether there will be a WMD terrorist attack in the future,
it is simply a matter of where.
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CHAPTER 9
BRUCE HOFFMAN’S VIEW OF TERRORISM
BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
Victor Utgoff
In his chapter titled “Terrorism by Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” Bruce Hoffman makes a number of valid
points. His central thesis, in particular, is, in the view of this
author, correct. The threat of terrorism by weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) is clearly not as great as some of the
sensationalized media presentations on the subject might
suggest. Moreover, we can surely join Dr. Hoffman in taking
comfort from the failure of the Aum Shinri Kyo to inflict
mass destruction using chemical and biological weapons.
This having been said, terrorism by WMD remains a serious
threat. It is the purpose of this brief commentary to offer a
slightly different perspective from Dr. Hoffman’s and to
suggest why we should continue to invest substantially in
defense against an event of this sort.
There are three general points that need to be made.
First, it is not logical to conclude that just because one large
terrorist organization with deep pockets failed in its efforts
to carry out large-scale chemical/biological (CB) attacks,
others therefore will also fail. In fact, there is evidence to the
contrary. Probably the best example of a successful attack is
the one made on the population of Dalles, Oregon in 1984.1
That attack was made by a local cult using cultures of S.
Typhimurium, a bacterium that causes salmonellosis.
These cultures were prepared in the cult’s labs and
clandestinely inserted in the salad bars of at least ten area
restaurants. These attacks caused approximately 750
people to get seriously ill. Furthermore, had killing been its
purpose, the cult could have used a lethal agent, and it could
have attacked many more targets.
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Second, Dr. Hoffman is undoubtedly correct in his claim
that the difficulties of making and using CB weapons have
been exaggerated. This is not, however, the same as to say
that they are impossible to make and will never be used. He
rightly observed that we have not, to date, accurately
assessed how hard it is to make biological weapons suitable
for large-scale terrorist attacks. The subject clearly calls for
more investigation. What can we deduce at this point?
Some of my colleagues and I have undertaken
preliminary analysis of this sort. Our research suggests
that creating such a BW capability would take 1-2 years,
require perhaps a half dozen people, and cost no more than a
few million dollars. The project would require some careful
cut-and-try engineering development and testing, not new
science. The offensive BW programs once pursued by the
United States, and apparently still continuing in Russia
and elsewhere, have demonstrated that it is possible to
make biological weapons capable of inflicting mass
casualties. A great deal of information is available in the
open literature on how to build such weapons. Legitimate
industry employs machinery and processes that solve many
of the problems involved in making practical biological
weapons. And one cannot dismiss the possibility that
terrorists might hire experts from foreign BW programs.
This suggests that a more careful and painstaking effort
by the Aum Shinri Kyo or others should bear fruit and result
in the production of effective biological weapons. It also,
however, bears out Dr. Hoffman’s contention that the effort
might be more trouble than it is worth to most terrorist
groups. The effort required to create a capability for
large-scale BW attacks would be far greater than that
required to blow tens or hundreds of people away with
automatic weapons and truck bombs. Thus, Dr. Hoffman is
right in arguing that nearly all of the terrorism we can
expect to see in the foreseeable future will probably involve
the use of conventional rather than CB weapons.
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But nearly all is not the same as all. And the necessary
components for successful CB attacks are already in
existence. Certainly the necessary motives are present.
Some terrorists are now driven not so much by the desire to
use fear to bring about clearly definable objectives as by the
desire to cause as much damage as possible. Then too the
necessary means are there. Some private groups and
individuals have already created and used biological agents
to cause substantial numbers of casualties. Further, there
are groups that have the money, engineering expertise,
managerial capabilities, and patience for the kind of
development and operational test activity that is needed.In
my opinion, these necessary components should not be
expected to come together often, but by the same token, can
be expected to come together sometimes. And this is cold
comfort.
My third general point is that the possibility of
large-scale CB attacks on the United States is already real
enough to deserve serious and well-funded attention by the
government. Currently the federal government is
attempting to create some initial capabilities specifically
oriented toward reducing the consequences of CB attacks by
terrorists against the public. To this end, it is spending
something on the order of $100 million a year. By the
standards of federal programs, this is not a great sum of
money.
At the present time, the government does not appear
ready to define what a full-blown defense against state or
nonstate BW attacks might look like. However, my
colleagues and I have done some preliminary analysis to
assess the nature and costs of such a defense program. Our
figures suggest that on the order of $5 billion per year could
provide a respectable defense. The kind of defense we
envision could drive down the losses from a very big CB
attack to a 10th or less of what they could be without it.
Clearly this level of expenditure is not prohibitively high. It
also does not rule out taking serious measures against
smaller-scale conventional terrorism.
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To conclude, Bruce Hoffman is surely right to note that
the threat from terrorists using WMD is probably not so
great as the news media suggest. But the government is
surely right to take the possibility of large-scale CB
terrorism seriously and to begin preliminary steps toward
defending the public against it. To fail to do so would be a
dereliction of its duty.
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CHAPTER 10
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE:
THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE IN DEFENDING IT1
Daniel T. Kuehl
Introduction.
Cyberspace is that place where electronic systems such
as computer networks, telecommunications systems, and
devices that exert their influence through or in the
electromagnetic spectrum connect and interact in the
telematic medium.2 It is, from a military point of view, our
newest operational environment. Threats, intrusions, and
attacks are likely to be mounted against the United States
in the future using this environment.
It is the thesis of this chapter that the Department of
Defense (DoD) does have both a role and a responsibility in
helping defend against this threat. To make the point, we
will start by looking at an imaginary scenario in which a
fictional state mounts an attack against this nation using
cyberspace as its chief operating environment. This
scenario will set the scene for a discussion of the security
problems posed by the advent of the age of cyberspace. The
chapter will (1) explain what we mean by cyberspace and
why it must be understood as a new operational
environment, (2) discuss the security implications of
cyberspace, (3) discuss what “war” is in the context of the
information age, and (4) conclude by considering the
appropriate role of the DoD in combating cyberwar and
cyber terrorism.
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A Fictional Scenario.
The date: December, 200X; the place: the new operations
complex for Triangle Telematics, the critical node for
virtually all digital and electronic traffic in the entire
eastern half of the United States; the problem: someone was
inside the system, exploiting its connections to, and in many
cases control of, computer and telecommunications systems
that crisscrossed almost every key infrastructure.3 The
BIGGER problem: this “someone” was causing significant
disruption to the efficient and effective functioning of many
infrastructural elements. Because of the overall U.S.
strategic situation, this caused a crisis. The disruption of
Triangle Telematics coincided with one of the worst cold
spells the Northeast had faced in recent memory. The
sputtering of energy management systems thus caused
acute hardship for millions. The attack also coincided with
the height of the pre-Christmas shopping season, a period
critical to the economic stability of thousands of businesses.
Financial management and transfer systems were being
adversely affected, raising the specters of both theft and lost
revenue. Telematic networks—the marriage of
telecommunications systems and computer networks—
were behaving mysteriously; phone service to selected areas
was collapsing for no apparent reason. Transportation
systems, including air and rail networks, were unable to
operate normally. Movement slowed, delaying everything
from tangerines to tanks.
From a national security perspective, the transportation
problem was especially crippling. The United States was
also in the midst of a politico-military crisis in a particularly
troublesome part of the world. It had just agreed to deploy a
significant emergency force to Ruritania in order to aid that
country in its resistance to aggression from its larger
neighbor, Zenda. Now, as a result of the disruption of
Triangle Telematic’s networks, the machinery of
deployment was grinding to a near standstill. The
telecommunications network around Scott Air Force Base,
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(headquarters for the U.S. Transportation Command, its
Air Force element, the Air Mobility Command, and its
Tanker-Airlift Coordination Center) was seemingly
connecting to everyplace except where it was supposed to.
Thanks to the collapse of the civilian communications
network, U.S. ability to direct the global flow of airpower
and airmobile forces was “significantly degraded.” The
initial deployment of several fighter wings had failed
because of inexplicable errors in arrangements made for
their rendezvous with the aerial tankers. Now fighters and
tankers were scattered all over the globe between the
United States and Ruritania. The transportation network
around East Coast ports had diverted tens of thousands of
tons of military equipment urgently needed in Ruritania
onto railroad sidings. When the Army brigade initially
slated for rapid movement to the crisis area began
preparations to move, the shocked commander received a
report from his frantic chief medical officer that 77 percent
of the troops were HIV positive. That, at least, is what their
medical records indicated.
In short, the United States had been subjected to a
successful cyber attack on its critical infrastructure. A
high-level Presidential Commission was formed to study
the causes of what could only be described as a strategic
debacle and to suggest some solutions.
A year later, the Commission issued its long-awaited
report. Even the sanitized version released to the press and
public over the DoD’s website could not minimize the degree
of damage that had been done by what was now being
dubbed the “Christmas Catastrophe.” The national power of
the United States had been dealt a serious blow via
exploitation of its infrastructural vulnerabilities. The dollar
losses to U.S. business were being measured in the billions.
The death toll from mid-winter energy interruptions was
tallied in the low hundreds. The shock to public confidence
was severe, and the administration saw no way to recover in
time for the pending national elections. As to the mission to
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aid Ruritania, this failed. Ruritania rapidly
accommodated—some would say capitulated—to its
aggressive neighbor Zenda, a country intent on establishing
itself as the anti-U.S. hegemon in the region.
The event was branded as this country’s worst foreign
policy disaster in a quarter century. Although the
investigatory reports and nodal analysis of the incidents
were not publicly released, there was no doubt that Triangle
Telematics had been the key target of the attack. It offered
massive connectivity to American businesses and those that
depended on the businesses—including the U.S. armed
forces. This connectivity proved to be both its greatest
strength and its greatest weakness. It offered a gateway
into America’s infrastructures, a gateway that was
strategically exploited, leading to a societal crisis and
resounding strategic defeat.
A Revolution in Warfare: The Lessons of the
Scenario.
The purpose of this brief glimpse into a possible future is
to help us grasp some of the fundamental issues at stake
about warfare in the information age. This, in turn, will help
us answer the question lying at the heart of this chapter,
“What role should the DoD play in defending our national
information infrastructure?”
The scenario highlights a couple of major points. It
makes clear that potential attacks on our infrastructure
pose a serious threat to our national security, an issue that
has been termed a “vital national interest” in the latest
version of the President’s National Security Strategy.4 In
our fictional scenario, Triangle Telematics constituted what
Clausewitz would have called a “center of gravity,” a
strategic point critical to our military strength, societal
well-being, and national will. By attacking Triangle
Telematics, Zenda was able to penetrate a wide range of
infrastructures. It degraded a diverse set of our national
functions and capabilities, some purely societal, some
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clearly military, but most serving both the society and the
military. The attack on Triangle Telematics was, in short,
responsible for the social crisis in the United States and for
its strategic defeat.
At the same time, the scenario sheds light on why we are
even bothering to ask the question of whether the DoD
should be involved in protecting our information systems. In
this scenario, Triangle Telematics was not attacked using
force as it is normally understood, nor was it attacked via
traditional environments—land, air, sea, or space. Had it
been, there would have been little or no problem deciding
who had the responsibility for defending Triangle
Telematics; the role would have fallen to the Army, Air
Force, Navy and Marines. But Zenda did not use any of
these traditional warfighting environments when it
attacked Triangle Telematics. It used cyberspace. Who,
then, should defend cyberspace? Because it is a new
environment, and because, as we will see, cyber attacks do
not comfortably fit into our traditional constructs of war, the
answer is not immediately obvious.
In short, we are experiencing an era of revolutionary
change in warfare and we need to be aware of three key
points: (1) cyberspace is a new operational environment; (2)
it is of immense strategic importance to us, and it is at the
same time a source of our vulnerability because we are
increasingly dependent upon it and on the private sector
which owns and controls much of it; and (3) traditional
paradigms of warfare may not be applicable in this new
environment. All these points must be taken into
consideration as we seek to answer the question of the role
and responsibility of the DoD in defending our information
infrastructure. Let’s discuss each in turn.
Cyberspace: DoD’s Newest Operational Environment.
Our starting point must be to define what we mean by
cyberspace and explain why it must be understood as a new
operational environment. To begin with, it is important to
understand that information has exploded to the point
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where it can no longer be encompassed by traditional
concepts alone. Almost everyone understands information
as a tool, a process, a target, even a weapon, to assist in the
application of traditional force elements: blast, heat, and
fragmentation.5 While these concepts remain valid, they do
not in isolation convey the import of what information has
become in the world today. The synergistic interactions of
electronic digital technology with an informationdependent society have, in fact, transmuted information
into a virtual environment, with cyberspace as its physical
manifestation.
It must also be recognized how very revolutionary this is.
At first sight, this may not seem to be borne out by the
evidence. Cyberspace was defined at the start of this
chapter as that place where electronic systems such as
computer networks, telecommunications systems, and
devices that exert their influence through or in the
electromagnetic spectrum connect and interact in the
telematic medium. Understood in this way, it is clear that
cyberspace has always existed. It must be realized,
however, that it was not until very recent times that
cyberspace became visible and usable.6
A useful analogy is outer space—it has always been
there, but not until mankind developed technologies that
enabled us to extend our affairs into it and use it to conduct
terrestrial affairs did we fully comprehend that it forms
another physical and operational environment beyond the
land, sea, and air. Outer space does not have the same
physical presence or properties of land or water—you
cannot weigh or measure it in a useful sense—but it
nonetheless exists because we can see the physical results of
things that happen there.7 The physical laws and principles
that govern how systems function in these environments
are the borders that fix the environmental boundaries.8
Submarines function very well in an environment governed
by the laws of hydrodynamics, but they cannot fly; the Space
Shuttle works in an environment governed by the laws of
orbital mechanics, but it cannot function submerged under
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the water. All of these environments interact with each
other and have synergistic effects, but they are distinct and
unique.
The same holds true for cyberspace. Those devices and
systems that operate in cyberspace function because they
were designed to conform to and exploit the laws governing
radiated and electronic energy. We can date our use of this
environment to the mid-19th century and the invention of
the telegraph, the first telecommunication system to
operate in accordance with the laws of this medium.9 The
next 100 years saw steady and evermore technologically
sophisticated advances in the ability to exploit and develop
this medium—undersea telegraph cables, telephone, radio,
television, microwave relay, even communications
satellites—that extended the reach of communications to
continental and eventually intercontinental distances.
We have enormously increased the volume of
information that can be stored, manipulated, and
transfered. But it has only been in the past 2 decades, the
closing quarter of the 20th century, that the fortuitous
marriage of these technologies with the microchip has led to
attainment of “critical mass” and the emergence of
cyberspace as a full-fledged environment. Cyberspace,
therefore, is something very new, an environment in which
military forces and society in general are only just
beginning to learn how to operate.
Cyberspace: Strategic Importance and Strategic
Vulnerability.
Cyberspace, then, is a new environment. But more than
that, it is of immense strategic importance to us. Our
imaginary scenario has already illustrated this. Let’s look
at another example. Every year, students from the different
service war colleges meet in April at the Air Force War
Gaming Center at Maxwell Air Force Base and engage in a
week-long exercise called the Joint Land Air and Sea
Simulation (JLASS). Blue team fights Red team. The
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wargame is set in an Asian context. National Defense
University (NDU) students specializing in information
warfare are always the Red team, and every year they cause
serious problems for the Blue team because of their mastery
of information operations. In 1998 these NDU students
developed a very interesting information operations war
plan that targeted a whole series of information systems. On
the very first day, the Blue team found, to its surprise and
consternation, that certain of its system capabilities had
been degraded by 25 percent. The Blue team students had
not realized how much their military effectiveness
depended on these systems. This anecdote vividly
illustrates just how crucial information and information
systems are to our military capability.
Cyberspace is also an environment in which the U.S.
armed forces and the private sector are inextricably
interconnected. The dependence, for example, of the DoD on
civilian telecommunications networks is well known. The
principle of dependency is not itself new. The military’s need
for reliable civilian communications dates back at least to
World War I as demonstrated by the fact that the President
exercised his legal power to take control of commercial radio
and telephone systems. But the degree of dependency is new
and growing rapidly.
DoD itself estimates that somewhere in excess of 90
percent of its daily communications are carried by
commercially owned and operated communications
systems.10 The problem grew so acute that the National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC)
was formed in the 1980s to provide a critical and very
high-level interface between the telecommunications
industry and the national security community.11 During the
Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, DoD drew upon commercial
communications networks to assist in the deployment,
support, and employment of American forces. This led to an
ongoing debate about the legal restrictions on the use of
some multinational communications systems such as
Intelsat or Inmarsat.12 As available bandwidth grows, the
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demand for it seems to grow even more rapidly, as the recent
air campaign in Kosovo clearly demonstrated.
Future warfare as conceived by American military
p l a n n e r s i n Joint Vision (JV) 2010 ( a n d i t s
soon-to-be-published follow-on, JV 2020) will be highly
information-dependent. Attaining and maintaining
information superiority are increasingly regarded as
indispensable parts of how Americans will fight. But this
trend entails problems. Take, for example, the concept of
focused logistics, which depends on the development of what
is called a “reachback” capability. This connects globally
deployed forces to critical nodes and bases far to the rear, as
far back in some cases as the United States. Reachback
capability reduces the size and scale of forces that need to be
sent to any operational area. This improves the speed with
which forces can be deployed and reduces the amount of
support needed to sustain them.
But this speed comes at a price. The military’s most
recent instruction on Defensive Information Warfare noted
that “use breeds dependence, and dependence breeds
vulnerability.”13 While this might seem to be obvious, the
implications for the future effectiveness of U.S. military
operations are profound, because the increasing
dependence of DoD on telematic systems that it neither
owns nor controls confronts those forces with a potential
vulnerability that may be difficult to counter. Since the
linkage between commercial telematic networks and
military capability is becoming ever more important to
national security, the need for an effective partnership
between those communities becomes increasingly
important. This is a truth recognized in the latest National
Security Strategy, which places great emphasis on the
ability to attain information superiority.
The Role and the Responsibility of the DoD.
DoD clearly recognizes these realities. It is taking steps
to ensure that it will, in fact, be able to operate in this new
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environment. It is making efforts to reduce the
vulnerability of which we have spoken, and recognizes the
need for an adequate defense of that part of the national
information infrastructure under the control of the private
sector, even if the question of who conducts that defense is
under debate. DoD is also working to develop new relevant
technologies and keep apace of the rapid changes of the
Information Age. Perhaps more importantly still, it is
developing new concepts to suit the changing environment.
The development of new technologies calls for new
organizations and doctrines. It is these, not technological
superiority alone, which lead to victory in war. History
makes this abundantly clear; during World War II, for
example, what enabled the German victory in France in
May 1940 was not their technologies per se, which were not
unique to them, but the way in which they were able to
exploit them. 14 The American military does, in fact,
recognize its need to make organizational and doctrinal
change in the area of information warfare to bring about
information superiority.15 Cyberspace is indeed a new
environment which is of great—and recognized—
significance to the military.
Information War: A New Paradigm.
Ironically, however, despite the obvious importance of
cyberspace to our military efforts and our national power,
threats directed against us via cyberspace are not visible
acts of war as traditionally understood. The problem is
partly definitional. The Clausewitzian paradigm with
which most of us are familiar is one where warfare is “an act
of physical force, a pulsation of violence.”16 Its purpose is to
“impose our will” on our opponents. It is waged by a special
class of actors, called “warriors,” who fight (using armed and
violent means) on behalf of a special kind of political entity,
called states. The information age is rendering this
definition less relevant, and perhaps obsolete. This is
because cyberspace may permit us to impose our political
will without the use of physical force, without the pulsation
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of violence. Under the circumstances, can cyberwar be
classified as war? What is an attack in the information age?
Who are the combatants? And what is an appropriate
response to an attack that does not involve the pulsation of
violence by a recognizable enemy?17
What is an attack? If we think back to the scenario with
which we started, in no way, shape, or form is it clear that
what happened via cyberspace amounted to an “attack.”
Certainly there were no kinetic actions like bomb
explosions, nor were there any violations of national
sovereign territory: no tanks or airfleets crossed any
borders. Suppose, however, that in a slight variation of this
scenario, the nation of Zenda were to target one of
Ruritania’s key communications networks. Suppose,
furthermore, that it wreaked havoc on that country’s
military capability, degraded its key societal
infrastructures, and created great disorder in political
systems and economic affairs. Suppose it did all of this
without the use of kinetic force and violence. Might not the
Ruritanians argue that they had been “attacked”? Would
they be wrong to claim that they were “at war” and entitled
to exercise their “inherent right of self defense"? During the
student exercise mentioned earlier in this paper the Red
team developed a war plan against the Blue team that
included information warfare attacks against such targets
as the air traffic control system, financial centers, energy
distribution network, and telecommunications
infrastructure. The intent of these attacks was to degrade
and disrupt the Blue team’s political, social, and military
cohesion.18 Would these actions equate to “force,” “armed
attack,” or “armed aggression,” to use the terminology in the
U.N. Charter? Does war between states, in short, require
physical violence, kinetic energy, and human casualties for
it to be termed war?19
There is a whole host of other questions that emerge.
What is a combatant? According to the Clausewitzian
paradigm, the warriors are the uniformed
military—armies, navies, and, in more recent times, air
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forces. In the student exercise just described, who is a
“combatant”? What role is played by intent? How might the
law itself change in response to the information age? How
will long-established legal principles such as national
sovereignty and the inviolability of national boundaries be
affected by the ability of cyberspace to transcend such
concepts? Will the technologies of the information age, by
bringing atrocities and violations of the law of war into the
intense and immediate glare of global public awareness,
increase the observance of the legal norms of armed
conflict?20 These questions merely hint at the tremendous
uncertainties that surround the evolving discipline of
information warfare and the concepts of national and global
information power.
We must search for a new and more satisfactory
paradigm for warfare if we are to resolve such issues. This
paradigm should remain true, as far as possible, to our
traditional notions of war. If cyberwar, in other words,
equates to warfare conducted via the environment called
cyberspace, then it must meet constructively the criteria
usually associated with warfare. It must be waged by a
political entity that is an acknowledged actor in the
international community, normally a nation-state. It must
include military operations. It must involve overt hostility
and the use of force, which normally entails physical
destruction. This is where, however, cyberwar can be
distinguished from other types of war. For, while most of the
operations mounted by Zenda did not cause death or
physical destruction, their intent was to compel the
Ruritanians to do their will. Zenda, in other words, did use a
form of force.
These definitional issues are of obvious relevance to the
question at hand. It seems clear that if (and the verdict is
not yet final) these activities can be called war, then the DoD
must be in the forefront of our defense against them. It must
lead any efforts to “protect and defend”—to use language
from national policy on information assurance and the
latest version of the National Security Strategy—our
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“national cyberspace” and national infrastructures that are
critical to military, economic, and societal security.21
Information War.
It must be clear by now that we are in need of a new
paradigm that will permit us to deal with this new
phenomenon of war in cyberspace. What is information
warfare?
The earliest use of the term seems to have originated in
the DoD’s Office of Net Assessment, where Dr. Tom Rona
was exploring the relationships among control systems, a
field known as cybernetics. Dr. Rona described the
competition between adversarial control systems as
“information warfare,” in the sense that control systems can
be described as the means for gathering, processing, and
disseminating information, processes which can be
diagrammed and described with flow and feedback charts of
mind-numbing dryness and complexity.22 Later, with the
publication of DoD Directive 3600.1 in 1993, we arrived at
an official definition for the term. To add confusion, there
were actually several definitions, at differing levels of
classification.23 Perhaps not surprisingly, this definition
underwent frequent revision, with the current definition
the longest-lived, in effect since promulgation of the current
version of DoD Directive 3600.1 on December 9, 1996. Joint
Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations, published in 1998, incorporated the DoD
language, probably ensuring that this definition will
remain in effect for some time longer.24 Let’s glance at the
current definition of information warfare (IW), along with
the closely associated terms information assurance (IA) and
information operations (IO), starting with the latter.
• Information Operations. Actions taken to affect
adversary information and information systems while
defending one’s own information and information systems.

149

• Information Warfare. Information operations
conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or
promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or
adversaries.
• Information Assurance. Information operations
that protect and defend information and information
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This
includes providing for restoration of information systems by
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction
capabilities.

These definitions leave much to be desired in the areas of
who, why, when, etc. Under the DoD definition, IW is an
activity that only the military undertakes, and even then
only under specific circumstances, while IO is a much
broader and more inclusive field in which the entire
government is engaged, in peacetime as well as wartime. An
example of IO was the activity of Radio Free Europe, which
operated during peacetime under governmental control. IA,
on the other hand, is an activity that goes on constantly and
engages all elements of national information power,
including specific aspects of the private sector.25
Most U.S. service concepts of IW rest in part on the
concept of the “information environment.” Whether it is
described as an environment, realm, domain, or whatever,
there is a clear sense that information has become some
kind of location where crucial operations are conducted. The
Army’s pathfinding doctrinal publication, Field Manual
100-6, Information Operations, even speaks of a “global
information environment [and] battlespace” in which
conflict is waged. The latest version of the U.S. Air Force’s
basic doctrinal publication explicitly addresses the need to
dominate the information realm, describing information
superiority as
the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information
while denying an adversary the ability to do the same. [It]
includes gaining control over the information realm.26
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IW/IO thus emerge as the struggle to control and exploit
the information environment. Needless to say, this struggle
extends across the conflict spectrum from “peace” to “war”
and involves all the government’s agencies and instruments
of power. One advantage of this approach is that if one
replaces “information” with “aerospace” or “maritime,” you
have defined air and naval warfare, or, more appropriate to
our purposes, airpower and seapower. Thus information
operations can be described as those activities that
governments undertake to control and exploit the
information environment via the use of the information
component of national power.
DoD and Cyber Terrorism.
A strong case can be made that the DoD has a
responsible role in the defense of our national cyberspace in
the event of IW (cyberwar). There is far less consensus when
it comes to how to deal with its lesser cousin, cyber
terrorism. Cyber terrorism may be defined as the use of
cyberspace by individuals or non-state/transnational
groups to cause human injury or physical damage and
induce fear for political purposes.
There is, first of all, quite a lively debate over whether it
should be a civil law enforcement or a national security
community responsibility. Cyber terrorism differs from
cyberwar in the same way that the non-cyber variants
differ: the political status of the actors. While most
terrorism is conducted in order to achieve some type of
political objective, the actor lacks the legitimacy of a
nation-state or other recognized political entity. It is
therefore usually viewed as a crime, and the task of dealing
with criminals traditionally belongs to the U.S. law
enforcement community rather than the military.27
Can the military do nothing? It is certainly constrained
to a degree. The Posse Comitatus Act, for example, enacted
in 1878 in response to the unrest of the Reconstruction era,
essentially prohibits the uniformed military from acting in a
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civilian law enforcement role. However, the prohibition is
not absolute. The DoD can assist the civil law enforcement
authorities under the proper conditions and safeguards.28
Indeed, over the past several years the military has played
an important role in assisting and cooperating with civil
authorities in their war on drugs. According to some
analysts, it could and should assist in the fight against
terrorism and cyber terrorism.
There is also a debate over the role that should be played
by the private sector. This added twist stems from the
pervasive involvement of the private sector in cyberspace.
The private sector owns and operates many of the
information systems and networks that would be affected
by the terrorists. It would thus seem to have a stake in the
defense of our information infrastructures. But cooperation
with the private sector is by no means easy to achieve or
universally desired.
The effort to defend against cyber terrorism is
complicated by the very different interests and perspectives
brought to bear on the problem by the DoD, the
law-enforcement community, and the private sector. The
private sector sees the information revolution as a means
for expanding business opportunities and exploiting
organizational changes to create a global economy. Its
concern quite naturally is whether a partnership with
government would affect their business. Would it, for
example, lower their profits? Undermine consumer
confidence? Lead to restrictive regulation?29 It tends to see
government involvement as an unnecessary impediment to
swift progress.
The law enforcement community, trying to fight the twin
scourges of organized crime and political terrorism, sees the
information revolution as a frightening collection of
capabilities that their adversaries can exploit to operate
inside of law enforcement’s OODA Loop, the famous Boyd
cycle of “observe-orient-decide-act.” The growing reliance on
cyberspace also makes it an objective in and of itself.30
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As to the national security community, in particular the
DoD, it faces a very real dilemma. Its ability to operate
globally has become increasingly dependent on this new
environment, yet, at the same time, its ability and authority
to protect and defend cyberspace is limited.31
None of this would matter so much if it were not that
cyber terrorism appears to be a serious and growing threat
around the world. A number of political groups around the
world have come to see cyberspace as an inviting new
medium in which to commit terrorist acts. More than a
decade ago, for example, the Italian Red Brigade’s
operational manifesto specified the destruction of Italian
computer systems and facilities as a means of “striking at
the head of the state.” Similarly, the Sinn Fein arm of the
Irish Republican Army attempted to bomb computer and
telecommunications systems supporting the British
financial network.32 In the past few years, groups such as
the Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka, the East Timorese
resistance movement, and the Maxican Zapitistas have all
employed Internet-based efforts to exploit cyberspace for
revolutionary purposes.
Cyberspace presents some obvious advantages to such
groups. The entry costs are negligible. Often, no more is
needed than a computer and Internet access. Yet the effects
of an attack can be rapid and intercontinental. There is
almost no physical risk to the attacker, while a direct
forceful impact can be directed against large faceless
entities such as corporations or government agencies.
These, rather than innocent individuals, comprise the
enemy. Attacks of this sort are less likely to result in a
hostile popular reaction.33 The use of cyberspace for these
purposes is not likely to diminish.
International Strategies.
In this new environment, so vital to both business and
national security, an effective defense against diverse
threats in cyberspace can come only from a partnership
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among all the interested parties, private sector as well as
government. While the United States has been described as
the most information-dependent nation in the world, it is by
no means the only nation whose society and military forces
rely heavily on the new technologies of the information age.
Many, if not most, of the world’s more technologically
advanced countries have become aware that information
and the infrastructures that depend on digital information
are critical to societal stability and national security.
In 1998 the Australian Parliament received a report on
the high-tech threat to that country’s critical
infrastructures. The collapse of the electric power grid in
Auckland, New Zealand, the following year, although
caused by a mechanical failure, not by terrorists, pointed
out the economic and social costs of such infrastructural
degradations. 3 4 The Norwegian government has
established a commission to study the vulnerabilities of that
country’s infrastructures, and the Swedish government has
undertaken a similar effort. Many of the NATO countries
have had discussions with American authorities, at least at
the level of protecting military systems and networks. But it
is at a higher level that some very interesting developments
are underway.
In the summer of 1998 the President of the Russian
Federation sent a draft resolution to the United Nations
Secretary General. The key portion of the resolution aimed
at
developing international legal regimes to provide security of
global information and telecommunication systems and combat
terrorism and criminality in the field of information.

Particularly interesting about this proposal was its
organizational path of entry: it was introduced via the First
Committee, which deals with issues of disarmament.35
After consultations with other delegations, including the
United States, the draft was rewritten. In its new form the
resolution aimed to develop
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international principles [to] enhance the security of global
information and telecommunication systems and help to
combat information terrorism and criminality.

This resolution passed the General Assembly by consensus
on December 4, 1998. While it does not, of course, have the
force of international or domestic law, it established the
basis for further work, which continues.
While the Russian proposal was primarily concerned
with military information warfare, there are other efforts
underway more tightly focused on the civil or criminal
aspects of the issue. In March 1999, a committee of experts
on crime in cyberspace, a subgroup of the Council of
Europe’s Committee on Crime Problems, issued a working
draft of a position on cyber crime.36 The draft focused on
such issues as extradition, mutual legal assistance, and
trans-border computer searches. These are thorny issues
that will not easily be resolved. The draft did not appear to
define cyberspace, although the draft was clearly focused on
computer systems and the interactions between systems
linked across national borders.
In October 1999, a G-8 Ministerial Conference on
combating transnational organized crime met in Moscow
and issued a communiqué. It made multiple references to
computer crime, stressing the need to continue work on an
action plan to deal with high-tech and computer crime. Six
weeks later, Stanford University’s Hoover Institution
hosted a symposium to explore ways to develop
international cooperation to combat cyber crime and
terrorism. The symposium’s closing session focused on a
proposal for an international convention, drafted by the
Center for International Security and Cooperation, or
CISAC, to combat cyber crime and terrorism. The CISAC
considered some of the same issues as those covered in the
Council of Europe draft, also providing specific explanations
of offenses. Members of CISAC are currently in the process
of gathering comments and inputs before revising the draft.
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In short, the seriousness of the threat is well recognized not
only within the boundaries of the United States, but beyond.
Conclusion.
We return to the question with which we opened this
discussion: “Does the DoD have both a role in and a
responsibility for defending American cyberspace?” Clearly,
the National Information Infrastructure is of critical and
growing importance to American economic strength,
political vitality, national will, and military power. A
growing number of government publications, directives,
and policies relating to information and its role in national
security provide evidence that this issue will increase in
importance. The newly issued government policy paper,
“Defending America’s Cyberspace: National Plan for
Information Systems Protection,” is a detailed and
comprehensive approach to this issue. There seems to be
little question that cyberspace is an operational
environment crucial to military capability, but there is
much less consensus that this is an environment in which
the DoD has a role outside of the confines of purely military
systems and infrastractures. But the mission of America’s
armed forces is quite clear: to provide for the common
defense. The growth of cyberspace as an environment
critical to America’s security and well-being means that the
DoD has both a role and a responsibility, albeit in
conjunction and cooperation with law enforcement and the
private sector, to protect this environment from “all
enemies, foreign and domestic.” To do less would be to
endanger national security and abdicate the responsibility
assigned it by the American Constitution.
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2. The term “telematics” probably originated in the United Kingdom
in the 1980s. It refers to an evolving disciplinary area that incorporates
telecommunications and communication networks. In today’s world,
which is massively interconnected and becoming more so every day,
those worlds are now inextricably bound together.
3. These infrastructures are described and the potential threat
outlined in a 1999 publication issued by the White House’s Office of
Scientific and Technology Policy (OSTP), “Cybernation: The American
Infrastructure in the Information Age,” available online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/html/cyber2.html.
4. See A National Security Strategy for a New Century, published by
the White House in December 1999 and available online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr1299.pdf.
5. I am indebted to the Director of the National Security Agency,
Lieutenant General Mike Hayden, for the terminology used here.
6. While it’s impossible to say when the term “cyberspace” was first
used, several authors stand out as being among the leaders. William
Gibson’s classic work of science fiction, Neuromancer (New York: Ace,
1984), first broached the concept of humans seamlessly operating
within a cybernetic, virtual reality environment, while Nicholas
Negroponte’s book, Being Digital (New York: Knopf, 1995), is an
exploration of the impact of cyberspace on our daily lives. The 1999
movie hit, The Matrix, is yet another exanple. The term itself has only
recently come into widespread use. A search of several automated
databases, for example, covering the years 1986-89 and 1986-91
contained only 17 “hits” on the term; the same databases for 1996
contained 754!
7. Of course outer space can be measured in a scientific sense, but
not in terms useful in a lay sense.
8. The question of where the borders of cyberspace lie is an
intriguing one. Michael Benedikt has written perceptively on it in his
book, Cyberspace: First Steps (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991), while Anne
Wells Branscomb in a recent monograph Cybercommunities and
Cybercommerce: Can We Learn to Cope? (Harvard University, Program
on Information Resources Policy), suggests that the borders of
cyberspace are discernible at the interconnection points between
segments of the Internet, with network managers and systems
administrators acting as the border guards, in a sense. A striking
graphical representation of this is available at www.peacockmaps.com.
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The technology of cyberspace makes “virtual” organizations ever more
plausible and perhaps in some scenarios even desirable. Four people
physically located on the Greenland icecap, in the Australian outback,
in the Amazon rainforest, and halfway up Mount Everest will be able to
meet in cyberspace, discuss a problem, develop a solution, and monitor
the corrective actions via information technologies. Already, totally
global voice communication is possible via satellite-based telephone
systems such as Iridium (see their website at www.iridium.com) or
Globalstar (at www.globalstar.com), and within a few years it is
planned to have the same capability for heavy bandwidth data
transmission. See, for example, the Teledesic plan at
www.teledesic.com. Regardless of the financial difficulties which
Iridium has encountered, the movement of telematic architectures into
space is a trend which can only continue.
9. This construct omits communication methods such as signal
flags, smoke signals, drums, or even heliograph because they did not
require manipulation of the electronic environment. The interest of the
national security community in cyberspace thus dates to the Civil War,
in which the national, political, and military leadership of both the
North and South depended on the telegraph for strategic direction of
their respective war efforts.
10. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force
on Information Warfare-Defense,” January 8, 1997, available online at
http://cryptome.org/iwd.htm.
11. By “high-level,” we mean interface between CEOs and the
President of the United States. See www.nstac.org for details. Note that
this was not the only reason for the formation of this institution, but it
was certainly an influential factor.
12. Richard A. Morgan, “Military Use of Commercial
Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and
‘Peaceful Purposes,’” in Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 60, No.
1, September-October 1994.
13. CJCSI 6510.1, Defensive Information Warfare, 1998.
14. The Germans were not superior in any one category. They had
tanks, to be sure. But so did the French and British. They had the
airpower. But so did the French and British. They had radios and
effective command and control. So did their enemies. Then why were the
Germans able to take their tanks through the French and British lines
in May 1940 like a hot knife through butter? The answer is that the
human element made all the difference. The Germans made
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organizational changes (Panzer divisions and even Panzer corps) and
developed an operational concept, a doctrine (we like to call it “lightning
war”) to employ the technology in a novel way.
15. We are evolving the necessary new concepts like “dominant
battlespace knowledge” or “network centric warfare.”
16. See On War, Book One, Chapter 1, for Clausewitz’s complete
analysis of these relationships.
17. In early 1999, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre
testified before Congress concerning recent intrusions into U.S. military
computer systems, intrusions apparently originating in Russia. Hamre
said that a “cyberwar” was underway. This mischaracterization of the
incident is an example of the murkiness of the terminology, because
while the incident could certainly have been called cyber-espionage, it
was hardly war.
18. While this example could be dismissed as an American example
of mirror-imaging, a recent book published in China by two colonels in
the Chinese Liberation Army, Unrestricted Warfare, suggests that such
concepts are gaining wider acceptance among other military forces.
19. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the Use
of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework,”
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1999); Walter
Gary Sharp, Sr., Cyberspace and the Use of Force, Falls Church, VA:
AEGIS Research Corp, 1999; and Lawrence T. Greenberg, Seymour E.
Goodman, and Kevin J. Soo Hoo, Information Warfare and
International Law, Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 1997, available online at www.dodccrp.org.
20. Information warfare also raises specific legal issues related to
computer crime: what is a crime, who commits it, and what does the law
say about it?
21. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December
1999.
22. This author first heard Dr. Rona’s ideas during a presentation on
June 13, 1994, at the Information Resources Management College,
National Defense University, in Washington, DC. He defined IW as
the sequence of actions undertaken by all sides in a conflict to
destroy, degrade, and exploit the information systems of their
adversaries. Conversely, information warfare also comprises
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all the actions aimed at protecting information systems against
hostile attempts at destruction, degradation, and exploitation.
Information warfare actions take place in all phases of conflict
evolution: peace, crisis, escalation, war, de-escalation, and
post-conflict periods.
23. During the initial classroom meeting of the School of
Information Warfare and Strategy’s first class in August 1994, the 16
students reacted with dismay to the plethora of official and unofficial
definitions of IW. While some believe that any attempt to fix a definition
of IW at the present time is premature and counterproductive, others
believe that some degree of imposed consensus is essential, and that
unless the different organizations involved in the issue have some
common terminology, any attempt to plan is doomed to frustration and
failure. While this author agrees that trying to fix terms for all time is
futile because the discipline is still evolving, some kind of terminological
commonality is vital.
24. One of the reasons for the creation of the term “information
warfare” is the visceral dislike and mistrust of the word “war” by many
of the agencies and people who are beginning to find that the
information age envelops their activities and mission. Thus the creation
of a term that points at the larger arena in which information “stuff” is
conducted, but does not tie those operations so visibly to the military.
25. See the author’s “Defining Information Power,” published by the
National Defense University Press as Strategic Forum #115, 1997,
available online at www.ndu.edu.
26. See Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, August 1996; also see Air Force
Doctrine Document–1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, USAF Doctrine Center,
September 1997, pp. 31-32. FM 100-6 is currently under revision. Some
would suggest that it is under attack rather than revision, by
traditionalists who see IO solely in terms of an enabler or force
multiplier rather than as something that could be the central or decisive
element of a campaign. While not so pronounced, similar currents are
detectable within the Air Force as well.
27. This oversimplifies. There is still a lively debate over the
question of whether counterterrorism is primarily a civil law
enforcement or national security community responsibility.
28. A detailed exploration of this issue can be found in Gregory D.
Grove, The U.S. Military and Civil Infrastructure Protection:
Restrictions and Discretion Under the Posse Comitatus Act, Palo Alto,
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1998, after issuance of PDD-63. During one discussion a lawyer from a
private sector firm asked quite pointedly of the government
representatives, “What’s in it for me?” This is, of course, an entirely
valid question for the private sector to ask. Fearful of increased
governmental regulation and bureaucracy, they view “help from
Washington” with a jaundiced eye. If the government cannot effectively
make the case that IA is a shared need, the partnership called for by
both PDD-63 and the Report of the President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), published in 1997, will be difficult if
not impossible to attain. The PCCIP Report is available online at
www.ciao.gov.
30. This was one of the key issues addressed by the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
31. Efforts are underway in academia as well as government to
study the problem. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
for example, has launched a study on the information revolution and
world politics, with cyber terrorism as one of its key issues. See their
website at www.ceip.org.
32. See Andrew Rathmell, “Assessing the IW Threat From
Sub-State Groups,” in Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality, Alan
Campen and Douglas Dearth, eds., Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International
Press, 1998, pp. 295-312.
33. Devost, Pollard, and Houghton, “How Safe is Your Toaster?” in
Sun Tzu and Information Warfare, Robert E. Neilson, ed., National
Defense University Press, 1996.
34. See Adam Cobb, Thinking About the Unthinkable: Australian
Vulnerabilities to High-Tech Risks, Parliamentary Research Service,
June 29, 1998; available online at www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/
1997-98/98rp18.htm.
35. Diplomatic historians and scholars familiar with the early
history of the Law of War and other international agreements such as
that at the Hague Conference of 1899 may recognize the motivations
behind Russian sponsorship of that meeting a little more than century
ago. Russian fears of advanced German and Austro-Hungarian military
technology had led to an understandable effort to restrain the
development and deployment of such technology.
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36. This draft, issued on March 11, 1999, was the 14th attempt
prepared by the Directorate of Legal Affairs.
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CHAPTER 11
DANIEL T. KUEHL’S VIEW OF
DOD’S ROLE IN DEFENDING THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE:
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
Phillip E. Lacombe
The previous chapter by Dr. Daniel Kuehl has much to
commend it. Broadly speaking, I share his understanding of
the problem and his evaluation of what needs to be done. If I
have any reservations, it is that Kuehl has not gone far
enough in stressing the urgency of the problem and the need
to deal with this important challenge.
This brief chapter will therefore not so much modify, as
underline, the points made by Kuehl. It will draw on my
experience as a member of President William J. Clinton’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1996)1 as
a member of the Transition Office that followed, and my
work at a company whose business is closely linked to this
very problem. The chief purpose of this discussion will be to
argue for some profound changes in the way we think.
The Nature of the Threat.
The first point to make is that the cyber threat has
developed with quite extraordinary rapidity. In 1996, when
I was considering whether or not to join the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP),
I was advised against the move by a very senior defense
official. His words of caution were, “Don’t go, there’s no
threat, it’s a flash in the pan, and will be gone in a heartbeat.
You won’t be doing anything important.” And at that early
date there was reason to believe he might be right. Within
the information warfare arena, there were people who were
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seriously concerned with the issue. But they were largely
alone. No one else seemed to be paying attention to the
problem, not operational commanders, not the law
enforcement agencies of the United States, not businesses,
and not the press. Two and a half years later, after the
commission issued its report, and in particular after
February 1998 when the solar sunrise woke people to the
danger, the level of concern is enormously higher. It is clear
that our information infrastructure is at risk, and that
attacks on it cannot be taken lightly.2
The suddenness with which the threat developed has
considerable implications. The seriousness of any threat is
related to the amount of damage it can inflict and to our
ability to defend against it. Cyber threats pose some unique
challenges to us in part because they are so very new. This
means that not only must we find ways to deal with new
complexities, but we must also draw upon our imaginative
resources to come to terms with a phenomenon outside of
our traditional experience. In doing so, we must overcome
deeply rooted cultural assumptions. We must do some
radical rethinking.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: A Neglected
Effort.
One of the most strikingly obvious features about
attacks on our information infrastructure is our failure to
accept it as the threat it is. Clearly such attacks have the
potential to do enormous damage to our nation. Kuehl
illustrated this very effectively in his chapter. It is a fact
that all of our infrastructures rely on communications and
information systems. The water system in Los Angeles is
controlled by a phone and computer system. It opens and
closes gates in the water system using computer controls
over the phone. All the electrical power in the United States
is delivered by way of the computer systems that control it.
In the near future, electrical power will be delivered using a
new system called Oasis. Electrical power will be auctioned
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in real time. This has clear advantages; the American
people will get the best rate in their homes, businesses, and
agencies. At the same time, however, this system will be
controlled by computer and communication systems,
enabling the systems to run without the intervention of
individuals. This will create a new vulnerability. Weapons
of mass disruption, as cyber attacks have been dubbed, are
indeed a serious problem. Yet, as we have already said,
recognition of the full scope of the problem has been very
slow in coming. What explanations are there for our
reluctance to accept reality? And what can be done about
this?
First, we have had relatively little historical experience
of attacks on our infrastructures; the last time America’s
information infrastructures were attacked was during the
War of 1812. This means that we must call upon
considerable powers of imagination to grasp what such an
event would entail. We must ask ourselves basic questions.
How would we be affected by an attack on our information
infrastructure? What do we mean when we say that this or
that institution is “at risk”? Let us consider here the
example of a library. Many American children today visit
the library by computer. Rather than going to the physical
building, they access the data base using their home or
school computers. If their internet service is cut off, so too
will be their ability to access the library. When we start to
think through some of these realities, we will begin to better
understand the profound ways in which our daily lives
would be affected in the event of a cyber attack.
Another explanation for the failure of many to grasp the
serious nature of the threat to the information
infrastructure lies in the complexity associated with the
information system itself. We do not fully grasp the notion of
cascading effects. We do not remember that the electrical
power system affects water supply, that the lack of electrical
power or the lack of telephone availability in turn affects a
whole host of other vital services. Once again, we must
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expand our powers of imagination and improve our
thinking.
Cultural assumptions are also to blame for our myopia
when it comes to the information threat. There is an old
adage that runs, “Sticks and stones may break my bones but
words will never hurt me.” We have grown up with the
notion (rightly or wrongly) that we cannot be hurt or do hurt
by words (read “information”). We minimize and
misunderstand the nature of the threat. This can also be
illustrated by thinking about the reaction of typical
American parents when they catch their children hacking
into computer systems. Most parents do not seem to grasp
the fact that this is not only a crime, but dangerous. In their
minds, their children are merely gaining access to
information.
We must rethink what we mean by information and
come to recognize that, contrary to our comfortable
assumptions, the state of communications can hurt you.
Bits and bytes do now contain the ability to harm to the
nation.3 We must also recognize that information is no
longer “just” information. It is property.4 It has value
independent of anything else, and we need to start to think
about it in these terms. If and when parents begin to
appreciate the act of hacking as a property crime, they will
come to have a better appreciation of its seriousness.
New Paradigms for Dealing with Cyber Threats.
The newness of the cyber threat also increases the
challenge by rendering obsolete many of our traditional
paradigms. How, for example, should we defend our
infrastructure? As a nation, we are accustomed to a
particular way of defending against threats. In the past, we
have followed a model whereby we sought to identify our
enemies, understand their motives, and anticipate their
potential targets.
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This paradigm simply does not work in the case of a
cyber attack. When something happens in the cyber
dimension, when a computer system is broken into, when a
telephone system goes down, when an internet service
provider’s capabilities are saturated or spammed5 out, we
do not necessarily know who is responsible for the problem,
nor why that person is doing what he or she is doing. There
are no explosions, gunfire, or blood in the streets to give us
an indication or warning of a pending threat. A cyber attack
can be perpetrated using nothing more than a 486
computer, a telephone line, and a modem. How is an
intelligence agent to anticipate such a threat? Even after an
attack, it is hard to identify the perpetrator, as Kuehl has
clearly pointed out.
Given the extreme difficulty of actually determining the
“who” or “why” of an attack, our conventional model
becomes dysfunctional. But from the standpoint of how we
are affected, the distinctions are in any event irrelevant.
Consider a major retail company that finds itself unable to
conduct business because its information network is down
and it cannot process a transaction. It really does not matter
whether the problem was caused by some 14-year-old in
Stockholm playing around on the internet, or by a
competitor or foreign country intending harm. The fact is
that the business will suffer and is vulnerable, regardless of
who the “actor” was or what his or her motives were.
This is why we must rethink how we deal with threats.
The President’s Commission concluded that we should
think about the threat in terms of capability and
vulnerability rather than in terms of actor and
motivation. We must, in other words, start to think in
terms of what our vulnerabilities are and whether or not the
capabilities exist to exploit them. It is clear that our systems
are vulnerable. It is also clear that the capability of
disrupting our information infrastructure does exist. Those
in doubt should read up on the modus operandi of
well-publicized hackers. It will become clear in very short
order that all their tools are extraordinarily modest.
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Another important point to register about “targets” in
this new environment is that public confidence itself is
today a target. This is not in and of itself really new; Bruce
Hoffman, for example, has drawn attention in his chapter to
the crucial role played by public confidence in terrorism. But
it is important to recognize the way in which cyber attacks
can erode public confidence and thereby disrupt our nation.
A hypothetical example here will illustrate the point.
Suppose a hacker were to intrude into the computer systems
of Citibank, causing some 100,000 people to lose $20 each in
their bank accounts. Suppose the hacker quit after a day or
two but also published an advertisement in the New York
Times and told everyone what he had done. Suppose he also
threatened to do the same thing again if his demands were
not met. What do you suppose this would do to public
confidence? It is not difficult to appreciate that it would not
only erode trust in the banking system, but might also
undermine public trust in the U.S. Government and its
ability to defend its people.
Who Is Responsible For Defense?
I shall conclude by taking a brief look at the question of
responsibility, a theme lying very much at the heart of this
anthology and clearly addressed by Kuehl. Who is
responsible for protecting those infrastructures that are at
risk? Here again, it seems that we shall need to think about
this issue in far from traditional ways. We must find new
ways to approach defense, law enforcement, intelligence,
and other activities as they relate to cyber threats.
Consider the question of the role of the military. Should
the military be involved in the defense against cyber
attacks? While the U.S. military has no problem
understanding that its job might be to protect Joe’s Corner
Market from a missile strike, it has a harder time
understanding that its job might be to protect Joe’s Corner
Market from a cyber attack. Either type of attack,
nonetheless, is likely to cause Joe’s Corner Market to go out
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of business. Kuehl is no doubt correct when he says that the
Department of Defense (DoD) should be involved in the
protection of our information infrastructures. Yet, as long as
we continue to think of attacks as confined to acts of
physical violence, this function will seem to be unnatural.
We thus must rethink our conventional notions of what
constitutes an attack.
We must at the same time redraw the boundaries
between public and private spheres. Where information is
concerned, every improvement in defense capability in the
private sector is tantamount to increasing our national
security. We must do more to bring about an effective
partnership between the government and business. Such a
partnership would entail, among other things, the sharing
of information among these groups. Both government and
the private sector have shown themselves to be profoundly
hesitant to do so, as this author, whose career has straddled
both sides of the dividing line, is very much aware. And their
hesitation is perhaps understandable.
From the perspective of a private company, entering into
a partnership with government may entail some serious
risks. The government clearly needs to know when AT&T,
Citibank, or Joe’s Corner Market is hacked into in order to
defend the nation better. Private companies are not
insensitive to this need. Yet if they were to share
information about system vulnerabilities and successful
penetrations, they fear that these would become public
knowledge and adversely affect the competitiveness of their
businesses. Given that it is so difficult to protect sensitive
information in the era of the Freedom of Information Act
in the era of the public’s right to knowthese fears are not
unfounded.6
But it is equally difficult, if not more so, to get the
government to share information with the private sector.
Consider, for example, just how difficult it is to get the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to share the information to
which it has access, even with those it trusts. Again, we can
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understand the reluctance: the information is both
sensitive and tied to criminal investigations. We must,
however, find ways to reduce the present impediments to
information-sharing among the parts of both the public and
private sectors.
It is vital, in short, that we come of age in the cyber age
and start thinking seriously about how to achieve a genuine
public-private partnership. This may call for a complete
redefinition of its meaning. It may also call for the creation
of entirely new types of institutions. To deal with the cyber
threat, we may need to rely on an institution that is not law
enforcement, not intelligence, and not defense, but a little of
each, that is not private sector nor public sector, but a little
of both. Such a concept has been discussed. A group of
analysts at the National War College is, in fact,
investigating the possibility of developing an institution
called a Triune, which would house an intersection among
the private sector and federal, state, and local
governments.7 This idea is one which the President’s
Commission considered in 1996-1998, but rejected as too
impractical. It is an indication of how much things are
changed that this idea is now being taken far more
seriously.8 Four years ago we were just beginning to
understand the cyber threat, and the idea of creating a
triune was a pipe dream. Today, it is not. It may be that we
really do need to start thinking about something unique,
something, to quote Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, far “out of
the box.”
Conclusion.
Kuehl is right to stress the growth of cyber space as an
environment critical to America’s security. He is also right
to stress that the DoD does have both a role and a
responsibility, in cooperation with law enforcement and the
private sector, to protect this environment. What I wish to
emphasize still more, however, is the degree to which
Americans need to rethink the meaning of such concepts as
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“information,” “threats,” and “public/private” relations.
Only if they do, can we hope to maintain an adequate
defense of our information infrastructure in coming years.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11
1. The members of the commission were asked by Clinton to look at
eight critical infrastructures to determine whether or not they were
vulnerable to both physical and cyber attack. They chose to concentrate
on the cyber arena because the physical arena was already well
documented.
2. This delay in recognition makes the problem all the more urgent
because we have not adequately anticipated the problem and are
therefore forced to play a game of catch-up.
3. This was one of the conclusions reached by the President’s
Commission.
4. As a matter of fact, we are beginning to think this way in the
United States.
5. To spam is computer lingo for disrupting or clogging e-mail or
computer traffic with commercial mesages.
6. As things stand at the moment, the tendency is for private
companies to work against, rather than with, the public sector. This is
illustrated rather strikingly by an episode which took place very
recently at a meeting between this author and some of his marketing
personnel at Veridian (a company which primarily contracts for the
government but is starting to move into the private sector). We were
discussing how best to market a new capability in the private sector.
One of the marketing personnel suggested that the way to do this was to
offer to protect potential commercial clients from the government!
Clearly, the mistrust is huge.
7. Randy Larson, Bart O’Neal, and Ms. Andreazi. State and local
governments have a huge responsibility because they regulate most of
our infrastructure.
8. Jeff Smith (a former general counsel at the CIA) suggested we
think about defining a new type of institutionsomething with a
defense, law enforcement, and private sector intelligence responsibility.
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CHAPTER 12
DANIEL KUEHL’S VIEW OF
INFORMATION WARFARE AND THE
DEFENSE OF U.S. INFORMATION SYSTEMS:
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
Richard Marshall
Introduction.1
The purpose of this chapter is to comment on the chapter
by Dr. Daniel Kuehl and raise some further questions
concerning the role of information warfare and the defense
of U.S. information systems. We are all captives of our
environment, and the environment and training of this
author are that of a lawyer. I am therefore going to take a
lawyerly approach to this task. I shall commence by
describing the problem and offering an analysis—a
somewhat subjective one, to be sure. Then, I will offer some
possible solutions for the readers’ consideration.
Framing the Issue.
Kuehl has argued, in no uncertain terms, that the
Department of Defense (DoD) does have a responsibility in
this area. He is undoubtedly correct that DoD (and, for that
matter, the National Security Agency [NSA], which in a
somewhat schizophrenic fashion can be considered a part of
DoD) has a mission to defend against all enemies, foreign
and domestic. At first sight, it would appear as if the issue
could be resolved with beautiful simplicity; let the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) take care of cyber attacks
when they are crimes, and let the DoD take care of them
when they are acts of war, that is, when they are
perpetrated by our enemies. Close inspection makes it clear,
however, that this is less than easy to do. It is very hard to
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determine who is behind a cyber attack. Action must
normally be taken long before it is clear whether the attack
is a crime or worse. So we must approach the question from
a different standpoint. We need first answer some basic
questions, specifically, (1) who can be trusted with the
important business of defending our information highways,
(2) who has the technological capability to do this, and (3)
who has the constitutional responsibility to do this? With
answers in hand, we shall conclude by arguing that the
defense of cyber space is indeed important enough to involve
the DoD, but that it needs to involve the business
community as allies in the fight.
Preliminaries.
Before we proceed further, a couple of really basic points
need to be clarified. The first relates to the fundamental
seriousness of the threat, which should not be
underestimated. The second relates to the nature of cyber
space, which in the view of this author is often
misrepresented, to ill effect.
As Kuehl indicated, the cyber threat has not loomed
large on our threat horizons until fairly recently. It is
unquestionably taken much more seriously now, since it has
the potential to cause us serious military headaches. Let me
illustrate this by drawing attention to a real life exercise
that was played out in 1997.
Eligible Receiver is a periodic exercise sponsored by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its purpose is to test the
responsiveness and effectiveness of our military forces. In
1997, for the first time ever, a cyber attack scenario was
incorporated, and, again for the first time, the aggressors
won. They a won in a matter of hours rather than a matter of
days. So rapid was the victory that the exercise had to be
halted. Afterward, the person who was acting as the JCS
Chair reported to the National Security Council (NSC) that
cyber warfare did indeed pose a military threat. He noted
that in the scenario just played, U.S. forces in the Pacific
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had found themselves facing a shooting war. They were,
however, without any means of communicating with
stateside headquarters except carrier pigeons and
semaphore flags! These would quite clearly not be up to the
task of sending messages between Washington and the
Pacific! The lessons of this scenario were obvious. Indeed,
the newly awakened consciousness of the seriousness of the
problem led to the formation of the President’s Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1996. It is a matter
of crucial importance, in short, that we apply our keenest
intellectual energies to this issue.
My other point relates to the popular understanding of
cyber space. One of the obstacles we face in our attempt to
deal rationally with questions of responsibility is our
tendency to make it more abstract than it actually is. Charts
depicting cyber space are generally depicted by clouds. Well,
cyber space is not a bunch of clouds. Cyber space is basically
the public switch network. It is a tangible, physical entity.
Behind all the abstractions, fascinating though they may
be, are physical things. There are switches, routers, and
telecommunication hard devices. This is true even in a
wireless society. When you incorporate a computer into a
cellular telephone, the signals go through a public switch
network. There is a choke point that can be accessed, that
can be utilized to determine a number of things. The
electrons go through an area which can be grabbed.
Thinking of cyber space in this way will help reduce the
confusion and perhaps make the business of defense of cyber
space seem less remote and more manageable.
The Challenge of Cyber Warfare.
Let us revert at this point to the question of
responsibility and the ambiguities we spoke of earlier. It
bears some elaboration. First, let us imagine a fictional
scenario. It takes place in what Kuehl would call the
traditional dimensions of war. If an enemy aircraft flying
somewhere in our airspace were to drop a nuclear bomb on
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the White House, our initial reaction would be that the Air
Force should respond to this threat. This reaction would be
right, however, only if the aircraft were state-sponsored.
Suppose that the aircraft was piloted by a slightly crazy
member of a fringe group from within the United States,
someone, for example, from Wyoming or Utah. In this case,
the bombing would be better classified as a crime than as an
act of war. And it would surely be the task of the FBI to deal
with this threat. The point of this scenario is to elucidate a
very important reality. It is extremely difficult in cyber
space to determine the status of the perpetrator of an
“attack.”
A series of real life cyber attacks that took place in 1997
suggests more fully the extent of this problem and its many
ramifications. At that time, some 3 months after the
military exercise Eligible Receiver, attacks on Air Force
logistics-related computers were reported at a number of
installations. In and of themselves, these incidents were not
terribly exciting. They seemed to be random, isolated
events. Taken individually, they had all the appearance of
criminal acts. However, seen in the broader strategic
context, they provided indications of a more serious threat.
For at the very time of these cyber attacks on government
computers, U.S. forces were preparing for another Middle
East test range exercise in Iraq. U.S. military forces were
preparing for deployment, and a military buildup was in
progress. This pointed to the possibility that it might be the
enemy nation—Iraq—who was behind these attacks.
Suppose for a moment that this possibility had in fact
been rapidly confirmed. This still does not make it
altogether clear what the appropriate reaction should be.
Ask yourself what you would you do if you were the
President of the United States, or Secretary of Defense, or
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Could one justify the
launching of military forces against another nation in
retaliation for the extraction of information from
government computers?
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The fact is, however, that it is rare indeed for any
clear-cut blame to be assigned in short order. In the case in
question, it took some time. Air Force computers have
sensors that make it possible to detect whether any
anomalous activity has taken place. This kind of activity is
not detected at the time of an attack, but some hours after it
occurs. The sensors point the way like Tonto for the Lone
Ranger. The FBI, with the assistance of the NSA,
determined that two adolescents in California were
responsible for all of this activity. Everyone involved heaved
a big sigh of relief. But was this premature? Were the young
Americans really acting on their own? According to press
reports, their mentor lived in Israel. Did he work for the
Israeli government? Did he work on his own? Perhaps, after
all, the attacks were state-sponsored.
There is a still more recent example. For some time now,
Air Force computer systems have been afflicted by
intrusions. The intrusions come in via educational sites and
then go out via industrial sites. They extract unclassified
data associated with advanced weapons technology. No one
knows for sure who is behind these intrusions. According to
press reports, they may be coming from countries in Europe.
But there is no definitive way to tell whether the intrusions
are sponsored by states, by non-states, or simply by a group
of cyber-happy kids. If you are part of the decisionmaking
authority in the United States, how do you react to a threat
of such uncertain origin? Do you go to the State Department
and have it issue a strongly-worded statement calling on the
perpetrators to stop their illegal activities? Do you launch
your Air Force bombers? Or your submarine-borne ballistic
missiles? Whom do you call upon to help you deal with the
threat? Do you call in the FBI? All of the above suggestions
have been considered. But framing the appropriate reaction
to an event is very difficult indeed.
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Analysis: Who Should Defend Our Critical
Infrastructures?
Dividing responsibility for the defense of cyberspace
between law enforcement agents and the military, based on
an evaluation of whether an act is a crime or an act of war,
does not appear to be very practical. Rather than do this, we
should approach the whole question from a different angle,
simply asking ourselves who should be entrusted with the
task of defending something so essential to our national
well-being, and why. We will also extend our consideration
to include the private sector. The reader is now invited to
ask himself or herself, some fundamental questions.
• Whom do Americans trust? First of all, we must
consider who it is that can be trusted to protect this vital
resource. A brief survey was taken at the time of the
conference presentation on which the present chapter is
based. Members of the audience were asked whether they
would permit NSA to examine their home computer and see
what kind of programs they were using and with whom they
were communicating. The same question was asked
concerning the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
FBI. Only a handful (some five or six people out of about 100
people) indicated that they would. When asked how many
would permit Microsoft to come in and take a look at their
computer system, rather more indicated that they would.
Far more have given their tacit consent simply by owning
computers and running Microsoft products like a Windows
95 or 98 or Microsoft Office 2000 product. In so doing, these
people have in effect given Bill Gates permission to come in
and see what type of programs they are using. The point is
that someone is looking into our computers. Americans do
not seem to mind if this someone is American business.

The question might be framed in a different way.
Suppose we were to poll Americans to see if they would
permit NSA or CIA or FBI to come into their computers and
modify the functionality of their programs? The evidence
suggests that most of them would be adamantly opposed to
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such a notion. Yet, these same individuals permit AOL and
other Internet service providers to do that very thing.
Merely by using an Internet service provider to connect to
the Internet, they have allowed these companies to come in
and modify the functionality of their computer.2
• Whom should they trust? Americans trust business
to do intrusive things even though they do not trust the
federal government. Is this logical? Perhaps. It is certainly
surprising in some ways. In the first place, American
business is uncontrolled. The federal government is subject
to federal law and the Fourth Amendment. In the second
place, our trust is in large measure based on the (false)
assumption that the businesses in question are American
businesses. In fact, we are living in the age of international
business, and much of the software that Microsoft and other
companies sell is written outside of the United States. Why?
Because it is much cheaper. It might surprise you to find out
where a lot of the software is written—India, Pakistan,
Israel, Russia, and China, for example. We should ask
ourselves whether or not we should, under these
circumstances, feel warm and trusting.
• Who is best equipped to defend us against cyber
threats? Both government and the private sector have
technological capabilities which they do not always share
with one another. The private sector tends to be somewhat
advantaged in that it is not quite as constrained as the
government when it comes to invading privacy for the
purposes of defense.
• Who bears the constitutional responsibility to
defend us against cyber threats? What is the proper role
of the government in dealing with these threats? Can DoD
defend us against crime and still keep within its
constitutional bounds? Do we let the military defend our
cyber space, even if those they are defending it from are
criminals rather than enemies of the state? One could argue
that there is a historical analogy for this. The early modern
period witnessed a commercial revolution in Great Britain.
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Britain’s budding prosperity was threatened by pirates and
other miscreants who preyed upon British shipping. This
led the commercial sector to ask for intervention by the
government and to the foundation of the Royal Navy. Have
we now reached a similar moment? Should we call upon the
DoD to protect our information highways?
At the same time, the legal authority of anyone in the
government to take appropriate action against threats to
our critical information infrastructure is limited. With
regard to NSA, Executive Order 12333 says that it is to
provide signals intelligence and national security for the
U.S. Government. That gives NSA the authority to deal
with threats to federal systems but not with threats to the
private sector. Another document, National Security
Directive 42, refines the role of NSA to that of protecting
national security systems. That affords some legal sanction
for guarding DoD telecommunications systems. That is
some small comfort. But even in this case, NSA is limited by
the Electronic Systems Privacy Act, the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, and also the Fourth Amendment. There is,
in effect, rather little that NSA can do to help protect
national systems.
One of the documents that came out of the President’s
Commission is Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63. It
reached some interesting conclusions. It recognized that a
threat to our information systems does indeed exist. It
recommended that various areas in the government work
individually and together to try to resolve it. A basic point to
remember is that no one is in charge. No single authority
has undivided responsibility to ensure that the systems are
protected. A variety of groups such as National Institutes
for Standards and Technology and the Office of
Management and Budget is involved. They have a role to
play and do have some responsibilities. But none of them
has the authority or the technical capability to reach out
and work with the private sector. And it is the private sector
which is most vulnerable. A joint task force for civil support
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was established, but this too was just a pathway to a fix, not
a fix in itself.
Solutions.
Thus far, this chapter has sounded a note of almost
unmitigated gloom. Some suggested solutions were
promised, however. Let’s consider a few ideas that might
point the way to solutions.
In my opinion, the defense of U.S. information systems
must, in the final analysis, rely in large part on private
industry and businesses. I will attempt to explain the logic
behind the conclusion.
In January 2000, I traveled to a conference attended by a
group of professionals who, broadly speaking, were
interested in communications and information security.
The conference was also attended by Internet service
providers, computer developers, and software
manufacturers. Significantly, their main concern was to
find ways to develop Internet security. In the past, what had
guaranteed a good profit margin was to sell
telecommunication and computer systems that worked.
Now, Internet security was the dominating concern. All at
the conference recognized that if e-commerce is to work,
ordinary Americans have to have confidence that their
communications are safe and secure from hackers, and
hopefully from state-sponsored terrorist activity as well.3
Recent events had contributed to the awareness of the
conference participants. When, for example, a major bank
was hit by hackers in January 2000, it lost money, and the
American public promptly fled in large numbers to that
bank’s competitors.4 The bank lost over 3,000 accounts in a
24-hour period. It is in the enlightened self-interest of
businesses to improve their security. What is more, they
know this.
This leaves room for some optimism. In the final
analysis, for all the mutual suspicions, government and
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private industry are all in the same boat together. Both face
a considerable threat, and both stand to gain by increased
cooperation.
The government is, as we have seen, handicapped in
ways that business is not; the Fourth Amendment and
Federal regulations, while serving a vital purpose, do put
obstacles in the way of government’s ability to handle
threats to the private sector. The private sector would itself
stand to gain if it could work more closely with the
government. The government has some experience in
identifying adverse activity coming into its communications
systems. The Army, Air Force, and Navy, to a degree, have
all had some success using the computer sensors we spoke of
earlier in this chapter. The key to national security (the
concern of government) and prosperity (the concern of
business) hinges on the development of an adequate defense
of U.S. information systems. It is, as we have stressed,
extraordinarily difficult to take effective action against an
attack once it has taken place. So prevention becomes of
paramount importance. This is where we should devote our
intellectual energies and our capital. And that is why it is
necessary to build a strong defense system, in large part
managed and funded by the private sector.
Conclusion.
There are no easy solutions to complex problems, but
Kuehl is absolutely correct to stress the seriousness of the
threat of information warfare. He is also surely correct in
arguing that the DoD has both a role and responsibility in
defending the United States from threats, intrusions, and
attacks mounted via this environment. To this end, we must
avoid the danger of functional paralysis. This comes in a
number of flavors. When Spike Bowman from the FBI talks
about its role in dealing with transnational threats, he is
very FBI-centered. That is the result of his training. When
Dan Roper from the DoD makes a presentation on the
problem, he offers the DoD as a solution, again an
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outgrowth of his training. These are all helpful
perspectives, but alone they do not resolve the issue. It is
necessary to realize our roles and missions, but it is also
important to realize and accept that there is another way of
doing business. And that is going to require a tremendous
amount of cooperation. That must include not only
cooperation among the government branches, which is
something that has been much discussed, but it must also
include cooperation with the private sector. Together,
and surely only together, government and the private sector
can find a common solution to a difficult threat.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12
1. The views expressed in this chapter are strictly the author’s and
do not reflect the official position of NSA. At the same time, my
comments and observations have been shaped by my environment,
including my current position at NSA. The basic charter of Executive
Order 12333 says that NSA provides signals intelligence and
communications security for the U.S. Government. There are basically
two teams at NSA—the offense and the defense. I work on the defensive
side. My views have been enriched by Lieutenant General Kenneth A.
Minihan, my former boss as the Director of the National Security
Agency, and by a professional colleague, Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker,
based on discussions over the last several years. I also wish to
acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Jeffrey Hunker, who is senior
director for critical infrastructure for the National Security Council and
who worked with me on the President’s Commission; to my colleague
Phil Williams; and to a an acquaintance made at the conference, Alex
Roland.
2. As mentioned earlier, cyber space has a very physical face, and
this physical face can be controlled and exploited. Who is in control of the
public switch network? Is it the government or is it private entities? Is it
the telephone communication companies, AT&T, Ma Bell, Bell Atlantic,
etc? Is it the Internet service providers? AOL? Do they have a
responsibility for detecting and reporting criminal activity? Do they
have a role and responsibility in detecting activity that could be harmful
to our national infrastructure?
3. It would be possible in today’s environment for an enemy
nation-state to jeopardize the U.S. economy by attacking Wall Street.
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4. In order to avoid precisely the kind of loss of confidence of which
we have been speaking, we will not mention this bank by name.
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CHAPTER 13
COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED
CRIME
Phil Williams
Introduction.
U.S. security is currently threatened by a variety of
transnational threats. Of these, one of the most menacing is
international organized crime and drug trafficking. This
chapter will define and evaluate the nature of the threat,
identify some important trends in transnational organized
crime, and then consider how these threats should be met.
Three levels of response will be considered: multilateral
responses, the law enforcement response, and the military
response. The chapter will conclude with some
recommendations.
Assumptions and Concepts.
This chapter rests on several assumptions, which should
be clarified from the start. First, not all security threats are
military in nature. Second, not all security threats require a
military response. And third, threats depend on
vulnerabilities.1 This last is a particularly key point to make
in a discussion of this sort. Vulnerabilities to organized
crime, as we will see, vary enormously from one state to
another. This having been said, let us turn to a discussion of
some of the basic concepts which need to be grasped if we are
to understand the threat posed by international organized
crime.
First of all, what is organized crime? No one definition
exists, with academics differing considerably over its
meaning. I follow a Clausewitzian paradigm, defining
organized crime as a continuation of business by criminal
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means. Given the name “organized crime,” one might expect
a high level of organization to be a defining feature. Though
some analysts say that organized crime is really
disorganized, I disagree. Organized crime is network-based,
and networks may sometimes have a somewhat chaotic
appearance but are in fact a very sophisticated
organizational form. Setting aside organization per se,
however, I would contend that organized crime is marked by
three distinctive traits: association for criminal purposes,
corruption, and violence.
When we say that organized crime involves association
for criminal purposes, we are not implying that the
organization must be large. The crime unit can be very
small, but the minimum number of persons involved is three
or more persons.2 Organized crime, moreover, makes
systematic use of corruption. This is of paramount
importance, but has not always been sufficiently
emphasized in the literature on the subject. Organized
crime also makes occasional use of violence. Russian
contract killings, to suggest the scope of the problem,
number about 500-600 a year. This figure is high enough to
warrant the claim that organized crime challenges the
state’s claim to a monopoly on the use of organized violence.3
The focus of this chapter is not on organized crime in
general, but rather on international organized crime.
Organized crime has moved a long way from its roots as a
local problem threatening domestic law and order. Today it
has a “transnational” dimension, involving criminal
business enterprises on a global scale. If we compare Al
Capone and company with the drug scene in Colombia, the
point becomes clear. Whereas Al Capone was a small-time
hood with a local fiefdom in Chicago, the drug trafficking
organization based in Cali, Colombia, was for a long time
the developing world’s most successful transnational
“corporation.”4 It developed a global marketing strategy and
even at one point had application forms.5 The decapitation,
first, of the Medellin organization and then the Cali, forced

186

the Colombian drug business to adapt itself to changed
circumstances.
Now, if a n y thi ng, i t i s even mor e menac i ng.
Colombian-based criminal groups are more numerous
(there are about 200 of them) and smaller (but still effective)
than before. These groups have shown themselves to be
adroit at answering challenges to their business. They have
started to grow coca leaves themselves to reduce their
dependency on imports from Peru and Boliva. They have
diversified their products, now distributing heroin as well
as cocaine. They send their products to market using a wide
variety of routes and employing a wide variety of ethnic
groups. They continue to use Mexicans, although of late
they have come to rely more on Caribbeans, especially
Dominicans, who demand only 25 to 30 percent of the profit
(in contrast to the Mexicans, who want 50 percent). The
employment of Sicilians and Russians, in particular, has
added to the global dimension.
In what way is organized crime transnational? Or
rather, to phrase it differently, who or what crosses borders?
First of all, there are those who perpetrate crimes, as for
example the hit man who flies from Moscow to New York to
do a contract killing and then flies back. Second, there are
profits. Today’s global financial system is a money
launderer’s dream. Access to financial systems is easy, the
movement of money is instantaneous, trading can be
performed anonymously, and, best of all, profits can be
placed in safe havens.6 Many of these are offshore. The
offshore financial systems of the Pacific islands offer some
interesting insights to what is going on. Their web sites are
bilingual—English and Russian. Clearly, they are trying to
get a share of dirty money from Russia or capital being
processed via the Bank of New York.
Third, people as commodities cross borders. In some
instances, they are illegal immigrants, as for example the
Chinese who were smuggled into the United States on rusty
freighters.7 A lively traffic also exists in women and children
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who are being sold for commercial sex. Products are also
moved across borders. Goods range from drugs, arms, and
nuclear materials, to stolen arts and antiquities. Most goods
flow from south to north, in other words from the developing
world to the developed world. The automobile moves from
north to south. Arms move in both directions. So, while we
worry about drugs coming north to us across the border with
Mexico, the Mexicans worry about guns going south
towards them from the United States. Finally, one may note
the fact that digital signals also cross borders in all
directions.
What accounts for this transformation of criminal
organizations to international criminal organizations? In
part it is a response to the pressures and opportunities of
globalization. It is the dark side of the modern trend
towards interdependence. All businesses have benefited to
a degree by globalization, and criminal businesses have
benefited more than most. They have benefited from the
internationalization of trade, finance, and communication,
and also from the spread and proliferation of ethnic
networks. The last is a point of particular importance
because organized crime tends, for a variety of reasons, to
flourish within the immigrant communities or diaspora.89 A
fascinating example of criminal cosmopolitanism is to be
found in a small criminal group once operating out of Rio de
Janiero; it was run by a Russian, the gang members
themselves were a mix of Nigerians and Ghanians, and the
group was trafficking drugs to the United States and
western Europe.
Criminal-friendly asymmetries also encourage much of
this transnational activity. Criminals cross borders to take
advantage of the legal, administrative, or market
opportunities afforded by the different countries.
Criminals, for example, migrate to countries with criminal
justice systems which pose little risk to them. They exploit
administrative asymmetries. When taxes are increased on
cigarettes in Canada, for example, smuggling across the
Canadian border increases. Criminals engaged in financial
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fraud seek out the profitable markets. South Africa, for
example, has become an important host state for many
criminal groups because it is the richest state in the
southern part of Africa. The Nigerians now control the drug
trade in general as well as the cocaine trade in
Johannesburg in particular. Over the last 5 years, the
Nigerians truly transformed the South African drug scene.
Five years ago, marijuana and mandrax were the drugs of
choice. Today it is cocaine and, to some extent, heroin.10
Transnational organized crime also flourishes because it
brings economic benefits. This is a disturbing notion, but
one that must be acknowledged if we are ever to get a handle
on the problem. Organized crime is a supplier and
multiplier of jobs and other trickle-down benefits. Profits
from organized crime are, to some extent, put back into the
local economies. It is impossible to understand why so many
peasants have become heavily involved in the drug trade in
South America if we do not recognize this. Cocaine is a more
profitable product than anything else they can grow; if they
do not make much from it, they still make more than they
would growing the crop substitutes that have been
proposed. Moreover, black markets often spring into
existence because legal markets do not work effectively.
Finally, it is worth noting that, common opinion to the
contrary, organized crime is not a direct threat to the global
financial system. Though it does do indirect damage by
challenging its legitimacy, it is much too dependent on the
system to do anything directly to destroy it. The recent
scandal involving the Bank of New York elucidates the
love-hate relationship that exists between organized crime
and the global financial system. The Bank of New York
developed relations with a large number of Russian banks.
Despite the American CEO’s disclaimer, it is clear that the
two were engaged in what can figuratively be described as
consensual sex in which the Bank of New York was a
vigorous partner indeed. The Bank of New York ignored
evidence that over 40 percent of Russian banks were
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controlled by organized crime.12 Organized crime and
financial institutions, in short, make good bedfellows.
The Nature of the Threat.
International organized crime today poses a mixture of
traditional and new threats. Both a Cold War and a
post-Cold War paradigm are at work. This increases the
complexity of the environment. World politics, as so astutely
forecast by James Rosenau, will in the future involve two
worlds: the state-centric world, which is the traditional
diplomatic world; and the multi-centric world, where
there is a multiplicity of non-state actors.13 The former is a
world that we are all used to and within which we have
developed some competence. States are very good at dealing
with threats from other states. Institutions such as the
State Department and the Department of Defense have
been created in order to deal with this kind of state threat.
The other world is a new phenomenon. It is not clear
whether this world presents us with a greater or lesser
challenge than the state-centric world.14 But it is clear that
the interplay of the state-centric and multi-centric worlds
will shape our ability to respond to threats in both worlds.
Any evaluation of the threat must also take into
consideration that threats to us vary, depending upon our
vulnerabilities. The threat from transnational organized
crime constitutes a direct security threat to vulnerable
states, but only an indirect threat to less vulnerable states.
Transnational crime does not for the most part directly
threaten the United States; an exception might be the
smuggling of nuclear materials from the former Soviet
Union by criminal organizations.
At the same time, it should be recognized that the threat
is multi-level. It may be a threat to good governance, to
institutions, and to individuals. As such, international
organized crime is not just a traditional national security
threat. There are three aspects of organized crime that can
impinge on the security of states. First, illegal markets,
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while impacting largely on individual security, can (as in
the trafficking of arms) directly affect national security.
Second, the concentration of illegal power can undermine
the democratic process and democratic governments. Third,
organized crime processes can undermine the rule of law.
This is tragically visible in Russia where “cleptocracy” and
“mafiocracy” have prevailed, effectively undermining the
hoped-for transition to democracy. This important reality
explains why corruption must be seen as one of the defining
features of international organized crime. Organized
crime-related corruption is the HIV of the modern state
because it breaks down the defense of the body politic.
Corruption is not just a condition, moreover. It is an
instrument of transnational organized crime.15 Organized
crime uses corruption for a variety of purposes, and it
essentially aims to neutralize and, in some cases, capture
the state.
Criminal Organizations and States.
States, as we have already indicated, offer criminal
organizations different kinds and degrees of opportunities,
depending upon how vulnerable they are. Organized crime
thrives best where the state is weak and corrupt. Criminal
organizations use such states as home states. States in
transition are often especially vulnerable; examples here
include Russia, South Africa, and Cambodia. Criminal
organizations do their best to perpetuate corruption in such
states, because it is this which makes them effective safe
havens. Host states, from the perspective of criminal
organizations, are states where the good markets are. Willie
Sutton, the famous bank robber, was once asked why he
robbed banks. He said, “That’s where the money is.” That is
why many organized crime groups use states like the
United States or South Africa as host states. These are the
states where they can make enormous profits.
Transshipment states neighbor home states and are
affected by incidental corruption along the way. In Latin
America, for example, drug trafficking corruption starts in
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home states like Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, but extends to
transshipment states like Venezuela, Argentina, and
Brazil. Finally, there are also what might be called service
states which serve as financial havens.
Attitudes of States.
Attitudes of states toward organized crime differ widely.
Some do their best to control crime. At the other end of the
spectrum, some states are actually controlled by crime.
Nigeria, under its military dictatorship, offers us a good
example of this kind of state.16 States do not necessarily
remain constant in their attitude towards crime, either.
Colombia, for a long time, certainly acquiesced in and
perhaps even accepted organized crime, but under U.S.
pressure it has adopted a confrontational attitude.
States in transition show a tendency to acquiesce in the
activities of criminal organizations. There are several
reasons for this. First, if we look at such states as the former
Soviet Union, we find that prior to the collapse of central
authority and control, organized crime did exist but in
circumscribed and controlled form. When the controls were
suddenly removed, crime proliferated enormously. Second,
states in transition often suffer from massive economic
dislocation. This causes people to migrate from the legal
economy to the illegal economy. Third, social norms break
down in states in transition. This open up the local society to
foreign values; in Kurdistan, for example, U.S. 1950s
movie-style gangsters live again.
Openness to the world is also a result of what can be
called capacity gaps and functional holes. Basically,
states in transition—that is, weak states—do not perform
all the acts of governance that we associate with states.
Organized crime can do two things—it can exploit the hole,
or it can fill the hole. For example, in Russia, there has been
very little government. Borders are no longer as carefully
monitored as they used to be, so that organized crime
exploits the hole and crosses them. Because the government
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has not done much by way of legal arbitration of business
disputes or of debt collection, organized crime fills the hole
and takes on those tasks.
Corruption plays a critical role in all of this. Corruption
is used to neutralize the state or even capture it. This has
happened, at least arguably, in Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and
South Africa. In contested states, the results are still being
decided. In criminal states, the issue has been decided—on
the side of crime.
Trends in Transnational Organized Crime.
Several trends should be noted in transnational
organized crime:
• It is becoming more widespread, more prevalent, and
more diverse. Fifteen or twenty years ago, organized crime
was largely restricted to the Italian community. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was able to deal with
crime by focusing on this ethnic group. This is no longer
true. We are now dealing with what might be called “the
new ethnic mobs.”
• Organized crime is increasingly gaining control over
property and, partly as a result of this, has much greater
economic influence than in the past.17
• Organized crime is becoming increasingly
sophisticated and using increasingly sophisticated
weapons. A few years ago, in a classic conflict between
criminal organizations, the Hells Angels and Texas
Bandidos, in Norway and Denmark, used antitank weapons
and grenade launchers against each other.
• Crime groups are trafficking in an increasing variety
of goods. The Global Survival Network in Washington, for
example, discovered that the same group that was
trafficking in Siberian tigers was trafficking in women.
Similarly, the groups involved in antiquities trafficking are
now involved in the trafficking of nuclear materials.

193

• Cooperation among criminal organizations is growing,
with such growth taking many shapes. While there is no
clear connection to terrorists, we are seeing some blurring of
boundaries between criminals and terrorists, especially in
countries such as Colombia, Kurdistan, Tajikistan. It is
often difficult to tell who is who. Sometimes a terrorist who
once had a political cause becomes a criminal because that
cause has been taken away.
• Criminal organizations are becoming increasingly
adroit at the exploitation of information technologies. They
use it in much the same way as do other firms, notably to
increase their managerial efficiency.
• Criminal organizations have largely abandoned their
traditional hierarchical organization and instead are
increasingly coming to rely on highly flexible networks and
loose coupling. This gives them the advantage of being able
to cross boundaries and borders with ease, and cross from
the illegal sector to the legal world. It also means that when
part of their network is destroyed, criminal organizations
will continue to be able to function. The networks make
them resilient and the battle space complex.

Responses.
Responses come in various forms: multilateral
responses, law enforcement responses, and military
responses.
Multilateral Responses. The response to international
organized crime comes from many quarters. On the one
hand, the international community has taken some actions,
though of varying degrees of effectiveness. Conventions are
useful inasmuch as they do set norms. The United Nations
(U.N.), most notably, held a World Ministerial Conference
in 1994, and this year will adopt a convention agreement on
transnational organized crime. A financial action task force
(FATF) was also established. It is, in essence, a peer review
body which checks out its members and encourages others
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to join. The objective is to stop such criminal activities as
money laundering. For example, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) reports transactions over
$10,000 and writes reports on suspicious activity. FATF is
not very effective, however; participation is time-consuming
and requires a lot of work while not accomplishing much. On
the other hand, there are some relatively effective regional
initiatives. Bilateral-multilateral task forces, such as
Europol, have met with some success; the task force
approach in general seems to be one that works, at least part
of the time.
Multilateral responses, however, have inherent
shortcomings. This is especially true when it comes to
efforts to regulate international behavior. Some members
lack commitment; some even defect. Others simply lack the
capacity to implement convention agreements. Moreover,
measures tend to become diluted when enacted in a
multilateral forum. For example, efforts have been made to
create a global money-laundering regime. First there are
regulated states. These include the United States and the
European countries (which continue, despite regulation, to
be the biggest money launderers). Then there are the
offshore banks. These are regulated to some degree. And
then there is the rest of the world. Here very few regulations
apply.
Cooperation between nations is also not very easy to
achieve. Some progress has been made on extradition
treaties, which make it possible to catch fugitives, and
mutual assistance treaties, which make possible the
collection of evidence. But problems remain. The fact that
different legal traditions prevail in different parts of the
world is a perpetual stumbling block. How, for example,
does a country know that its partner is reliable? U.S. law
enforcement, at the federal level, hesitates to work with
Mexicans because they know the information is almost
inevitably going to be passed on immediately to criminals.
From the Mexican perspective, they have reason to be wary
of the United States, which is capable of acting in
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heavy-handed fashion. Customs, for example, put together
a very good sting operation, called Casablanca. It was,
however, a unilateral action, which was sufficiently
aggravating to the Mexicans to oblige Secretary of State
Albright to offer them an apology.
Law Enforcement Response. Law enforcement agencies
across the world have a mixed record. They have engaged in
some productive efforts, with the FBI, for example, having
met with considerable success, notably in dealing with La
Cosa Nostra. The kingpin strategy of the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) and the Italian use of Pantiti (defectors who
agree to cooperate in return for leniency) have also proved to
be effective. But the law enforcement response has some
real limitations.
First, it focuses its efforts at a low level. Most of the law
enforcement communities fail to target the real source of the
problem: profits, organizational integrity, and leadership.
Instead they try to seize products, picks up low level
personnel, and recover some money. The FBI and the DEA
are, perhaps, exceptions to this rule. Second, law
enforcement ultimately has no choice but to be preoccupied
with cases. This makes it, for the most part, reactive. One
consequence of this is that it has failed to develop a
comprehensive strategy for combating organized crime.
Third, the efforts made by law enforcement are fragmented.
There are Federal, regional, state, and local agencies, which
do not always cooperate. The problem is compounded by
interagency rivalries, which afflict law enforcement much
as they afflict the military. Recent efforts to achieve
jointness have been only moderately successful. Finally, one
of the most serious difficulties comes from the fact that
criminals operate in a borderless world. Law enforcement is
bordered. Criminals have learned to use borders
defensively. This has proven to be a major obstacle to the
effective containment of the threat.
Military Response. The military does have a useful role
to play in dealing with international organized crime. It has
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played a constructive part in the interdiction of drugs and
other criminal products. It has made useful contributions in
the area of intelligence. It provided a model, which has
modified the way law enforcement understands
intelligence. Thanks to the military, we now have the
National Drug Intelligence Center, focused on strategic
intelligence. And even though law enforcement does not
always understand how to make use of that intelligence, it is
clearly a step in the right direction.18 The military also
provides short-term surge capability in regard to cargo
inspections.
The U.S. military has become involved in combating
criminal organizations during the course of peacekeeping
operations. In places where there are black markets, often
the only powers at hand are criminal figures. The situation
can be confusing, with no obvious “good guys” and “bad
guys.” Different factions work together at times and kill one
another at times; sometimes they work together in order to
get the money to kill one another! The military has had to
navigate through these tricky waters, gaining some useful
experience dealing with criminal organizations in so doing.
Yet, there are some serious limits to the usefulness of the
military in dealing with this particular transnational
threat. First of all, when we deal with organized crime, we
are dealing with a continuation of business by criminal
means. We are, in effect, dealing with business markets.
The military provides a very blunt instrument where
refined tools are needed. Second, we are dealing with
organizations that have safe havens. Where the criminals
go, the military cannot always follow.
When considering the appropriate role of the military,
we must also remember that the threat differs from country
to country. For the United States, the organized crime
problem is essentially a law-and-order problem. For states
in transition, the problem is much more serious. Should
their militaries become involved? What of Russia, for
example, where you have an iron triangle of politicians,
197

businessmen, and criminals, and where the military itself
has been corroded by the environment?
Again, does the U.S. military have a role to play in
assisting these other countries deal with the problem? Only
to a limited degree. There are limits to U.S. power and
influence. Intervention in weak states does not seem to be a
good idea; the lessons of Vietnam should remind us of this.
There is a further problem. When the United States
intervenes in a weak state, it undermines the authority and
legitimacy of that state. And yet it is that very lack of
authority and legitimacy that has made the weak state
vulnerable to organized crime in the first place. Colombia is
a case in point. One thing we can do is to be more careful
where we give our aid and encourage the international
institutions to be the same. In short, the multilateral
response is flawed, the law enforcement response is
fragmented, and the military response has limited
applicability.
Developing a Comprehensive Strategy.
A comprehensive strategy needs to be developed. The
United States is attempting to do this, although more needs
to be done. What does this entail? First, we must do what we
can to build viable states so that criminals no longer find it
so easy to shelter in weak states. This will increase the risks
for criminals and distribute the problems more evenly. The
United States has taken steps to do this, and, interestingly,
its legislation has inspired similar legislation in South
Africa.
Second, we must recognize that international organized
crime is a national security threat. This will serve several
purposes. It will ensure that more resources will be devoted
to the task of combating this threat. It will encourage
intelligence agencies to become more fully involved. And it
will encourage the adoption of military concepts. Military
concepts and strategic approaches are often very functional.
The military stresses, for one thing, the importance of
198

defining objectives, which is something that could usefully
be emulated by law enforcement. Target hardening is
another concept that might usefully be applied to the
civilian sector.19 The military model for jointness could be
used to help foster interagency cooperation.
Third, we need to build international law enforcement
networks. It takes a network to defeat a network; this is why
the Hungary training academy is so important. To defeat
international organized crime, it is important, as has been
stressed earlier, to attack what really matters to the
criminals—their networks, their leaders, and their wealth.
This is done, first, by identifying the critical node of a
criminal organization, followed by attacking this node and
its connections. Then the crossover figures, the legal
protectors, must be removed. Criminal markets must be
targeted. The risks for criminals must be increased, and
their profits reduced. The demand must be decreased, and
the supply cut off. Sanctuaries for both criminals and
criminal proceeds must be eliminated.20 Efforts must also
be made to undermine the structures which support
criminal organizations. These include the criminal nexus
with politicians and business. Finally, the environment
should be modified. For example, Russia’s perverse tax
system plays into the hands of members of organized crime.
It provides incentives for people to avoid paying taxes, and,
since the criminals have access to banking records, they
have the means to blackmail a large percentage of the
Russian population. This makes it hard for anyone to move
against them.
Conclusion.
Organized crime, defined as a continuation of business
by criminal means, has recently attained a transnational
dimension. This transnational extension is a response to the
pressures and opportunities of globalization. It has resulted
in a type of criminal organization that is highly adaptable
and very slippery to deal with. While clearly harmful in
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many ways, organized crime does benefit some, a fact which
makes it all the harder to uproot. Responses to the threat
have come from many quarters; none has proved to be fully
effective. The threat is certainly serious enough to warrant
a concerted effort on the part of the United States (and other
nations) to develop and implement a comprehensive
strategy to counter the threat. This strategy should target
the values that truly matter to the criminals. And it should
learn from the experience of both the military and the law
enforcement communities.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13
1. Lawrence Friedman made this point about strategic nuclear
power.
2. Two’s company; three’s an organized crime syndicate.
3. The Ridgway Center at the University of Pittsburgh has a
database on Russian contract killings, which number about 500-600 a
year. It is an interesting list because it enables one see what sector
Russian organized crime is influencing. For example, in 1993-94, there
were numerous contract killings in the banking sector. It was clear that
Russian organized crime was becoming entrenched in the Russian
banking system. In 1995-96, there were numerous killings in the
aluminum industry surrounding Lev Churney and the Churney
brothers, who were linked to some important people in Moscow. It has
been suggested that Churney was involved in laundering money
through the Bank of New York, along with a long line of other people. He
was involved in various forms of corruption and also resorted to violence
occasionally. In a 6-month period, close to ten people associated in some
fashion with the aluminum industry were killed. It was not clear why. In
some cases, the killings appear to have been linked to a desire to cover
tracks.
4. Though often referred to as a cartel, it never really was one.
5. One interesting dimension of these application forms was that the
applicant was asked to include next-of-kin so that there was someone to
exact retribution against in the event that he stepped out of line.
6. For example, there are walk-in accounts where you can put money
in one jurisdiction and then move it on immediately to another. These
have bank secrecy restrictions such that if the FBI or some other law
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enforcement agency asks for and receives information, the bank
employee who supplies the information is in some cases then subject to
criminal prosecution in that jurisdiction.
7. In fact, about 90 percent of the illegal Chinese immigrants come in
by air and only about ten percent by sea.
8. Nicholas Passus, at Temple University, developed this theory.
Transnational organized crime is deeply imbedded in ethnic networks.
This is not to say that all immigrants are criminals. More often than not,
they are the victims rather than perpetrators of crime.
9. As additional examples, the turn to the growing of coca some 15 or
20 years ago, and the turn to opium in Southeast Asia, were both
market-driven.
10. It seems to this author that the Bank of New York did have
actionable intelligence. Even if it did not know specifically which banks
were controlled by the mobs, it certainly could have shown at least as
much diligence as it showed in checking up on its partners, which it did
not.
11. He wrote a book in 1989 called Turbulence in World Politics. This
was written before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War. It was one of the few academic studies that predicted the end
of the Cold War and had a clear sense of the way in which world politics
would change.
12. The problem is that many states defect. Defection is one of the
decisive factors shaping international relations, and, increasingly in the
future, bilateral relations. We do not have to expect the clash of
civilizations so much as a clash between those states that are essentially
law-abiding and those states that represent criminal interests.
13. Headly Bull once raised the questions in relation to nuclear
deterrence, “Who is trying to deter whom, from what actions, by what
means?” An analogous question can be asked regarding corruption:
“Who is trying to corrupt whom, for what purposes, using what means?”
14. David Kaplan published a wonderful story in U.S. News and
World Report, calling North Korea a wise-guy state representing not a
case of organized crime taking over the state, but of the state taking over
organized crime.
15. David Kaplan did another wonderful piece, again in U.S. News
and World Report, on the Yakuza’s role in the financial crisis in Japan.
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16. The center has several problems, one of which is its eccentric
location in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, dictated by pork barrel politics.
17. For example, major oil companies have coordination units that
work with law enforcement to try to keep mischievous intruders out of
their industry. Some of their employees have been sent as students to
the Ridgway Center.
18. At the moment, the off-shore world is a major sanctuary which
we are currently attempting to eliminate.
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CHAPTER 14
PHIL WILLIAMS’ VIEW OF
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DRUG
TRAFFICKING:
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
Thomas V. Fuentes
Dr. Phil Williams’ chapter provides a comprehensive
and valuable assessment of the threat posed by
international organized crime and drug trafficking and an
interesting discussion of the measures taken to deal with it.
The purpose of this brief chapter is to respond to Williams’
views from the perspective of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). I am writing from my experience
running the FBI office concerned with organized crime. This
office deals with all international organized crime cases
except those concerned with specific Mexican/South
American drug cartels. 1 Besides monitoring crime
developments around the world, this office also runs
investigations worldwide. 2 For the most part, my
disagreement with Williams is minor, centering upon his
contention that the FBI is not doing all that it can do to
combat organized crime.
Points of Agreement.
Williams’ analysis of how criminal organizations
operate is, in general, borne out by this author’s own
experience. Several points deserve to be emphasized. It is
indeed true that organized crime can bring “benefits.” An
interesting example of this can be found in the United
States, where we may point to the marriage of organized
crime and the federal government during World War II. The
American La Cosa Nostra and Lucky Luciano struck a
bargain with the U.S. Navy, agreeing to use their
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organizations to protect the docks, particularly on the
eastern seaboard, from Nazi sabotage.
Also key is Williams’ observation that organized crime is
not a threat to the United States in the same way that, say,
terrorists are. Criminals are not, in fact, interested in
attacking us or defeating us for political purposes or
through some kind of ideological imperative. They do not
want to take us over. As a matter of fact, it is in their best
interest not to do us too much damage. If you imagine the
United States as a blood donor, and organized crime as a
leech, you will understand the point. It is not in the best
interest of the leech to kill the donor. International
criminals want to bring their money to the United States.
They want to bring their operations here or at least take
advantage of our protective measures. They want to operate
within our structures and within our economy.
The famous movie, The Godfather, is revealing in this
regard. It portrays how criminal groups started in the
Italian community and then expanded. They gradually took
over key labor organizations and the related
industries—from trucking to longshoremen and hotel
workers. The actual La Cosa Nostra operated, in fact, very
much in this way, particularly in New York and some of our
major northeastern cities. This is the sort of agenda on the
minds of criminal organizations. We should not minimize
the problems created for us by organized crime, but we
should also keep the threat in perspective. In the final
analysis, these groups are anxious to continuing feeding at
the golden trough, and this offers us some safeguards.
Williams is also right to stress that organized criminal
groups are becoming globalized. The traditional American
crime organizations are, to be sure, a bit of an exception in
this regard. They are well entrenched, satisfied with their
situation, and reluctant to change. The Italian mobs are
structured on the model of the Roman army and not, as yet,
much interested in networking. They have become involved
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in technology and off-shore organizations only to a limited
extent.
Nonetheless, globalization is indeed a trend to be noted.
It is certainly very true of Eurasian-Russian organizations.
These do indeed rely on networking and have become very
international. They now operate on every inhabited
continent, even on the South Sea Islands! Russian crime
groups have infiltrated the countries of Eastern Europe,
turning Budapest, Hungary, for example, into a kind of a
Moscow south. Also bothersome, given the volatile nature of
the Middle East, is that 18 percent of emigrés to Israel come
from the former Soviet Union. Probably seven of the top
nine crime bosses in Russia have dual citizenship in Israel.
“Specter,” that sinister group of global criminals of James
Bond fame does have some real world equivalents. They are
becoming dominant on a number of continents and are
taking advantage of what Dr. Williams called the
“vulnerable” states.
Transnational organized crime groups, notably those
from the former Soviet Union, are also invading our turf.
They are interested in exploiting our bank and investment
system in order to more freely access the global financial
network—something they find difficult to do from Moscow.
Williams quite correctly highlighted that the criminal
organizations to emerge in Russia today are groups that had
already learned to operate successfully under the
communist regime. They are used to operating a surrogate
economy, regardless of official boundaries. Though there
are no indications that they want to take over either the
United States or any other Western country, there is also no
question that under certain circumstances they do pose a
serious threat to national security. It is, for example, a
matter of considerable concern that organized crime groups
are able to compromise a country like Russia, which has,
among other dangerous assets, a nuclear capability.
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Points of Disagreement.
In most regards, I find myself in cordial agreement with
Williams. There are, however, a couple of exceptions. One of
these concerns the Bank of New York (BONY) scandal.3 The
Bank of New York has been sharply criticized for developing
banking relations with a large number of Russian banks in
spite of the fact that over 40 percent of the Russian banking
system was known to be controlled by organized crime.
It is not clear to me, however, that what happened was
quite as nefarious or damaging as has been suggested. In
the first place, we are not necessarily looking at an effort on
the part of the Russians to use BONY for money laundering
purposes. For this to be true, it has to be shown that the
money sent to New York was gained illegally in Russia. This
has not been proven.4 Second, Russia was not self-evidently
a loser from these transactions. The problem is that the
Russians do not have a functional consumer banking
system. In order to expand the economy, all the foreign aid,
including loans from the IMF, had to be put in foreign
banks. It was logical enough to rely on American banks,
given the stability of the dollar.5 A lot of the money that was
sent to the United States was returned to Russia. What took
place, in other words, was not so much the one-way looting
of the vast resources of the Russian economy as it was an
exercise in fund management.
Are we perhaps exaggerating the significance of this
episode? If we look at the sorts of things that might have
happened over the last 10 years and have not, we might gain
a clearer perspective. After all, we have not had to resort to
military action since the Berlin Wall came down. Nor have
we faced a military coup or a communist takeover in the
former Soviet Union. For that matter, we have now
witnessed approximately 10 years without a revolutionary
change in regime. For all the entrenched presence of
organized crime, disaster has not struck. We need to take a
closer and less emotional look at the role played by the
criminal element in Russia.
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The second point of contention that I have with Williams
concerns the role of the FBI. Williams’ view is that the FBI
tends to be reactive and has not as yet developed a
comprehensive strategy. It thus fails, in his view, to tackle
some of the more important problems. The FBI also, he
charges, fails to cooperate with other branches of
government to the extent it might.
Whether the FBI has what can be called a
comprehensive strategy may perhaps be questioned,
although it certainly does have a strategy, here outlined in
brief:
• Identify the organized crime groups posing the
greatest threat to the United States or our significant
partners throughout the world;
• Determine the structure of the group and the scope of
its criminal activities;
• Develop prosecutable cases against priority groups
using the criminal and civil provisions of the RICO statute
in order to disrupt and dismantle criminal enterprise; and,
• Establish working relationships with domestic and
foreign law enforcement and intelligence community
agencies to accomplish this mission.

The other charge—regarding failure to cooperate—calls
for a more detailed rebuttal. Many critics claim that
intelligence and law enforcement agencies do not share
information because they do not like each other, do not want
to work together, and are protecting their turf. They also
argue that it is the culture of law enforcement and the
culture of the intelligence community that create tension.
This is to trivialize what is going on. These organizations do
recognize the advantages to be gained by cooperation and
do, in fact, work together with other agencies. The FBI
section that I run, for example, is in touch with both the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National
Security Agency (NSA). 6 If these organizations are
reluctant to share information, it is for quite legitimate
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reasons: the sharing of information carries with it some
serious hazards. Moreover, not just cultural, but also legal
barriers exist between the intelligence and law enforcement
communities.
To understand the reluctance to share information, it is
important to appreciate one of the fundamental realities
about the prosecution of cases by the FBI. This organization
must litigate its cases in the public sector. As is well known,
in U.S. criminal prosecutions, the defendant has a right to
face his accusers in court and challenge the manner in
which evidence was obtained by the prosecution. A series of
pre-trial hearings is held to determine what items of
evidence are admissible. The main focus of every trial is
proving facts to a jury in order for that jury to conclude
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
offenses charged.7 In prosecution cases based upon FBI
investigations, it is imperative that the FBI employ
constitutionally permissible means to obtain the evidence
used, both to build its case and to present it in court. The
government must explain how the evidence was obtained
and who provided the information used to further the case.
The discovery process, as this is called, creates a serious
dilemma for both law enforcement and intelligence. An
intelligence agency that provides law enforcement with key
information must disclose the sources and the methods it
used to obtain that information. Clearly this poses
problems. If the intelligence community has a highly-placed
source reporting on sensitive espionage matters, it
naturally does not want to risk having that penetration or
capability exposed in a U.S. courtroom. It also needs to
protect the sources and methods of its overseas partners. At
the same time, the law enforcement agency runs the risk of
being ordered by the judge to either identify the source or
drop the entire prosecution. To be put into this quandary
after spending 3-4 years, not to speak of thousands of work
hours and other resources, on a case is no small risk.
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The lack of smooth communication between law
enforcement and intelligence, moreover, is due to certain
legal barriers. These, it should be stressed, did not happen
accidentally, but deliberately. The National Security Act of
1947, which created the intelligence community as we know
it, put up walls between the different agencies. The fear was
that if intelligence and law enforcement were to merge
completely, an Orwellian type of government would result,
and “Big Brother” would watch the American people too
closely.
The concern for the preservation of the liberties and the
privacy of the public is not unique to our country. My FBI
office is currently directly and indirectly involved with the
working groups of some 30 countries. They are acutely
sensitive to this issue, particularly those who come from
countries like Germany and Italy, which suffered under the
fascist yoke during World War II. They have been given
extremely limited police powers. It took about 10 years
(1984-1994) for the FBI, for example, to persuade the
Italians to allow the use of a “Pantiti”— a confidential
informant or a cooperative witness.8 The Italian police were
not allowed to collect intelligence and conduct operations,
even in their capacity as members of a law enforcement
agency. They were certainly not allowed to cooperate with
the intelligence community and take advantage of its
assets, sources, and methods. The foreign partners of the
United States, in short, share our concern for the
preservation of liberties.
Does this mean that cooperation between the various
agencies is an impossible task? Clearly not. Indeed, here in
the United States some changes have been made over the
last couple of years. The National Security Act was
amended and several useful presidential directives (for
example, PD-42) were issued. These directives stated that
the FBI did have the right to use information collected by
the intelligence community for intelligence purposes, if that
information could be of benefit for law enforcement
purposes. These measures have not brought an end to all
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the difficulties, however. The FBI has had to set up a
protocol establishing how intelligence information gets into
its hands from the intelligence community and then gets
disseminated to its agents in the field. This is an arduous
task. It is also a challenging one, since the intelligence
community is still not exempt from the discovery process.
One final point should be made. The insistence on the
need to subject criminal investigations to careful public
scrutiny and to maintain the barriers between law
enforcement and intelligence should not be seen in an
entirely negative light. The FBI enjoys an exceptional
reputation with its overseas counterparts. Its operations
during criminal prosecutions are held up as role models.
Thanks to this reputation, the FBI can play a role in
extending the rule of law overseas. Through its working
groups, joint investigations, training programs, and other
efforts, the FBI promotes support for tough, but fair, laws
and constitutional safeguards to ensure the proper balance
between protection of the people and individual liberties.
These are concepts that are regrettably absent in many
parts of the world. In the long run, promotion of these values
will do as much as anything to reduce international crime.
Thus, while it is true that investigations and prosecutions
are to a degree handicapped by legal requirements, these
safeguards are the very things that give the United States
credibility. They should not lightly be cast aside.
In short, the FBI recognizes the need to obtain
information to prosecute its cases. And it is certainly taking
steps to improve communication with other intelligence
agencies. Yet, whether it is tactical intelligence, as the FBI
calls it, or actionable intelligence, as the intelligence
community calls it, the bottom line is that information must
be obtained in a usable fashion, and has to stand up to public
scrutiny and the jurisprudential process.
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Conclusion.
In conclusion, Williams offers a valuable assessment of
the threats posed by transnational organized crime and
indeed makes many valuable suggestions as to how those
threats should be addressed. In weighing his discussion of
the role of law enforcement, however, all readers need to be
fully cognizant of the realities that govern the operation of
the FBI.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14
1. When Russian and Italian organized crime are involved with
South American drug-trafficking organizations, Mr. Fuentes’ section is
involved. His section at FBI headquarters covers organized crime of
Asia, Eurasia, Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and South Africa.
2. The FBI has close to 1,000 investigations in process overseas, in
virtually every country with the possible exception of North Korea and a
couple of Middle Eastern countries, where the United States is still not
very popular.
3. An article in the New York Times, August 18, 1999, claimed that
billions of dollars of IMF loans were stolen or diverted by Russian
organized crime, and that much of this was transferred to the Bank of
New York. Similar media accusations followed.
4. If the money concerned had originated as direct U.S. aid and had
been stolen before it arrived in Russia’s Central Bank, the FBI would
have been given jurisdiction in the case. However, the funds concerned
were IMF loans and did reach Moscow. Hence the responsibility for the
billions of dollars transferred out of Moscow is Russian. For these
transactions to be defined as “money laundering,” they must involve
money that was obtained illegally. Since the FBI has no jurisdiction in
Russia, only the Russian authorities can obtain and turn over the
evidence concerning how the money transfers were initiated, and who is
responsible. In the BONY case, we have identified 165,000 individual
transactions totaling $7 billion. The transfers occurred over the course
of an 18-month period. The funds moved from Moscow through 100
banks in over 50 countries to accounts at BONY. Russian authorities,
including the MVD, FSB, Tax Police, and officials of the Central Bank,
are still investigating the matter.
5. This was especially true up to 1988 when the ruble was devalued.
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6. The author has a group in his section working full time on this
matter. An operations officer has been assigned to him from the CIA,
and he maintains dual contacts with the NSA.
7. The O. J. Simpson trial, for example, clearly centered on how the
investigators secured the evidence. Who got the DNA? Should they have
gotten it? How was the evidence processed? Where did the investigators
go?
8. A “Pantiti” is someone who is caught up in an investigation and
agrees to cooperate instead of going to jail.
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CHAPTER 15
PHIL WILLIAMS’ VIEWS ON
COMBATING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED
CRIME:
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
James R. McDonough
My chapter derives from my experiences as Director of
the Florida Office of Drug Control Policy, and prior to that as
Director of Strategy for the Office of National Drug Control.
These jobs have put me in a position to appreciate the
complexity of the drug control problem. I have been involved
in developing national and state strategies to deal with
transnational threats as they pertain to the illegal drug
threat. At the same time, I have experienced first-hand the
difficulties that follow in trying to implement those
strategies at a local level. Incidentally, one thing I learned
very early in the game is that there is a danger in classifying
drug trafficking in the same way as other types of
international organized crime. Drug trafficking may
constitute a unique category, and for this reason it may not
be possible to apply the same sorts of solutions as to other
types of organized crime.
Let me begin by endorsing the effort being made to
understand transnational threats and to find ways to deal
with them. As one who participated in writing the 1998
National Defense Panel report calling for homeland
defense, I am very sympathetic to the goals of Triangle
Institute for Security Studies (TISS) and the Army War
College (AWC). Nonetheless, I urge caution in applying
general solutions to what constitute complex,
multi-dimensional problems.
To put this chapter in context, two points must be made.
First, I cannot agree with Dr. Williams’ contention, if that is
what he meant to imply, that there might be some benefit in
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some criminal organizations. While the theoretical
foundation of this view can be appreciated, in practice this
position is quite untenable. There are about 1.2 million drug
users in the state of Florida. About 700,000 of these are
addicted or on their way to addiction. Last year, the death
rate from drug overdoses in Florida surpassed our murder
rate. Our heroin overdose rate is now growing at something
like 50 percent a year. About 250,000 of the addicts the
Florida Office of Drug Control seeks to assist are children.
Of these, many are children of the middle class. No one is
immune from the threat of illegal drugs, regardless of
geographic location, economic status, educational
background, or ethnicity. Drugs underlie a great proportion
of the crime, ill health, social malaise, child abuse, economic
waste, and family disintegration in America today. We have
a massive problem on our hands, and it does not seem to me
that we can claim that much good comes out of drug
trafficking.
Second, we have a drug problem in the United States
because we have a high demand for drugs. We ask for the
drugs and pay top dollar for them. A strategic approach to
the business of drug trafficking must logically, therefore,
start with a reduction in demand. The Florida Drug Control
Office, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy as
well, puts most of its effort not in the reduction of the supply
and not towards undermining the organizations that supply
the drugs. It focuses most of all on a reduction in demand. It
does so by discouraging the onset of drug abuse by those who
have not yet begun to use them, and by treating those who
are addicted to drugs so that they can once again become
productive citizens. And this is as it should be. If somehow
we could reduce demand for drugs to zero, our supply
problems would go away.
Observations.
I offer a number of observations and suggestions as they
relate to the problem of drug trafficking.
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• We should not underrate our ability to deal with the
threat. To be sure, at times it looks as if we have made no
progress. But we also have not made the kind of concerted
effort of which we as a nation are capable. While it is true
that the organizations that traffic in drugs are rich and
powerful, hiring good communicators, bankers, and
lawyers, we are the United States of America. We have
taken on capable foes before and vanquished them. We can
defeat this threat if we make the effort, and it is of critical
importance that we do.
• Law enforcement and intelligence must improve their
ability to cooperate with one another. While both have real
successes to their credit, they have not combined efforts and
shared their capabilities in an intelligent fashion. On
February 2, 1997, in the White House, I was called upon to
brief the Mexican government’s drug czar. He had just been
checked out by the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others. Less than a week
later, he was found hanging by his ankles in a Mexican
prison in the northern part of the country, corrupt up to his
eyeballs. This was news to me. The Customs operation
Casablanca, mentioned by Williams in Chapter 13, was
beautifully conceived and, in many ways, well executed. It
did not help, however, that my boss Barry McCaffrey, who is
in charge of the Office of National Drug Control in the White
House, first found out about the operation when he read it in
the newspaper! Nor did it help that the Attorney General
was kept in the dark. Joint operations hold great promise for
countering such unilateralism. Not only do they tend to
keep all the critical players informed, they promise to
produce a whole greater than the sum of their parts.
• By and large, the military should be kept out of the
fight against drugs. There are only limited things the
military can do to combat international organized crime,
and many of the things it can do, it should not. The Army
War College solicited some advice from us: my advice was to
stay away from a direct operational role. That is not to say
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that the military has no role at all to play. Williams did a
very good job outlining the ways in which the armed forces
can make a useful contribution. They do an excellent job
training people; they can (and do) train other agencies,
including law enforcement personnel; they can train other
nations in a variety of ways, including the use of technology.
They are good at handling equipment. They are good at
communication, and no better group of translators is to be
found anywhere.
They also can do some things that they would be better
off not doing. They can, for instance, work the ports. A
glimpse of the soldiers put to work manning the docks in
Florida will shed light on my argument. Soldiers stand by a
large sea-land container, unload boxes, put them through
an X-ray machine, and then stick them back in the
container. That is what they do all day, 7 days a week,
indefinitely. While their performance of duty is admirable
and the work crucial, this is probably not the best use of
precious military manpower.
Soldiers also are entrusted with reconnaissance duties
along the borders. Here the problem is a little different.
There is a real danger that they will react unwisely and
precipitate a crisis. Imagine to yourself a group of pretty
tough guys, rather gung-ho, who have been told to keep alert
for crossers. They see somebody moving and assume he is
trying to flank them. They get nervous and fire. And they
shoot a boy dead. In this instance, the problem is not that
they cannot (legally) do the job, but that they may not be the
personnel who have the training and disposition to handle
the threat in the optimum way.
Williams also rightly stressed that the military has
learned a lot about organization and working jointly with
others. Lending that expertise to other organizations would
probably be very helpful. Barry McCaffrey has, in fact,
taken note of this. He has gathered a bank of military or
former military people around him to help organize and
coordinate the national counterdrug efforts of the myriad
216

federal, state, and local agencies that contribute to the
endeavor. I have taken a page out of his book, trying to apply
the lessons of organizing to solve complex problems that I
learned during a long career in the military.
• We would do better to approach the drug-trafficking
problem from an operational level as well as the
oft-discussed strategic level. We should move, in other
words, from preoccupation with solutions at the strategic
level to what could be applied at the operational level. The
chapters in this book are largely devoted to a consideration
of transnational threats as seen from a national
perspective. They have discussed what can be done by such
national agencies as the FBI, CIA, NSA, U.S. Customs, and
others. That is all well and good, and must be done if we are
to develop a comprehensive strategy. But America is a big
country, and drug trafficking is a major issue. Focusing on
an operational approach that would integrate regional and
local efforts into the larger strategic effort promises to
improve the return on our investments.

This calls for some explanation. Let us consider what
happens in a real war. First of all, a strategic plan that
commits resources is developed at the national level.
Theaters of war are identified. In World War II, Europe, the
Central Pacific, and China-Burma-India were instances of
theaters of war. But in each of these theaters, separate
geographical and functional campaigns were developed.
Consider an intelligence campaign. First of all, strategic
intelligence is obtained (e.g., satellite pictures) from
national sources. Then strategic communications
intelligence is added to flesh out the strategic picture. But at
the same time reconnaissance patrols are sent out on the
ground so as to obtain a clear picture at the tactical level of
what is going on. The strategic view and the tactical view
are then merged at the operational level. Geographically,
different lines of operation are developed. They are
constructed to support major objectives in the theater of
war. They define theaters of operation. It is the fusion of
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such efforts at the operational level that allows the
translation of tactical events into strategic outcomes.
In countering the drug threat, we should remember the
criticality of an operational approach. That means we must
be prepared to focus, perhaps functionally, perhaps
regionally. We must mount a strategic effort and mount a
local effort, and then fuse the two. We are trying to do that
right now in Florida. For example, we invite colleagues in
the DEA, the Counter Narcotics Center of the CIA, the FBI,
and the National Drug Intelligence Center to come to
Florida and provide us with critical analyses on what we are
doing. We add to that input the information received from
the El Paso Intelligence Center. At the same time, we try to
involve Florida’s sheriffs and policemen. We encourage
them to meet one another and work together. In this way we
will be able to develop an improved operational intelligence
picture that fuses perspectives from both the strategic and
local levels.
Then we try to move from intelligence to operations.
That is the purpose of developing an intelligence picture—to
act on it. There are, it must be conceded, some difficulties
involved. Intelligence is defined in at least two distinct ways
in the drug control business. First, there is evidentiary
intelligence wherein the purpose is to gather information
for the prosecution of cases. In this sort of intelligence,
interest focuses on finding out what happened, and whether
the evidence collected is sound and untainted. Second, there
is predictive intelligence. This is the type of intelligence
with which we are largely concerned. Its purpose is to
develop the kind of information that will permit us to
anticipate and react to threats. The process starts at the
national level. For example, to find out who is trafficking
internationally, Florida must turn to its friends at the
federal level. The process continues with a progressive
effort to focus ever more narrowly on the problems nearer
home. What have the drug traffickers targeted, and when
are they coming? What ports will they use? What avenues?
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As these questions are answered, they must guide
operations. That means that law enforcement must be
capable of receiving and acting on fused intelligence
analysis on short notice. That means organizations must be
in a position to receive information, plan, and react. Seldom
should these steps be unilateral, that is, by a single agency.
Better to have in place standard operating procedures for
joint efforts across agencies and across jurisdictional
boundaries that maximize the unique skills and advantages
of all involved.
My remarks have focused on only one part of
transnational organized crime, i.e., the organizations that
traffic in illegal drugs. I have tried to bring to the discussion
both strategic insights (that derive from my having been the
national counterdrug strategist) and operational
considerations (that ensue from my responsibilities in
connection with Florida’s drug problem, fusing these two
perspectives in a pragmatic way.
We have a vast amount of resources committed to
address illegal drug trafficking. And while I grant that the
criminal organizations we oppose are wealthy, ruthless,
and determined, I believe that if we organize appropriately,
if we make better use of available intelligence, and if we
better integrate strategic, operational, and tactical efforts,
we have the advantage.
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CHAPTER 16
PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE FOURTH
DIMENSION: A REALITY CHECK
David M. Crane
You can never plan the future by the past.1

Introduction.
The revolution in military affairs (RMA) has not yet been
fully accomplished. There is still room for an honest
assessment of how Department of Defense (DoD) will decide
to fight the wars of the 21st century. A reality check is
needed. As a global power, the United States is not in an
enviable position. The United States will have to be
prepared to engage in armed conflict in all environments
and dimensions.2 Until the recent Balkan crisis, conflict
occurred in only three dimensions—air/space, land, and sea.
To these must now be added a fourth, that of cyberspace.
Future conflict will range from tribal scuffles to computer
network attacks.3 Planners will have to field a trained and
ready force that can deal with a warlord, an industrial-age
tyrant, and a cyber terrorist or cyboteur.4 Force planners
will have to conceptualize, train, and equip this force. The
hard part in all of this will be to strike a balance that allows
the United States to fight and win in all four dimensions. We
may not be ready to do this, yet.
The information age has arrived and has almost left the
military establishment behind.5 Five years ago information
warfare was a concept new to the Pentagon, a fascinating
idea tossed about in seminars and conferences alike.6 It was
little more than this, however. The concern at that time was
fighting and winning a two-theater war consisting of
industrial-age struggles fought in the traditional
three-dimensional manner. This is still a valid strategic
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issue. But now, as the fourth dimension reveals itself and
information warfare becomes a reality, the defense problem
becomes more complicated. We must now find a way to
balance our needs. How do we fight the cyber war of the
future while facing the traditional military threats of the
industrial age? Throw in the asymmetric challenges of
terrorism, international criminal cartels, and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), and the balancing act becomes
even more delicate.7 But to defend the national security of
the United States and its interests around the world, our
armed forces must update its thinking and capabilities, and
soon. In a practical sense, how can this be done?
There are two general (but certainly not all-inclusive)
needs that should be considered. First, thought should be
given to reform of the Planning, Programing, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) within DoD. Second, we need to consider
bolstering our intelligence community’s ability to provide
timely, all-source intelligence to face any threat, anytime,
anywhere. Let us consider these two needs in greater detail.
Reform PPBS.
The current 5-year budget cycle, created in the 1960s,
has served the needs of a three-dimensional industrial-age
armed force.8 With the advent of the information age and
the fast pace of technological development, as well as
changing missions and threats, this time-tested but
cumbersome process is not moving fast enough to allow the
armed forces to meet these new challenges.9
Weapon systems and programs coming online were and
are developed and fielded using technologies that may
already be dated or outmoded.10 Costly modifications and
changes become necessary during the development of the
system and afterwards during the fielding of that system.
The relevant technology is simply changing too fast for DoD
to handle.11 Reform may be needed.
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Congress and DoD have undertaken several initiatives
to streamline this process through the Quadrennial Defense
Review, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee, the
Unified Command Plan, acquisition reform, better business
practices, and increased use of off-the-shelf technology.12
There appears to be an understanding, however, that the
process could and should be more efficient. Yet the entire
department is so linked to the current three-dimensional
process that wholesale functional and organizational
changes may be needed in order to rectify the problems.
Unfortunately, this may be just too hard to do.
Preparing the Defense Intelligence Community for
Four-dimensional Warfare.
The defense intelligence community faces two
challenges to its ability to provide timely all-source
intelligence to the combatant commands in all four
dimensions of warfare.13 These challenges relate to the way
the community is organized and to its ability to manage and
disseminate the information it obtains from numerous
collection sources and methods.
The intelligence community of the United States, largely
nonexistent until World War II, was organized to fight the
Cold War.14 It owes its birth mainly to President Harry
Truman, who realized early in his presidency that he
needed information on the many world events happening
around him, particularly as they related to the aggressive
policies of the Soviet Union.15 In signing the National
Security Act of 1947, Truman created the national security
structure that still exists today.16 The concept of centralized
intelligence was no longer a theory but reality. Over the
years the intelligence community has served this nation
well, in the shadows and out of the public eye, facing new
and unheard-of challenges. There were many successes and
some failures.17
As technology evolved, the collection capabilities of the
intelligence community increased manyfold, providing key
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information to policymakers and warfighters alike.18
Technology elevated the intelligence community’s role in
our nation’s defense against the Soviet threat. Before the
advent of the information age, which has given relatively
easy access to information to everyone, research and
development in imagery and cryptology moved the United
States into the forefront of information systems
technology.19 New agencies evolved to handle these new
collection methods.20 All of these agencies became a part of
the vast defense intelligence community. Designed to fight
the evil empire through functional organization, this
community is now facing serious organizational and
philosophical challenges as it tries to meet the asymmetric
threats and cyber wars of the future. It is a daunting
challenge.
Roughly centered on the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and the intelligence community management staff,
each of the intelligence agencies operates separately,
answering to either the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, or
both.21 Though the DCI heads the intelligence community,
the reality of it all is that the Secretary of Defense manages
and controls most of the intelligence assets. 22 The
organizational shortcomings of the intelligence community
posed substantial problems even when we faced the single
Soviet threat; it is still more of a problem today. Essentially,
the intelligence community is too large, too
compartmentalized, and unable to share the vast amount of
data it collects on a daily basis in a collaborative manner.
The DCI, moreover, continues to be head of the
community in name only. This hampers the ability of the
community to develop the kind of strong central focus it
needs as it faces the transnational, multi-dimensional, and
asymmetric threats of tomorrow. Driven by this historical
and still very real dichotomy, the community is approaching
these various asymmetric challenges in a fragmented and
patchwork manner, causing duplication of effort and
expense. Congress, through the Intelligence Committees, is
all too aware of this predicment and is becoming
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increasingly frustrated. Is it time for a wholesale
reorganization of the intelligence community? This course
has been studied, yet there have been no executive or
legislative remedies forthcoming. 23 Reorganizing the
intelligence community, it has been said, is like turning
around an aircraft carrier. It cannot be done quickly or with
a great deal of precision without assistance. It may be that
what is called for is something on the scale of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act (DoD Reorganization Act of 1986) to
move the intelligence community into the 21st century.24
Another challenge is the intelligence community’s
inability to manage and disseminate the vast amount of
information funneling into its receiving systems. To date,
the effort has been piecemeal. Attempts have been made to
secure collaboration in the development of various
collection and analytical tools, but they have not been
consistently managed or monitored.25
Technology is starting to become a threat as well as a
benefit.26 On the one hand, increasing technological
sophistication means that our ability to access and gather
information is increasingly being matched by our ability to
manage and disseminate it. This development will, over
time, reduce the problem alluded to in the preceding
paragraph.27 On the other hand, the increasing openness
and availability of information made possible by the
Internet have created new threats by reducing the relative
advantage once held by the U.S. intelligence community.
The information systems are also increasingly vulnerable to
penetration by state or non-state actors. Computer network
defense is becoming a key operational concern that all
policymakers and commanders must consider in their
planning.28
Conclusion.
There is no reason to regard these challenges as
insurmountable. Historically the nation’s armed forces
have succeeded in overcoming an endless succession of
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problems. New political, social, cultural, doctrinal, and
technical challenges have confronted our armed forces from
Valley Forge to Kosovo. What is needed now are new ideas
and initiatives enabling our nation to better deal with the
transnational threats and asymmetric challenges that will
assuredly face us in the years to come. It is to be hoped that
this chapter will generate creative thought and further
dialogue to assist DoD in its efforts to achieve such goals.
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CHAPTER 17
TERRORISM AND NATIONAL DEFENSE:
THE CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE
William Natter
I have spent a number of years working for
Representative Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority Member on
the House Armed Services Committee, during the course of
which I have had the chance to observe firsthand the
workings of Congress and think seriously about the issues
that concern us in the present book.1 I do not consider myself
an expert in the field of national security. However, I do
have a working knowledge of the matters at hand. I am on
even firmer ground when I speak about my place of
employment—Congress—and its inner workings. And it is
to this dimension of the problem that I will reserve my
comments.
I would like to present a perspective which both comes
from Congress and sheds light on it. To grapple with the
more important issues raised in this book, we should
understand the role and viewpoint of Congress. Such
understanding brings to light the pressures and
motivations that result in congressional action which, in
turn, affects national security, for better or for worse. Above
all other relevant observations, it is important to remember
that Congress is accountable—accountable for events,
accountable for explanations, accountable for the very
actions and decisions pursued by the various agencies of the
federal government. If any readers are skeptical on this
point, I would encourage you to join your congressman at a
town meeting so you can hear for yourself the variety of
questions, comments, and criticisms he or she is required to
address in 30-second responses. In terms of accountability,
this means that every 2 years elected representatives must
stand before their electorates and renegotiate their
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contract. For senators, it is, of course, every 6 years. And
each must stand in the shoes of his or her constituency,
represent their respective values, and judge the worthiness
of particular ideas or proposals—both proposals of response
and proposals of prevention.
For our present purposes, it is most important to
remember that congressional accountability includes what
I refer to as “accountability to the unreasonable.” Much of
the American public is extremely passionate about
protecting the homeland from terrorist attack or protecting
their sons and daughters from random acts of violence
abroad—and they demand answers. They demand action
and demand results. Members know this and respond
accordingly. American citizens often ask, what is being
done? What assurances do we have? How much money has
been spent? And, perhaps the most significant question,
have we as a nation done everything possible? To a member
of Congress, they ask, “Have you done everything
conceivably possible?” This last question leaves
representatives and senators vulnerable if, heaven forbid,
something catastrophic occurs. Consider for yourself the
difficulty of responding to such a question.
All of these questions require members of Congress to
seek results. Understanding these pressures goes a long
way towards understanding particular spending priorities
and congressional directives. Why are new initiatives
undertaken? Because they provide “answers.” Additional
money is given for research in chemical and biological
defense programs because it is an answer. The Marine
Corps’ Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force
(CBIRF) is created because it, too, is an answer. The
creation of the National Guard Rapid Assessment and
Initial Detection (RAID) team concept is an answer, as is a
proposal for additional spending for the Health and Human
Services’ Medical Strike Teams. All of these initiatives are
answers, as is the existence of more than 43 departments
and agencies claiming an interest in responding to a
potential terrorist threat or incident. All are responses of a
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sort. And, although I must admit that they may not
necessarily represent appropriate or effective responses,
they are something.
So what does this mean for actions that Congress might
take? In short, Congress needs a plan, and the more
comprehensive, the better. It needs to be a plan preferably
provided by a non-congressional source, such as from
members of the various federal departments or agencies, or
from business, academia, or the executive branch as part of
the President’s annual budget submission to Congress. The
more comprehensive the plan submitted, the more
favorably it will be received. If such a plan is not submitted,
mark my words, Congress will enact a version of its own. It
has been known to do this from time to time. Yet, if the
historical experience is any indication, I suspect a
congressionally-initiated response to terrorism would likely
prove to be a hodgepodge, inefficient, driven by
parochialism and partisanship at the expense of the
national interest, and thus ineffective. This would be
unfortunate.
Although I do not want to get in the position of
prescribing the response, let me mention a few points that
should be considered as part of any policy that is proposed.
First, there should be a greater awareness of the
problem at hand, and this awareness should be
institutionalized. For instance, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, with his
anti-terrorism initiative, is a case in point. Known as J-34,
the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Combating Terrorism
oversees the preparation of worldwide vulnerability
assessments for U.S. forces and installations. This office is
responsible for performing more than 90 assessments a
year, in addition to those performed by the individual
services. I would argue that this initiative has already
improved DoD’s force protection measures and command
awareness. It should continue, and General Shelton should
receive additional support from the highest levels of the
administration.
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Interagency training exercises represent another
method for improving our state of awareness. Such field
exercises should continue, and be repeated over and over
again. The participants in these exercises should invite
congressional representatives and staff in order to improve
executive-legislative branch relations. I had the benefit of
serving as an observer at such an exercise more than a year
ago in Norfolk, Virginia, one that proved to be a most
rewarding experience. However, readers may be surprised
to learn (at least I was) of the initial resistance I received
from officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The top participating FBI official said he did not want a
congressional staff member to be present. He particularly
did not want congressional staff at the standard closing
critique where discussion would invariably include a
discussion of “lessons learned.” Fortunately, the Special
Operations community recognized the potential value of my
participation and urged my involvement. The experience
has served me well in my official duties. If we believe the
service axiom, “We must train the way we fight,” then in
order to facilitate the availability of necessary resources,
the legislative branch must fully understand the
inseparable concerns of resource needs and resource
employment requirements.
Second, the president needs to take a greater
interest in this subject, and not just for speaking
engagements. I am talking about day-to-day operations.
The national coordinator for transnational threats, Mr.
Dick CLarke, sits on the National Security Council (NSC)
staff in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives
(PDD) 62 and 63. Clarke and his assistant, Ms. Lisa
Gordon-Hagerty, should be commended for their good work.
However, the NSC staff is advisory in nature. True
influence, true power—at least in the budgeting
process—and therefore true results must derive directly
from the president and not from an advisor. Future
presidents must be cognizant of this point. They should
make a habit of asking all cabinet secretaries for regular
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progress reports on the effort to address transnational
threats.
Third, we need to rethink legislative and
regulatory oversight, modifying and updating the
existing statutes, if necessary. Again, I do not pretend to
be an expert in this area, but would implore such
individuals as Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, Richard
Marshall, Spike Bowman, and those with comparable
experience to assist with the exploration of needed and
feasible improvements. It is easy to sit in one’s office and
make a policy determination based on the facts at hand. It is
a little more difficult, however, to anticipate the subsequent
interpretation and implementation of statutory fixes. On
such a complicated issue involving the convergence of
national security, law enforcement, and intelligence
involvement, it is important for us to examine legal issues
with great care. If the information age has brought with it a
need for updated laws, then let us examine the proposals.
But, again, Congress will need to receive convincing
testimony from noncongressional sources prior to approval
of any far-reaching statutory revision.
My fourth and final point concerns the pursuit of
structural reforms. Structural reforms are needed,
perhaps on the scale of the DoD reforms of 1986. That
is, perhaps we need a “Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act”
equivalent for the defense, intelligence, and law
enforcement communities. As we have heard, there is a
need for a “cross-pollination” of expertise. Perhaps we
should establish programs whereby mid-level professionals,
from intelligence, DoD, FBI, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the State Department, etc.,
are required to spend 2- to 3-year stints in positions outside
their agency of origin, further mandating that such a joint
criterion be a prerequisite for promotion. Such a
requirement would certainly get the attention of the
national security and law enforcement communities and,
moreover, elevate the issue of transnational threats within
their respective departments or agencies.
235

Perhaps we could open further the DoD senior service
schools to these same individuals, and establish exchange
programs for mid-level U.S. Government professionals and
members of the business world as well. It may well be that at
this juncture such ideas are a bit premature and that more
time is needed for the prerequisite bureaucratic and
cultural “percolation.” But the idea of cross-pollination
certainly has gained a greater audience since I first
discussed it with National Defense University professor
Bard O’Neill a few years ago. I suspect the idea will continue
to gain support. Perhaps it and the other proposals will soon
receive the necessary consideration. In any event, I would
not delay for a universal consensus to coalesce in the
executive branch, thus causing Congress itself to take the
lead.
In conclusion, I will echo earlier sentiments: “So many
questions, so few answers.” Still, the four points for
consideration mentioned above must be addressed before
we embrace any proposed solution.
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CHAPTER 18
NEW INSTITUTIONS AND NEW WAYS
OF OPERATING
Jeffrey A. Hunker
Introduction.
The U.S. economy is now an information economy. The
Commerce Department reports that during the mid-1990s
over one-third of U.S. economic growth originated in
information technology fields; no doubt that percentage is
already much higher. Along with the benefits of this
development come some costs in the form of increased
dependency on secure and reliable cyber systems. Business
and government, including the military, have come
increasingly to depend on these networked systems.
Unfortunately, these systems are subject to deliberate
disruptions, theft, and outright attack. The perpetrators
can be pranksters, but they can also be terrorists, organized
criminal cartels, and hostile nation-states. Most break-ins
have been mere inconveniences, albeit costly; but the
potential for truly serious disruption is growing
exponentially.
President William J. Clinton has acted to protect our
cyber networks. In 1998 he called for a national cyber
defense strategy. Then in January 2000, he released version
1.0 of the National Plan for Information Systems Protection
(the National Plan).1 A month later he met with leaders of
the Internet industry to plan additional actions for cyber
security. In March 2000, he ordered federal departments to
take extraordinary steps to provide protection against
distributed denial of service attacks.2 Two fundamental
factors shape this program. First, cyber security is one
component of an overall redefinition of national security.
Second, cyber security poses an agenda that can be
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managed, but never solved. The program underway is only a
partial solution to the challenges, and much remains to be
done. These two factors shape not only those efforts that are
currently underway, but also the next generations of
initiatives for information systems protection.
Fundamental Rethinking of National Security.
Our agenda for cyber security represents a fundamental
rethinking of what we mean by national security, and how
we act to protect it. This rethinking is the consequence of a
complex shift of our enemies, our priorities, and our
vulnerabilities. In the past, national security has been
strictly a government responsibility. Military, diplomatic,
and intelligence assets protected the United States against
overseas threats. Law enforcement—carefully excluded
from playing any role in national defense—was employed to
defend the United States against domestic threats. The
threats were usually well defined—they emanated from
country X or group Y. U.S. business had almost no direct
role.
The emerging threat of cyber attack turns this paradigm
upside down. The private sector—U.S. corporations—has to
solve this problem in partnership with the federal
government. Like the Internet itself, no single organization
is responsible for the security of our cyber systems.
However, since most of the critical information systems are
owned and operated by the private sector, they must share
in the responsibility for defending them. This responsibility
cannot be regulated. The fast pace of Internet developments
precludes such a traditional approach. Furthermore, the
anonymity afforded by networks, and their international
reach, complicates the task of making a clear, a priori
identification of emerging threats. As in the recent
distributed denial of service attacks, it may be some time
b efore we k n ow the s our c e or i ntent of the
disruptions—foreign or domestic.
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One thing stands clear—the nature of threats to our
nation, in the domestic sphere in particular, has changed.
This is forcing the United States to reexamine its
traditional views of national security and the way it is
organized to face threats. As the chief law enforcement
organization, the Justice Department will play a leading
role in facing the security challenges of critical
infrastructure protection, terrorism, and the threat from
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The private sector has
a major role to play in working with the Department on
these issues. With its special role as the voice of business,
the Commerce Department serves as a central point of
contact and coordination with the private sector. It is
supported by other departments and agencies which enjoy
special relationships with individual sectors, as for example
the Department of Energy does with the energy sectors of
the nation.
The Emerging Agenda.
The National Plan lays out ten programmatic
initiatives.3 New institutions, and new ways of operating,
are being developed by both the federal government and
leading industries to address the new responsibilities and
challenges. The ten initiatives can be condensed into the
following five broad areas: building an effective
public-private partnership; government as a model of
information security; education and training; research and
development; effective law enforcement and national
security capabilities. Let’s look at each.
Building an Effective Public-Private Partnership. Three
characteristics of the Internet dictate that a
federally-centered national program will fail: (1) most of the
Internet and networked information systems are in private
sector hands;4 (2) only the loosest structures oversee
Internet activity; and (3) the pace of Internet investment far
outstrips the established Federal regulatory pace. These
factors dictate a shared approach—a voluntary partnership
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between the federal government (in particular, the federal
national security community) and the private sector. What
drives the success of this partnership will be self-interest:
the recognition that the Internet needs to be secure and
reliable if it is to succeed as an e-commerce medium.
Core to this emerging partnership is the newly formed
Partnership for Critical Information Security, which brings
together over 130 Fortune 500 companies for joint action on
cyber security. Sectoral dialogue and cooperation are
fostered by a system of Federal “sector liaisons” in
appropriate departments (e.g., the Treasury Department
working with the banking and finance industries). New
ways in which trusted partners in business and government
can share threat and vulnerability information are being
developed—e.g., the Financial Services Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (FS/ISAC), which provides a
mechanism by which participating companies may
anonymously share incident and vulnerability data.
Government as a Model of Information Security. While
the private sector must take responsibility, the federal
government can provide models and leadership. The federal
government can exemplify cutting-edge best practices and
drive the deployment of new technologies. This agenda
includes the following topics:
• Building a Trained Organization reflects the
desperate shortage of trained Federal cyber security
experts.
• Developing a Framework of Best Practices that
federal agencies and departments (and those outside the
federal government) can apply. Unfortunately, there is no
commonly accepted framework now.
• Vigilance against Vulnerabilities is a dominant
goal as large and complex organizations proceed to identify
and prioritize their information security needs. For the first
time, Federal civilian agencies are being directed, with
generally inadequate resources, to improve cyber security.
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Again, there exists no accepted and fully adequate
methodology for accomplishing this.
• Sharing Information across federal agencies, with
non-Federal security organizations (e.g., the
Carnegie-Mellon CERT), and with the private sector.
• W a r n i n g , R e s p o n s e , a n d R e c o v e r y. T h e
Government Civilian Agency Computer Emergency
Response Center depends heavily on the capabilities of
Carnegie-Mellon, and is still developing an effective
protocol for alerting and sharing information among
Federal agencies.
• Resources and Accountability remain major
challenges, which may require fundamental reforms to
address. Federal budgeting, on both the executive and
congressional sides, does a poor job of addressing
cross-cutting needs that are not directly linked to
organizational mission. To address Y2K reprogramming
requirements, for example, both Congress and the executive
branch created new exclusively dedicated mechanisms.5

Education and Training. The United States faces a
desperate nationwide shortage of workers skilled in both
information technology in general and cyber security in
particular. The National Plan seeks to address this problem
by creating a series of educational and training initiatives.
These aim to bring into the federal government a cadre of
highly skilled information technology (IT) security
professionals and to upgrade the existing skills of IT
professionals within the federal government. However,
these Federal initiatives will not in themselves address the
nationwide shortages, and should be viewed only as pilot
programs for a much more extensive national commitment
involving substantial business participation.
Central to the educational iniatives of the National Plan
is the Federal Cyber Service “scholarship for service”
program. The concept is based closely on the 1958 National
Defense Education Act. In both NDEA and the current
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proposal, the government pays for the education and living
expenses of persons earning a bachelor’s or master’s degree
from an accredited university in the requisite fields, in
exchange for a commitment to serve with the federal
government for a stipulated period of time. Preliminary
discussions with a number of universities are underway.
Research and Development. To preserve U.S. cyber
security, it is vital that we retain our technological edge,
hence the need to foster Research and Development (R&D).
Two major R&D actions are underway or proposed. First,
Federal R&D spending for cyber security is being increased
35 percent in the 2001 FY Federal budget—to $606 million.
Most of this will be directed to Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA)6 and the National Security
Agency. Proposals have also been made to increase support
for certain civilian R&D programs, such as the National
Institute of Standards and Technology at the Commerce
Department. The increases proposed are substantial,
although they would be added to a very small base.
Second, industry and government are working together
to design a new Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (IIIP). The IIIP is necessary because existing
federal and private R&D programs still leave gaps in the
national cyber security research portfolio. The Y2K episode
amply illustrates this problem. A concern arising from the
widespread remediation of computer systems was that a
malicious code might also be inserted into the systems. It
would have been very useful had some automated process
for detecting such a malicious code been available. However,
neither government agencies nor private sector sources
engaged in R&D were developing such tools. Researchers in
the private sector had neglected this area of investigation
because there was no market demand for such a product.
The public agencies had neglected it because they could not
see how such a product would help them fulfil their
missions. Yet everyone agreed that such a product would
have been extremely useful. Clearly there is need to develop
a new kind of R&D institution that focuses on issues
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neglected by existing federal programs and market-driven
R&D.
IIIP would concentrate primarily upon funding,
coordinating, and integrating research on advanced science
and technology areas that are not being addressed through
existing industry or government programs. It would not
compete with industry. It would fund top-quality basic
research. It would also fund and/or conduct more applied
activities such as modeling and identifying vulnerabilities
in U.S. information infrastructure systems and providing
testbeds for information assurance technologies. To meet
these needs, the Institute would:
• Have only a small expert staff. The Institute would
carry out its missions by funding and tasking existing
organizations or groups, operating in a manner similar to
DARPA.
• Supplement, not absorb, existing research. It
would coordinate its information infrastructure protection
activities closely with ongoing efforts in the U.S.
Government, the private sector, and academia. The
Institute would also provide demonstration and
development support for key foundations of cyber assurance
such as benchmarks and standards, provision of testbeds,
and curriculum development.
• Have close working ties to both industry and
concerned Federal agencies. To ensure coordination
and relevance to Federal priorities, the Institute would
report to a federal Coordinating Council consisting of
principal science and technology leaders. The Institute
would also seek industry guidance from the National
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) and Sector
Coordinators. Private corporations and Federal agencies
would be encouraged to fund and support projects or to lend
in-kind support.

Effective Law Enforcement and National Security
Capabilities. Unlike earlier national security issues,
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domestic law enforcement and overseas defense
responsibilities may be difficult to disentangle. This
requires coordination and information-sharing between
previously separate organizations. It also requires new
structures and capabilities. These include:
• The National Infrastructure Protection Center.
This is designed to fuse defense, intelligence, and law
enforcement capabilities for threat analysis and warning,
and incident response and investigation. Though part of the
FBI organization, the NIPC has substantial staff from the
defense, intelligence, and other law enforcement agencies.
The eventual goal also includes a close operating
relationship with local and international resources, and
with the private sector.
• Intrusion detection monitoring systems. These
are intended to provide additional warning and notice of
illicit system activity. The Department of Defense (DoD) has
already invested significant effort in creating a series of
systems, integrated through the Joint Task
Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND). Federal
civilian agencies would be protected under a proposed
parallel system, the Federal Intrusion Detection Network
(FIDNET). However, the technological currency and
functionality of these systems need to be improved. The
National Plan proposes to undertake new research to
improve on the existing DoD technology. The ultimate goal
is for a proven intrusion detection system to migrate to the
private sector where it can protect key corporations.
• Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs) or Computer Security Centers. In networked
environments, it is critical that information about
vulnerabilities and threats be shared among key network
players. Historically, both legal and administrative
concerns have largely prevented such interchange. ISACs
are mechanisms to facilitate such information exchange,
whether among corporate members only, or between the
private sector and the federal government. The Financial
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Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(FS/ISAC) mentioned earlier is one model—providing
anonymous information exchange among participating
banks and financial institutions. Computer security centers
for telecommunications, the Internet community, electric
power, and oil and gas companies are also either in early
stage launch, or under development.
Challenges of the Future.
Ongoing initiatives in the five areas described above—
public-private partnership, government as a model,
research and development, education and training, and
enhanced law enforcement and intelligence
capabilities—capture most of the activity now underway as
part of the National Plan. This work, however, is only the
beginning. Major challenges remain in our efforts to deal
with transnational threats. Among the principal
outstanding unresolved issues are the following:
An Agenda for the Federal Government. Government
organization is in need of fundamental restructuring in
several areas.
• Government Decisionmaking that Matches
Internet Speed. Budget cycles and technological cycles do
not coincide. Internet “years” run from 2 to 3 calendar
months. Sometimes, the actual level of funding remains
uncertain until well into the current fiscal year—when a
final budget deal between Congress and the president is at
last agreed to. Moreover, there is no assurance that funding
from fiscal year to fiscal year will be sufficiently predictable
to support consistent program planning and
implementation.
• Reorganizing and Clarifying Responsibilities.
Interagency cooperation and coordination remain
inconsistent at best. National defense, intelligence, and law
enforcement must find common ground. The founding by
President Clinton of the National Infrastructure Protection
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Center was an important step on the way to providing
operational coordination. Unfortunately, it has not yet
generated the intended result. In the area of policy
coordination, there still is no single official accountable for
cyber security within the federal government, or even
within the civilian Federal agencies. A vigorous discussion
of this deficiency is underway within Congress and the
executive branch. To date, however, no solution is in place.
• Increasing Effective Effort. The president has
requested over two billion dollars in support of the National
Plan for fiscal year 2001, which would double the amount
spent 3 years earlier. In addition to increased resources,
spending is proportionately shifting towards civilian
agencies. In FY 2000, 90 percent of the cyber security
budget was in national security accounts; for FY 2001 the
corresponding proportion is 75 percent. These proportions
are moving in the right direction. However, many Federal
agencies still do not receive adequate funding. Nor is there a
system in place to make sure that funds will be allocated for
the best uses.
• Articulating Clear Goals to Shape Technology
and Commercial Market Development. The federal
government has not yet presented to industry a unified
vision of our national security needs. The potential for
government leadership through procurement and the bully
pulpit is large but untapped. While the government
constitutes only a small part of the overall market, it is also
the largest single customer. In a network environment,
particularly in defense procurement, the federal
government has an extraordinary ability to shape the
eventual development of standards or interoperability
protocols7 that will eventually be adopted by the rest of the
economy and, arguably, by the rest of the world. For
example, government research and procurement play key
roles in shaping the ongoing evolution of intrusion
protection systems and public key infrastructure (PKI)
systems. An interoperability standard for different vendor
offerings is needed in both these technologies. Were the
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federal government better organized, it might be able to
assert a leadership role.
• Intelligence Collection and Analysis for
Ambiguous and Asymmetric Threats. National security
threats to the United States will change. They will
increasingly come to share several common characteristics.
First, the means used by those threatening the United
States will not be conventional nation-state force projection
(missiles, bombers), but forms that are both cheaper to
develop and whose sources are harder to identify (cyber,
chemical, biological). Second, the targets will likely be
homeland assets, in particular commercial and economic
infrastructures. Third, the threats will come from a far more
diverse group of enemies, be they terrorists, organized
criminals, or isolated individuals of whatever mental or
political persuasion.

The expanding range of these ambiguous and
asymmetric national security threats challenges the Cold
War intelligence system—which was adept at counting
missiles and tanks, but was not designed for these
amorphous, low-profile, and shifting threats. There is a
fundamental need for a thorough review of our intelligence
and law enforcement information-gathering, analysis
assessment, and distribution systems.
An Agenda for Industry. W e m u s t a d a p t
risk-management techniques to cyber security. Insurance
and audit tools are well-established mechanisms by which
companies and organizations assess and manage their
exposure to various risks—financial, legal, natural, and
commercial. Legal and management practices dictate that
these concerns rise to the Board of Directors and senior
management. To date, only very limited progress has been
made in extending these techniques to the management of
cyber security threats. A number of factors slow the use of
risk-management techniques—the absence of a widely
accepted benchmark of cyber security practices defining
“due diligence,” the need for management education, and
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the absence of a compelling legal or liability regime
addressing cyber security risks.
Arguably, however, the widespread extension of
insurance, audit, and other commercial risk-management
techniques to cyber security is the single most powerful
force for improving network security. The National Security
Council and others in the federal government are
aggressively working with these risk-management
communities to help extend the use of these techniques.
Difficult issues emerge in regard to cyber security
insurance. For example, most insurance is void under acts
of war.8 Yet what is war in an information systems
environment? Such issues, spanning legal, policy, and
economic concerns, may have significant ramifications for
the eventual form of the market for cyber security
insurance.
Joint Federal-Private Sector Concerns. Several relevant
concerns are unique neither to the federal nor to the private
sector, but rather are shared between the two.
• A System for Cyber Reconstitution. Work
addressing Y2K concerns helped to illustrate that
widespread or system-wide computer failures would have
devastating effects on the nation. Such work also concluded
that effective computer system reconstitution and
rebuilding will require coordinated responses across both
Federal and private sector communities, with the private
sector having to contribute much of the expertise and
resources. Unfortunately, the nationwide system required
for such a coordinated response does not exist. While the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has the
authority and capability to coordinate non-cyber disaster
relief, there is no agreement or system in place for a
corresponding cyber incident. Nor are the legal
underpinnings for coordinated national cyber
reconstitution in place. Federal decisionmakers are not, at
the moment, clear as to how key statutory measures,
especially the Defense Production Act and the Stafford Act,
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should be applied to address the consequences of a cyber
attack.
• Expanding the Educational Agenda. Cyber
security needs to become a factor in corporate, legal, and
government decisionmaking—reflecting the reality that
secure and reliable information systems have now become a
fundamental necessity of U.S. commerce and governance.
Law and business schools should include courses on
transnational threats in their curriculums. America’s
future decisionmakers must be educated on such issues,
irrespective of whether their careers are in the public or
private sector. Transnational threats are not a matter of
concern for the government alone, nor are they merely a
technical concern.
• Creating a Legal Framework for Cyber security.
How we deal with information that resides on these
networked systems and prepare for and react to system
failures raises complex legal and policy issues. One critical
and contentious area is how both public and private sector
activities affect privacy interests. Other issues include: How
will courts determine and apply standards for liability?
What levels of due diligence exist for information security
challenges? How should lawmakers generate new policy
options in this highly technical environment? The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and other key
statutes need to be carefully reexamined in light of the rise
of more sophisticated cyber threats and the development of
new technology. There are even more basic and unanswered
legal issues affecting privacy, security, and liability in an
environment of growing cyber security threats.
• Who is “us”? The cyber security agenda is manifestly
international in scope. Yet, while government and industry
must work together to deal with cyber security threats, it is
not clear which corporate citizens should be considered as
part of the U.S. security establishment. To enhance
security, information of a sensitive nature (classified or
unclassified) may have to be passed on. But to whom?
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Should we base our decision on whether or not potential
recipient companies are U.S.-chartered? What if they are
multinational in nature? This issue is of long standing, and
no good framework for addressing it appears to exist.
Conclusion.
The agenda for cyber security is still under construction.
New organizational structures must be developed, the legal
framework for further public-private partnership must be
built, challenging international issues must be addressed.
The National Plan is subtitled “An Invitation to a Dialogue”
for the very good reason that significant work remains to be
done in building the framework for a new national security
partnership.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 18
1. The National Plan for Information Systems Protection, Version
1.0: An Invitation to a Dialogue, Washington, DC: The White House,
January 2000. Available at www.ciao.gov.
2. A “denial-of-service” attack is an attempt by attackers to prevent
legitimate users of a service from using that service. See
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html#1
3. These are (1) identify critical infrastructure assets and shared
interdependencies, and address vulnerabilities; (2) detect attacks and
unauthorized intrusions; (3) develop robust intelligence and law
enforcement capabilities to protect critical information systems,
consistent with law; (4) share attack warnings and information in a
timely manner; (5) create capabilities for response, reconstitution, and
recovery; (6) enhance research and development in support of programs
1-5; (7) train and employ adequate numbers of information security
specialists; (8) conduct outreach to make Americans aware of the need
for improved cyber security; (9) adopt legislation and appropriations in
support of programs 1-8; and (10) ensure the full protection of American
citizens’ civil liberties, their rights to privacy, and their rights to the
protection of proprietary data.
4. A frequently cited statistic is that 90 percent of networked
information systems are non-federal; the factual basis for this
statement is unclear, but it is probably not a bad guess.
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5. These included the Special Assistant to the President for Y2K
(John Koskinan), with responsibilities for coordinating Federal and
national Y2K preparedness, and the special Senate Y2K appropriations
subcommittee chaired by Senator Bennett. Both institutions cut across
the preexisting divisions of responsibility.
6. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is the
central research and development organization for DoD. It manages
and directs selected basic and applied research and development
projects, and pursues research and technology where risk and payoff are
both very high and where success may provide dramatic advances for
traditional military roles and missions and dual-use applications.
7. Common protocols are currently being developed in order to
promote the evolution of the Web and ensure its interoperability. The
challenge is to make the Web accessible to all by promoting technologies
that take into account the vast differences in culture, education, ability,
material resources, and physical limitations of users on all continents.
8. This is a requirement of many reinsurers.
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